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THE

WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER

1870

^O'i T t

THE

WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER

1870

ITS POLITICAL AND HILITABY HI8T0BT

W. RirSTOW

coLOim. m THx swbbs abut; vorxbrlt gaftaih in thi phvosiax Ktatr; rowokaiit

mOIBSB OF THX SWSDIBH BOTAL ACAODfT OV WAR

Airthor of * T1i« BuUer (>uiipolgiw of Napoleon Botu^Mrte ;** The Oennaii MUltMT
DletlonuT :' • Hie Stntegy of the Nlnrtee n tti Century.' etc etc.

TRAN8LATBD FROM THE GERMAN BT

JOHN LAYLAND NEEDHAM

LICUTEirAlIT ROYAL MARIKB ARTILLERY

IN THREE VOLUMES

VOLUME 11.

WILLIAM ^LACKWOOD AND SONS

SDINBUKGH AND LONDON
MDGCGLXXII

CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

CHAP. PAOK

XVII. THE COUNTRT FROM THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF

THE MEUSB TO PARIS, 1-12

Boundaries of the district— The hill-country of Lorraine
— The Argonnes and the Ardennes— The Meuse— <The
Aisne— The Aire— The Seine— The Aube — Fortresses on
the Meuse — Verdun— Sedan— M^eres— Givet — Rocroy
— Fortresses on the Chiers — Carignan — Montm^y —
liongwy— Fortresses on the Aisne — Soissons — ^La F^
— Laon — On the Mame — Vitry — Chalons — Camp of Chal-
ons — ^Railways in the district.

XYIII. CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY OF PARIS UNDER
MARSHAL M'MAHON IN THE CAMP OF CHALONS
— ^MAROH OF M'mAHON NORTHWARDS TO RE-
LIEVE BAZAINE, 13-24

Mobiles assembled in the Camp— Troops of the 6th
Corps remaining there— Fonnation of a 12ih Army Corps
— Its composition— Retreat of the 7th Corps after W5rth
— Of the 6th Corps— Tilliard's brigade of cavalry— Sava-
res8e*8— State of MHiiahon's army— M'Mahon marches
northwards — His change of intention when he hears
that the Germans have turned north — Faults of the ex-
ecution of the original project

XIX. ADVANCE OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH ARMIES
(QERMAN) AGAINST THE CAMP OF CHALONS —
CHANGE OF THE DIRECTION OF THEIR LINE OF
OPERATIONS ON INTELLIGENCE BEING RECEIVED
OF THE DEPARTURE OF M'MAHON, . . 26-32

Formation of the Fourth Army (German) — Its advance
upon Chalons — Attempt upon Verdun — Capitulation of
Vitry— Affair at Epeuse— Proclamation of the King of

VI CONTENTS.

Prussia— Advance of the Third Army—Chalons occupied
— The Gennan Armies change front to the north.

XX. THE BKIRMIBHES OF BUZANCT OK THE 27TH OF
AUGUST AND OF NOUART ON THE 20TH OF
AUGUST, AND THE ENCOUNTER AT BEAUMONT
ON THE 80TH OF AUGUST, .... 33-42

Movements of the Saxon Corps on the 26th of August
—On the 27th— Of the French Corps on the 2»th— Posi-
tions of the Germans on the 29th — Orders for the SOth^
Encounter at Beaumont— Retreat of De Failly.

XXI. THE BATTLE OF SEDAN ON THE 1ST OF SEP-

TEMBER, 43-76

M'Mahon concentrates round Sedan — Orders of the
King of Prussia on the evening of the 80th of August-
Positions of the Fourth Army on the evening of the Slst
—Advance of the Third Army on the Slst— Attack on
Bazeilles— Orders of the Croim-Prince for the 1st of Sep-
tember — Orders of the King of Prussia for the night from
the Slst to the Ist— Position of M'Mahon — Commence-
ment of the battle of the 1st of September — Struggle for
Bazeilles — Bazeilles taken by 10a.u. — M'Mahon wounded
— Is succeeded by Ducrot — General von Wimpffen —
Movements of the Sazon Corps— Of the Prussian Guard
—Action on the Gennan left wing up to 11 a.m. — ^Ways
of escape open to WimplTen — Order to retreat upon Sedan
given at 4 km.— Wimpffen attempts to force a way for
the Emperor— Is repulsed by the Bavarians and 8th
Corps — Movements of Prussian Guard after 11 A.M. —
Movements of the German left wing after 11 ▲.![. — Napo-
leon capitulates at 5 p.m. — Napoleon's letter to the
King of Prussia — Capitulation concluded — Terms of the
capitulation — French losses — German losses — Import-
ance of the surrender of Napoleon — Interview of Napo-
leon with Bismark — and with the King of Prussia.

XXII. PARIS AT THE END OF AUGUST AND IN THE

BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER THE REPUBLIC

DECLARED, 77-127

Tone of the Paris journals— General Trochn— The Com-
mittee of Defence— Works initiated by Trochn— State of
the fortifications and armaments of Paris — Gairison of
Paris — Means taken to provision the capital — Difficulties
of the task — ^Raid on the demi-numcU on the 28th of Au-
gust—Expulsion of Germans — Sitting of the Corps Legis-

CONTENTS.

Utif on the afternoon of the 8d of September— How the
news of Sedan was reeeiyed in Paris— Midnight meeting
of the Chamben— Jnlee FaTre's motion— Palikao's pro-
clamation — ^Meeting of the Chambers on the 4th of Sep-
tember — Palikao*8 motion— Thiers's proposition — Mob
enters the Palais Bonibon— Republic proclaimed at the
Hdtel de Yille— Dissolution of the Corps Legislatif and
of the Senate— National Guard and mob take possession
of the Tnileries— Flight of the Empress — Composition of
the Qoremment of National Defence— Antecedents of
Fourichon— Of Le Flo— Of Gambetta— Of K€ratry— Of
Steenackers— Of Cr€mieux — ^How would the revolution
affect the prospects of peace f — Change of feeling in Ger-
many — Institution of the Govemments-General of Alsace
and Lorraine— Arguments against the annexation of these
proYinces by Germany— Circular of Jides FaYTfr— Jour-
ney of M. Thiers to visit the Great Powers.

THB MARCH OF THE GERMANS UPON PARIS —
THE INVESTMENT OF PARIS — ^THB CONFERENCE
OF FEREOERBS, 128-159

Advance of the Third and Fourth Armies upon Paris—
Capitulation of Laon— Explosion in the Citadel— Plan
for the investment of Paris— Resistance offered to the
Third Army— Reconnaissance of General Ducrot on the
19th September— Germans occupy the intrenchment at
Villejuif— Sortie of the 80th of September— Description
of Paris — Its population — Daily consumption of the
capital — Course of the Seine— Rulways leaving Paris-
Fortifications of Psris- Heights round Paris— Detached
forts round Paris — Conference between Jules Favre and
Bismark — Conditions demanded by the latter— Failure
of the negotiations— Delegation of the Government sent
to Tours— Proclamation by the Delegation— Answer of
Count Bismark.

XXIV. TAKING OF THE FORTRESS OF TOUL,

Formation of the Idth North German Army Corps —
(Harrison of the Fortress of Toul— Institution of the
Government-General of Rheims— Bombardment of Toul
—Preparation of siege-batteries— Surrender of TouL

160-164

XXV. THE SIEGE AND TAKING OF STRASBURO, •

History of Strasburg— Its population — Its situation —
Si«ge of the town — ^Railways leaving the town— Military

165-195

VIU

CONTENTS.

establishments in Strasbnrg — Its fortifications — Want
of detached works — (rarrison of Strasbuig — Antecedents
of Qeneral Uhrich — Composition of the besieging force —
Antecedents of General von Werder — Aigmnents .in
favonr of a bombardment — Its inexpediency in the case
of Strasbuig— Commencement of the bombardment — ^The
regular siege undertaken — Its progress — ^Taking of the
lunettes Nos. 52 and 58— Surrender of Strasbuig on the
27th of September— Number of rounds fired during the
siege — ^Terms of the capitulation — Destination given to
the 14th North German Army Corps.

XXVI. 8TATB OF THE WAR AT THE END OF THE

MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, .... 196-204

Destination given to the forces employed in the si^e
of Strasbuig— State of affairs before Metz — and before
Paris— The valley of the Rhone— Of the Loire— Char-
acter of the newly-to-be-fgrmed French forces — Cheerless
prospects for both parties.

XXVII. THE BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE ON THE 81ST OF
AUGUST AND THE 1ST OF SEPTEMBER, .

Forces before Metz reinforced by Kummer^s landwehr
division— Probable direction of any attempt of Bazaine
to escape — Positions of the German Coips round Metz —
Construction of a railway from RemiUy to Pont k Mous-
son — Prei>arations for the sortie of the 81st of August —
Position of Kummer*s division and the 1st Corps on the
evening of the 80th — Colombey taken at 9 A.M. on the
Slst— Kummer^s division attacked— Measures taken by
Manteuifel — Lyll of the fighting about noon — Its re-
sumption in the afternoon — Noisseville taken — Battle
subsides at 9 p.m. — Offensive again assumed by the
French at 10 p.iL — ^Recommencement of the battle on
the 1st of September — ^Attack on Noisseville — French
retire into Metz — Loss of the Prussians.

205-227

XXVIII. THE ENOOUNTERS AT WOIPPT ON THE 2D AND
7TH OF OCTOBER, .....

Position of Bazaine after the 1st of September —
Reasons for his inactivity — Germans expect him to break
out in the direction of Strasburg— Steinmetz resigns his
command — Small sorties made by the garrison of Metz
—Sortie on the 2d of October— On the 7th— Losses of
the Germans.

228-238

CONTENTS. IX

XXUL THE OAFITULATION OF BAZAINE, . . 239-260

State of affoin in Metz after the sortie on the 7th of
October— Total loes of the Army of Metz np to that
date — ^Amount of Bupplies remaining — Number of sick
— Council of war assembled on the 10th of October-
Its resolutions— Beyer's mission to Versailles— Inhabi-
tants of Metz placed upon a daily allowance of bread —
Failure of Boyer's negotiations — Second council of war
in Met^— Journey of Boyer to Chiselhurst — General
Changarnier — His mission to Prince Frederic Charles —
Final negotiations on the 26th — ^Terms of the capitula-
tion-Excitement on the announcement of it to the
army — ^Number of prisoners— Value of matSrid of war
— The two Prussian Princes made Marshals— How the
news of the surrender of Bazaine was receiyed in France.

XXX. PBOOEEDINOS OF THB OOYERNMENT OF NATIONAL

DEFENCE UP TO THB MIDDLE OF NOYEMBEB, . 261-281

Gtembetta sent from Paris to Tours — ^Employment of
balloons in France, and especially in Paris— Subteiranean
telegraphs — Messengers — Carrier - pigeons — Ingenious
coniaivance to enable them to carry long despatches —
Despatches by the water-courses — Gambetta undertakes
the Ministry of War— and of the Interior— Result of
Thiers's visit to the Great Powers — Conference between
Thiers and Bismark — Socialistic demonstration in Paris
on the 81st of October — Questi<m of reproTisioning Paris
— Failure of the negotiations.

XXXI. THE KECONSTBUOTION OF THE FRENCH ABMY, . 282-308

Measures adopted by Palikao's Ministry— And by the
(Government of National Defence— Decree of the 2d of •
November— Later decree — Division of levies into classes
— Number of men of various ages in France — Numbers
available in each class— Difficulties of collecting men
—Number of old soldiers forthcoming — Admission of
foreigners into the French service— Oaribaldi — Improvis-
ing of the various arms of the service— Infantry— Cavalry
— Artillery — Engineers — Four general governorships
established in France — Composition of the new Army
Corps — Formation of eleven camps — Their object — ^Want
of officers.

XXXIL MILITART EVENTS IN AND ABOUT PABIS FROM THE

1ST OF OCTOBER TO THB MIDDLE OF NOYBMBEB, 309-328

State of feeling in Paris after the failure of the con-
ference at Feiri^res— Means of reducing Paris— Circular

ZZXIIL

CONTENTS.

of Bismark — ^AveTsion felt throughout Bnrope to the idea
of a bombardment of Paris — Difficulties of attempting it
^Oomparative advantages of a regular siege — Sortie
from Paris on the 18th of October— Sortie on the 2l8t of
October— Le Bourget taken by the French on the 28th —
Betaken by the Prussians on the 80th — Paris in the
beginning of November— Three annies formed in Paris
— Task assigned to each, and their composition and
numbers.

KXTERPBISE8 OF THE OBBMAN CAYALBT IK THE
BNVIBONS OF FABIS,

Cavalry divisions detached on special expeditions —
direction given to the 5th division of cavalry — ^to the 6th
— ^Afiiair at Ablis — ^Ablis burnt down — ^Inexpediency of
such acts — ^Direction given to the 4th division of cavalry
— Country about the Loire — Toiin of Orleans — The
Sologne.

329-336

XXXIV. THE BNCOUNTEB AT ABTENAT — THE OOGUPATION
OF ORLEANS BT THE GBBMANSy AND ITS BEGON-
QUEST BY THE BATTLE OF COULMIEB, .

The French Army of the Loire — General de la Mot-
terouge— Von der Tann detached to the Loire ^Bn-
connter at Artenay on the 10th of October— Advance on
Orleans on the 11th, and its occupation— Be la Mot-
terouge superseded— General d'Aurelles de Paladine ap-
pointed to succeed him — ^Increase of the Army of the Loire
—Battle of Coulmier on the 9th of November— Retreat
of the Bavai'ians upon Artenay and Toury.

337-346

ZXXV. THE OPERATIONS IN THE EAST — ^ADVANOB OF THE
14TH QERMAN ABMT CORPS UPON THE OIONON,
AND THE BATTLE OF OIGNON ON THE 22D OF

OCTOBER, 347-363

Welder sends a column into the V osges — Difficulties
experienced— Formation of a 14th German Army Corps
— Instructions given to it— Engagement at Btival— Ad-
vance ui)on Epinal — Besanfon— Advance upon the Oig-
non— Battle of Oignon— Werder purposes advancing
upouDyon.

ZXXVL THE OCCUPATION OF DUON ON THE UST OF

OCTOBEB, 354-367

Advance of the Badensers upon Dyon— Defence of the
town organised— Death of Colonel I^uoonnet— Straggle

CONTENTS.

for St ApoUinaiie— Snirender of Dyon— Conditions of
the capitulation— Xioss of the Germans.

XXXVII. THB OPERATIONS OF THE 4TH RESEBVE DIVISION
— THB OAPTURB OF SOHLETTSTADT AND NEU
BBEISAGH, 358-361

The 4th landwehr diyision crosses the Bhine— Task
assigned to it— Schlettstadt — Siege commenced on the
22d of October— Schlettstadt surrenders on the 24th—
Neu Breisach and Fort Mortier bombarded on the 2d of
November — Fort Mortier surrenders on the 8th — Nen
Breisach on the 10th.

XXXVIU. THB OPERATIONS OF THB 14TH NOBTH GERMAN

ARMY CORPS DURING THB MONTH OF NOVBHBEB, 362-371

Belfort — Its intrenched camp— Its detached works—
The Fort Des Barres — Projected works on the Perche—
Treskow's troops appear before Belfort— Dijon reoecu-
pied by the French— General Bourdon— Werder sends
two columns southwards— Surprise at Chatillon.

XXXIX. THB EMPLOYMENT OF THB FIRST AND SECOND
GERMAN ARMIES AFTER THE FALL OF METZ —
THE CAPITULATION OF SOISSONS AND THIONVILLE,

Picture of the state of things in Noyember^The First
Army sent against the Army of the North — The Second
towards the Loire — ^The 2d Corps sent to Paris — Thion-
ville besieged by Kameke— Antecedents of Kameke —
Thionyille surrenders on the 24th of November— Verdun
bombarded and capitulates on the 8th of November—
Soissons on the 16th of October— Ham — La F^ and
Amiens occupied by the Germans.

372-388

P L A 1^ S.

I. THE BATTLE OF SEDAN, tO foce page
II. THB SIEGB OF STRASBURG, tO foce page

43
165

THE WAE

FOB

THE RHINE FRONTIER.

CHAPTER XVII.

THB COUSXBT VBOH THE NEIQHBOrBHOOD OF THE

MEUSE TO FABIS.

The district into which the events of the war now
lead us is roughly bounded thus : on the east by the
watershed between the Moselle and the Meuse; on
the north by the Belgium frontier ; on the west by
the Oise ; and on the south by the middle course of
the Seine.

K a man were to journey from the eaat towards the
Mense, he would remark that the hill-country of
Lorraine rises up towards the west. This uprising
forms a chain-lie edge on the right ba^k of id
Moselle, and similar eVevations corLpond to it on
the left of the river.

From Le Ch^ne le Populeux, as far as Bar le Due,

VOL. II. A

2 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

these heights are called the Argonnes, and to the
north of Le Ch6ne le Populeux, where they branch
away to the north-west to the Oise, the Ardennes ;
while sometimes these names are understood to
include also the corresponding ranges of heights on
the right bank of the Meuse. The elevated land,
again, which at some small distance from the Meuse
spreads itself out between the Aisne and its tributary
on the right, the Aire, is specially called the Wood of
Argonne ; whilst the heights between the Aire and
the Meuse, even past Bar le Due, as far as the points
where they branch off from the plateau of Langres
and the Faucilles, are named the Meuse Moimtains.

All these lime and chalk hills assume the form of
much-indented and wooded plateaux; and although
they only rise up to a height of about 1000 to 1200
feet above the level of the sea, they nevertheless,'
when seen from the monotonous plains of Champagne,
which have only an altitude of 400 to 500 feet, make
a very considerable impression on the observer.

Lately, agriculture, as well as cattle-farming and
industry, has made great progress in these districts^
Woods have been cleared away, and where, even at
the beginning of this century, only barely practicable
paths existed, good carriage-roads now run. Among
other places, this is the case also in the defiles of
Grandpr^, La Croix aux Bois, and Le ChSne le Popu-
leux, which Dumouriez, as late as 1792, called "the
ThermopylfiB of France."

COU]!n?RY BETWEEN THE MOSELLE AND PARIS. 3

The Meuse rises neax Doinmartin in the eastern
angle of the plateau of I^angres, where the FauciUes
branch off to the eastward from it Dnring its course
in France, which country it leaves at Givet, it runs
mainly in a direction from south to north in a narrow
and tortuous valley, shut in by steep and wooded banks.

The Aisne and the Aire, which run into it, flow
both from the Argonnes. The Aisne, which has been
formed into a canal for the greater part of its course,
and is connected with the Meuse by the Ardennes
Canal, runs into the Oise at Compi^gne, which river
again flows into the Seine.

The Seine, and its tributaries on the right, the
Aube and the Mame, all rise in the plateau of Langres,
and, foUowing at first the north-westerly slopes,
flow in broad valleys between its hills. At Troyes,
Brienne, and Vitry le Francais, they enter the arid
chalk-plains of Champagne in which their waters
have worn deep-cut beds, and of which Chalons on
the Mame may be considered the central point. The
aspect of these districts is very mournful, there being
but few villages and only a stunted vegetation.

The Aube, which empties itself at St Just into the
Seine, does not emerge again from- this plain ; but
the Seine and the Mame, issuing from it, soon enter a
hill-country, which, weU cultivated, attractive, smHing
with signs of plenty, and offering most varied land-
scapes, stretches away over Paris and around the
French capital, and aided in some parts by art, pre-

4 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER,

sents a peculiaxly chaxming appearance. As the
ea^ Waary of thU dMc(L may taic . line
drawn somewhere from Nogent on the Seine, by
Sezanne, Vertus, Mareuil, to the east of Epemay,
Sillery to the south-east of Rheims, Bery au Bac on
the^ Aisne, -and Laon to La Fhve on the Oise. In this
part of their course, also, the Seine and the Mame, and
the tributaries joining them, flow all in deeply-cut
channels.

In this whole district there is no lack of strongholds.
For the present we will leave the giant fortress of
Paris, which is worthy of a more minute description,
and occupy ourselves with the smaller places.

On the Meuse we have in the first place Verdun,
Sedan, M^zieres, and Givet.

Verdun, a town of 13,000 inhabitants, is included
in the Ust of fortresses of the first claBS. It lies on
both banks of the Meuse, which here divides itself into
five arms, by which the town is surrounded and tra-
versed, like as is Metz by the branches of the Moselle.
The citadel, a bastioned pentagon, lies altogether
upon the left bank of the Meuse, upon a slight rise in
the ground, and is connected by a retrenchment with
the fortifications of the town. Verdun has no de-
tached forts ; and as the valley, the sides of which
are high, closes in rather near to the town, it does not
now in any way fulfil the conditions required in a
fortxess of the fiL class.

Sedan, with 16,000 inhabitants, famous for its

TOWNS ON THE MEUSE. 5

cloth and machiiie manufactories, ranks as a fortress
of the second class. The town proper, with its forti-
fications, lies on the right bank of the Meuse ; and a
few advanced works secure the nearest heights. The
suburb Torcy, inhabited by operatives, stands upon
the left bank, surrounded by a long line of works.
Turenne was bom in Sedan.

M^zieres, with about 6000 inhabitants, is a fortress
of the second class, and has a citadel.

Givet, with 6500 inhabitants, is called a fortress of
the first class. It lies on both banks of the Meuse,
and was fortified by Vauban. The citadel, Charle-
mont, on an isolated hill 720 feet high, on the left
bank of the Meuse, was built by Charles V.

Rocroy, with 3000 inhabitants, is considered to
belong to the second class. It does not lie on the
Meuse, but about 4^ miles from it, upon a table-land
which is surrounded on aU sides by swamps and the
Wood of Ardennes. It is renowned in history as the
site of the victorious battle which the French fought
against the Spaniards on the 19th of May 1643.

On the Chiers, a tributary on the right of the
Meuse, stand Montm^dy, Carignan, and Longwy.

Carignan, with old fortifications and 2000 inhabi-
tants, belongs to the fourth class of fortresses.

Montmddy, 2200 inhabitants, and a fortress of the
second class, is composed of the lower town (Nieder-
stadt) in the valley of the Chiers, and of the upper
town (Oberstadt) upon a height above it, both on the

6 THE WAR FOR THE RHD^ FRONTIER.

right bank, and both surrounded with a continued
line which is strengthened by bastions.

Longwy, a fortress of the second class, with 3500
inhabitants, is a regular hexagon, on the right bank
of the upper Chiers, 23^ miles from ThionviUe.

On the Aisne we find Soissons, on the Oise La Ffere,
and between them Laon.

Soissons, the old Roman Noviodunum, with 11,000
inhabitants, has, as a passage across the Aisne, fre-
quently played a part both in ancient and in modem
military history. As a fortress it is in the present
day absolutely worthless, although it is kept in the
third class, and destined to receive a war garrison of
1700 men.

La Ffere, with 5000 inhabitants, a fortress of the
second class, is of some impoitance because of its school
of artillery and arsenal.

Even if La F^re can be called a fortress — certainly
a very insignificant one — ^the word can scarcely be
employed in speaking of the town of Laon, with its
10,300 inhabitants, although traces are still visible
of an old enclosing wall, and it is provided with an
ancient citadel, which was somewhat repaired by
Louis Philippe, and although it is numbered among
the places of the third class. The town itself, stand-
ing upon a detached height, is certainly admirably
Bilt^i for defeBoe.

Following now the course of the Mamc, we come to
yitry and Chalons.

CHALONS. 7

Vitry le Franjais has by old traditions always been
kept up as a fortress of the third or fourth class. After
the ancient town of Vitry en Perthois, at the junction
of the Omain and Vifere, was burnt down by Charles
V. in the year 1544, the community of Vitry le Brul^,
the present Vitry le Franjais, was founded by Francis
I. The town, which has now 8000 inhabitants, and
is favourably situated, being at the point where the
Rhine-Marne Canal branches from the river, has pre-
served its old fortifications, which have from time to
time been strengthened by the addition of earthworks;
still, even with these, it could not offer the slightest
resistance to the artillery of the present day.

The town of Chalons on the Mame, with nearly
20,000 inhabitants, a great manufactory of champagne,
although it grows none, and rich in everything con-
nected with the champagne trade, is not fortified.
When, in the year 1867, the French system of fort-
resses was subjected to a revision, which, however,
was by no means thorough enough, the idea was
originated of giving France a strong place in the
chrpagae ZiJior tte pu^V cheeking a
German invasion. For this Chalons and Rhemis were
especially deemed to be suitable; but the Govern-
ment wavered in its choice between the two, and in
the year 1870 there had been nothing more said of
its execution. Still Chalons must be here mentioned
as a military point, because of its nearness to the
great Camp which is called after it.

8 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The terrain of this Camp, which is situated about
seven miles to the north of the town of Chalons, between
the villages of Mourmelon, Gross St Hilaire, Suippe,
and La Cheppe, comprises about 12,000 hectares, or
about 46,000 Prussian ^norgens, or more than forty-
six square miles.*

The ground was bought by the French Grovemment
in 1867, at a price of 80 francs the hectare.t When
the price of a morgen or juchxirt^ in the average dis-
tricts of Germany or Switzerland, is thought of, it is
easy to imderstand what is meant by the epithet in
La Champagne PouiUeuse.

It has been calculated by some lovers of arithmetic,
that the area of the Camp of Chalons is 300 times as
great as that of the Champ de Mars in Pans ; and
that if it were cut up into strips three yards wide,
it would suffice to compose a girdle which would
encircle the earth.

The first troops quartered in the Camp of Chalons
were the Imperial Guard, under Regnault de St Jean
d'Angely, in 1 85 7. In the same year the railway which
connects it with the town was commenced, and in little
more than two months the line was completed.

From that time two or three series of French troops
have been encamped and exercised in the Camp every
year, each of them consisting of an Army Corps of
about three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry,
with the artillery appertaining thereto.

* About 29,640 English aczes. f About 26b. an acie.

THE CAMP OF CHALONS- 9

The mass of the troops were always under canvas,
and the horses stood, in the open ; but, naturally, a
number of permanent or half-permanent establish-
ments sprung up.

Depots for the forces and magazines were built^
bakeries and hospitals were established^ and the of&cials
of the administration were obliged to remain through
the winter. Quarters were erected on an elevated
spot for the Emperor and the General Staff; then
barracks were built which could receive a division of
infantry in the summer, and which in winter gave
sufficient acconmiodation for tiie brigade left to guard
the Camp and all pertaining to it during that season.

The village of Mourmelon consisted, prior to 1837,
of twelve miserable stone huts, which, if one takes
the trouble to search for them, are still to be found.
It has since developed into a species of town. En^
terprismg men established there shops and drink-
ing-bars of all kinds, to supply the various wants
of the soldiers in the summer and winter. They
built houses also, in which the officers who were
constrained to pass the inclement season there could
find some degree of comfort. An imperial theatre
was opened for the amusement of the soldiers, and
the Emperor caused his own actors to perform there.
The great brewer, Frau Dreher, sent there the
Vienna beer-booth which had been used in the
Exhibition of 1867. In short, an intelligent man»
who knew how to look about properly, could finally

10 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

find in Monrmelon aU he sought m weU aa in
Paris.

In countries where the civil and military element
stand in close connection, as is the case in Swit-
zerland and in Germany, men find it difficult to
comprehend to the full the value of the Camp of
Chalons to the French army. The Swiss and the
Germans manoeuvre everywhere where they wish.
The damage occasioned is afterwards very moderately
assessed* The owner of the land does not make
exorbitant demands ; and the troops carefully avoid
doing any useless or avoidable injury. Up to the
present time aU this has been very difierent in
France; aaid therefore extensive Ixacte of land for
purely military purposes are of greater importance.
Latterly, too, the value of the Camp of Chalons has
been increased by the circumstance that in most of the
garrisons there were no shooting-grounds long enough
for practice at the full range of the Chassepot. All
that the French army required for^its great exercises
could only be properly met with on the Catalaunian
fields.

The terrain, broadly considered, is a vast plain;
but still, slight elevations and waves of the ground
are not wanting to give concealment and cover to
troops, and there are heights also which afibrd good
positions for artillery. To make a little break in the
monotonous uniformity of the chalk - steppe, small
square groves of fir-trees have been planted here and

THB CAMP OF CHALONS. 11

there : these are numbered, and allow some variety
and change to be introduced into the manoeuvres.

The Camp of Chalons is also not fortified ; and, as
far as we know, this has never been intended, although
we have frequently heard from German sources that
such was the case. The only work on the ground
was the small fortification thrown up in 1870 near
the farm of St Hilaire, for the purpose of exercising in
siege operations.

As is well known, the site of the present Camp was
the theatre of the decisive battle which, in the year
451, the Neo Eomans under Aetius fought with the
Huns under Attila. The latter chief is said to have
had his right wing in the village of Suippe, and his
left in that of La Cheppe, near which, in the time of
the Romans, stood a small temple of Minerva, which
was converted by the Christians into a chapel of the
holy St Moritz, and was only pulled down in 1820.
Close to this runs the old Roman road from Rheims
to Bar le Due, now a good highway; To the south
of this road, and to the west of La Cheppe, the ruins
of the old circimivallation may still be seen, called
Attila's Camp, into which it is said the king of the
Huns retreated after his defeat. Aetius had his
right wing at Cuperly, the left towards St Remy;
and the hill on which the battle first began was the
elevation now called Piemont, which rises up about
90 feet above the plain, to the east of the road from
the town of Chalons to Suippe.

12 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

These notes may not be uninteresting, as, after
the first reverses in 1870, men of a poetical nature
asserted that, as in the year 451, so in the year 1870,
the invasion of the barbarians of the East would
succumb here to the civilisation of the West.

The principal lines of railway which we have to
consider in this district are, besides the Paris-
Strasburg line—

1. The railway from Paris by Creil, La Ffere, Laon,
to Rheims ;

2. From Paris by Crepy, Soissons, and Fismes^ to
Bheims ;

3. From Bheims to Epemay ;

4. From Eheims by Mourmelon, St Hilaire au
Temple, to Chalons on the Mame, — ^the last two,
tiierefore, join the Paris-Straaburg line;

5. From St Hilaire au Temple by St M^n^ould to
Verdun ;

6. From Eheims by Rethel to M^zieres, with con-
tinuations thence north-westwards by Avesnes to
Valenciennes, northwards by Givet into Belgium,
south-eastwards by Sedan and Montmedy to Thion-
ville;

7. From Soissons by Laon and Vervins into
Belgium; and

8. The line from Blesmes to the east of Vitry le
Fran9ais by St Dizier and JoinviUe to Chaumont,
joiniujg the Strasburg-Paris and the Basle-Paris
lines.

CHAPTER XVIIL

COKCENTRATION O? THE ARMT 0^ PABIS UNDEB MABSHAL
STMAHON m THE GAMP OF CHALONS — ^MABCH OF M'MAHON
NOBTHWABDS TO BELXEVE BAZAINB.

We have seen how ori^olly only the 6th Corps,
Canrobert, was assembled in the Camp of Chalons,
whei^B Le Vassor SorvaFs division of infantry, and Bd-
viUe's brigade of cavahy, which had in the first place
remained in Paris, joined it on the 1st of August

Shortly afterwards a number of the Mobile Guard
were also concentrated in the Camp of Chalons. The
main body of these was formed by the/18 battalions
of the department of the Seine. These Mobiles were
to be drilled and instructed in the Camp ; but the
carrying out of this intention was attended with
difficulties, as there was a lack of instructors and
of arms.

It has also been already related how Canrobert
hurried with three of his divisions of infantry to the
assistance of Bazaine. There remained then of the
6th Corps in the Camp of Chalons only the greater
part of Bisson's division, which had been obliged to

14 THE WAB FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

turn back at Frouard ; and of the cavalry of the Corps,
the two brigades of Tilliard and Savaresse under
General F^n^lon, for B^ville's brigade was still in
Paris.

When Palikao's Ministry came into office, it imme-
diately caused a new Corps to be completed, the for-
mation of which had been only in some slight man-
ner commenced before. This was called the 12th ;
and after this, all fresh embodiments were numbered
from this one — and thus there were formed, later on,
the 13th, 14th, &c., Corps.

The original field army had, as we have seen, but
seven Corps, besides the Guard; so that the 9th, 10th,
and 11th Corps were wanting. These never existed ;
and the only explanation that can be given of the
method of enumeration adopted is, that the Ministry of
Palikao wished to deceive the Germans, and perhaps
the French themselves. In this they did not at first
altogether fail ; but naturally, as soon as it came to real
work, the hollowness of the stratagem showed itself.

The command of the 12th Corps was given first
to General Trochu. After he was, on the 17th of
August, appointed Governor of Paris, it devolved on
General Lebrun, who had left Bazaine's army when
Marshal Leboeiif gave up his post a^ major-general.

The Corps was composed of three divisions of in-
fantry, Granchamp, Yassoigne, and Lacretelle, and of
Lichtlin's division of cavaby, which was strength-
ened by the two brigades, Vendeuvre and B^ville,

CONCENTRATION OF FRENCH FORCES IN CHALONS. 15

the latter of which, belonging originally to the 6th
Corps, has been frequently mentioned by us.

Granchamp's division consisted of two brigades of
together four provisional or inarching regiments, each
of three of the fourth battalions of the line regi-
ments.

Vassoigne's division was composed of two brigades
of together four regiments of marine infantry, which
had been originally destined for the expedition to the
Baltic and North Sea.

After the battle of Worth, M^Mahon retired with
his own Corps, the troops of the 7th Corps, and the
great reserve of cavalry which had joined him, by
Saveme (Zabem), first along the railway by Nancy,
upon Bar le Due. On the way he received the order
to take command of the Army of Paris, which was to
assemble in the Camp of Chalons, and which was to
consist of the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, and of
the part of the 6th Corps remaining there, which was
to be used to complete the other Corps.

M^Mahon now retired at first upon St Dizier and
Joinville, towards the railway from Blesmes to Chau-
mont, to draw in the part of the 7th Corps (Felix
Douay) which still stood in the neighbourhood of
Belfort, and to cover its movements.

By the 16 th of August, the 1st Corps, the command
of which had been given to Ceneral Ducrot in the
place of M'Mahon, and the 7th Corps were in the
Camp near the town of Chalons.

16 THE WAB FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The 6th Corps, De FaiUy, followed M*Mahon along
the railway by Nancy, and then retired southwards
by Mirecourt to La Marche and Montigny, towards
Chaumont It received on the way divers orders
from the headquarters in Metz : first it was directed
to march upon Toul ; then to move by any route it
pleased upon Paris ; and afterwards, when in the
vicinity of Chaumont, it was called into the Camp of
Chalons. Its main body was on the 1 8th of August
at Vitry le Franjais, about to march into the Camp
of Chalons.

On the 15th of August, TiUiard's brigade of cavalry
was sent to St M^n^hould. It was there placed under
the orders of General Margueritte, who commanded
the 1st brigade of Du Barrail's division (Chasseurs
d'Afrique) of the great Cavalry Reserve, and was
afterwards mortally wounded at Sedan. When the
brigade of Tilliard came into the vicinity of Metz,
it found the fortress already surrounded by the Ger-
mans, and thereupon retreated towards M^Mahon's
army again.

Savaresse's brigade, which alone had remained with
General F^n^lon in the Camp of Chalons^ was rein-
forced on the 1 7th of August by the 4th regiment
of Chasseurs d'Afrique, which had just arrived from
Algeria. General F^n^lon had thus, after this day,
three regiments of his division present, and with these
he, later on, followed the 12th Corps.

M'Mahon, or his present successor, General Ducrot,

CONCENTRATION OF FRENCH FORCES IN CHALONS, 17

had only about 22,000 men of the 1st Corps in the
Camp of Chalons : these had in a great measure lost
their knapsacks and a large part of their equipment
and baggage. The division of Conseil Dumesml was
in a similar plight.

The whole army which M^Mahon could concentrate
in those days in the Camp of Chalons may have
numbered about 120,000 men, infantry and cavalry.
We have often, in previous works, explained why we
adhere to this way of reckoning. It must be remem-
bered that by it we are always below the numbers
given by those who count in all, gunners instead of
^ eimeers. ta«n. all thelSeB of the ad-
ministrative services, and also, where possible, men
of the Sedentary National Guards, and other similar
formations, with our way of calculating, errors will
also unavoidably creep in, but in every case they will
be less important and less considerable than when
counting by the ration list, or when the numbers of
two opposing armies are given on different principles
—the one by the list of combatants, the other by the
ration list.

The comparatively numerous cavalry of M^Mahon
—about 12,000 horses— was good, and in a great
measure intact; but, in general, his army was not
worth as much as that originaUy placed in the field, or
as that which was now under Bazaine's orders in Metz.

The 1st Corps had been greatly weakened, both
materially and morally, by the battle of W&rth, and

VOL. IL B

18 THE WAR FOB THE BHINE FRONTIEB.

thd subsequent tiying marches. The same was trae
of Conseil Dumesnil's division. It was therefore re-
solved that the Mobiles who were then at Chalons
should make over their articles of equipment, espe^
cially their packs^ to these troops, and should be sent
back to Paris ; and accordingly they left the Camp of
Chalons on the 19th of August, and were concen-
trated for the time being in the Camp of St Maur,
near Paris.

The 5th Corps had entirely lost confidence in its
chief, General de Failly ; he was to be superseded by
General Wimpffen, recaUed from Afidca : but although
this general was in Paris by the 25th of August, he
only joined the army very late, and, as we shall see,
in the decisive hour of misfortune.

The 12th Corps had been somewhat hurriedly
gathered together, and could not possibly, however
good the individuals of whom it was composed might
be, have the same discipline that an older Corps would
have.

On the 17th of August the Emperor Napoleon
arrived in the Camp of Chalons from Verdun. He
greatly wished to repair to Paris ; but the Empress
Eugenie, as well as the Count of Palikao, counselled
him in a mannen so earnest that it amounted to
rudeness not to take this step. In Paris men spoke
no longer of the Emperor Napoleon, or of the Em-
pire; no one troubled Mmself any more about the
man or Ms concerns ; even the adherents of Imperial-

DOUBTS OP M'MAHON. 19

ism mentioned them with shame. Stilly spite of this^
and although Palikao had, with a loud voice, publicly
declared from the tribune that Bazaine alone, and
none other, commanded the armies of Fnmce, Napo*
leon III. was Emperor still, and still commanded.
If the Mobiles of Paris expressed their opinion of him
very candidly, and by their behaviour rendered his
sojourn in the Camp unpleasant, yet the marahals of
France still bowed down before him.

The great question now was. What was to be un-
dertaken with M'Mahon's army ?

The Duke of Magenta himself was agitated by
inward doubt. Without distrusting Bazaine, he was
still doubtful as to the actual state of affairs about
Metz; and it seemed to him unquestionably moro
reasonable to employ his army to cover Paris, and
rt the «une time to a.gm«.t L fo,<« by reWorc^
ments from the interior — ^for the formation of which^
the troops he still had would be an excellent nucleus
•"-— than to risk an attempt upon Metz, an ei^terprise
which could only have a promise of success if Bazaine
was really able to free himself from the iron embrace
of the Prussians.

Could he do that ? At one time M^ahon beUeved
he could, and then the matter appeared to him again
extremely doubtful. The Count of Palikao mean-
while urged continually by telegrams from Paris that
M^Mahon should march upon Metz to relieve Bazaine.
A retreat of M^Mahon upon Paris, he said, would

20 THE WAB FOB tHE RHINE FROKTIEB.

ineyitably be tlie signal for a revolution agsdnst the
Empire. At the same time he sought, upon the foun*
dation of imcertain reports, and by concealing and
veiling what he knew of the truth, to strengthen any
hope M'Mahon might have that Bazaine could break
out of Metz by way of Briey.

The Emperor Napoleon, as soon as he knew that
he could not venture to return to Paris, supported
Palikao's arguments, and M'Mahon made up his mind
to undertake the enterprise; but still he was only half
resolved.

On the 21st of August he set the 1st and 12th
Corps in motion northwards— in the first place, upon
Rheims. A day's march in rear, followed the 7th and
and 5th Corps.

Fdn^lon's division of cavalry had been sent, on the
20th of August, in the direction of Bar le Due, to ob-
tain news of the enemy. Returning, it rejoined the
army on the 23d at Betheniville, to the eastward of
Rheims, which was as far as M^Mahon had by that
date arrived.

On the 20th of August the Emperor had held a
review in the Camp, at which he had been very coldly
received.

On the 21st he repaired to Rheims, and established
his headquarters at Courcelles, to the north-west of
the town, near which he remained until the 25th,
when he moved to R^thel.

On the 24th of August, M^Mahon began to move

MARCH OF M^MAHOK TO RELIEVE METZ. 21

towardB E^thel ; thence, on the 26£h, he bent to the
eastward towards the Argonnes. His march lay at
first by ToTirteron to Le Ch6ne le Popideux.

Here M'Mahon received, on the 27th of August,
sure intelligence that the German armies had turned
away northwards from the Strasburg-Faris railway to
follow him— a movement which we shaU describe in
the following chapter. Upon hearing this, M'Mahon
wished to retire along the valley of the Aisne by
Bethel and Soissons upon Paris, and thus to return to
his former idea.

Orders to this effect were actually issued, and at
the same time M'Mahon informed Palikao of his in-
tention. In reply, he immediately received directions
from him to march to the relief of Bazaine, let what
might happen, as such was the decision of a Council of
Minis^rs ; and it was again reiterated that the retreat
of M'Mahon upon Paris would be the signal for the
instantaneous outbreak of a revolution there. The
Emperor, who came on the morning of the 28th .of
August to Le ChSne le Populeux, supported the;
opinion of the Minister. A stormy scene ensued ; but
^'Mahon yielded finally, and once more, on the 28th,
set his army in motion in the direction of Mouzon
on the Meuse.

We will now leave for the present M'Mahon's army ;
but a few remarks about its movements up to this
time win be in their place here.

When M^Mahon had once determined to march to

22 THB WAR FOB THE RHIKE FRONTIER.

the relief of Bazaine, every hope of success himg upon
thiSy that the Crown-Prince should know nothing of
the movement.

With one part of his cavahy M^ahon could have
formed a screen round the Camp of Chalons, while
with the mass of his troops he should have maxched
as rapidly as possible, to render it probable that he,
in concert with Bazaine, would have to deal with the
First and Second Armies alone, and not with the
Third and Fourth also. Under such circumstances
the troops might have been called upon for extra-
ordinary exertions in marching. But this did not
happen ; barely ordinary performances were required
of them.

From the direction of the march from B^hel upon Le
Ch6ne le Fopuleux, it must be concluded that M'Mahon
wished in the first place to march by Stenay upon
Montmedy. From the Camp of Chalons, by Bethel
and Stenay, this distance is 100 kilometres — 70 to 75
miles. To assign 20 kilometres to the da/s march
was certainly not to require too much under the cir-
cumstances. Then the head of M'Mahon's army could
have arrived on the 25th of August at Montmedy,
and the last troops on the 26th. On the 29th, or at
the latest on the 30th, he could have united with
Bazaine before Metz — that is, if the latter broke
through the investing lines — ^and have fought a battle
with Prince Frederic Charles, who would then have
ib^n no longer able to oppose him with equal forces.

MARCH OF M^MAHON TO BELIEVE B£ETZ. 23

Instead of such an operation, we see the head of
M^Mahon's army only arriving at Mouzon on the
28th of August

It has ahready been related, at the end of the former
volume, how the dispositions of the troops on the
German side after the 19th of August extraordinarily
favoured such a movement as that of M'Mahon's.
We shall, later on, find these favourable opportunities
recurring on other occasions and in other matters.
Time was in this case more than ever golden. The
slow advance of M'Mahon can only be explained by
the inward doubts about the whole situation which
he brought over with him from Africa, and which
always clung to him-^doubts which, as the event
proved, were only too well founded, and which the
whole course of the war hitherto would certainly
have strengthened.

Looking at the general state of affairs brought
about by the bad calculations, or rather by the com-
mencement without any calculation at all, of the war
on the part of the French, it can scarcely be assumed
that a victory of M'Mahon at Metz would have had
any vital influence upon the ultimate result of the
campaign ; but it would certainly have caused delay
in the German operations, and thus have revived the
courage of the French people.

In 1866 the Prussians sustaiued at least two, even
if insignificant, defeats, at Langensalza and at Trau-
tenau; in the campaign of 1870, they had hitherto

24 THE WAR FOR !rHE RHINE FRONTIER*

not experienced a single reverse — so many encounters
and battles, so many victories.

When M^Mahon evacuated the Camp of Chalons,
he set on fire all its military establishments. Paris
newspapers asserted that the conflagration was to be
a signal to Bazaine that the Duke of Magenta was
now speeding to his rescue. But as the distance from
Metz to the Camp of Chalons is about 85 miles in
a straight line, the conflagration could hardly have
answered such a purpose, especially with the chains
of heights which rise up between the two places, and
the prevalence at that time of thick weather. Much
more likely would it be a most unwisely-given signal
to the nearer troops of the Third Army ; still even
these did not remark it.

CHAPTER XIX.

ADVANCE OF THB THIBD AlH) FOURTH ARMIES (GEBHAN)
AGAIKST THE GAMP OF CHALONS— CHANGE OF THE DIBEC-

. TION OF THEIB LINB OF OPERATIONS ON INTELLIGENCE
BEING RECEIVED OF THE DEPARTURE OF M'MAHON.

As the anny of the Crown-Prince of Prussia was
advancing along the Strasburg-Paris line of railway,
a new army, the Fourth or Meuse Army, was, as we
passingly remarked, formed before Metz, and placed
under the command of the Crown-Prince of Saxony,
to advance on the right of the Crown -Prince of
Prussia against M^ahon and the Camp of Chalons.
At the same time, this army was directed to en*
deavour to seize, in passing, the fortress of Verdun ;
but it was not, if a ^rise was impossible, to delay
its march before that place.

This Fourth Army was composed of the Prussian
Guard, of the 12th and 4th Corps, of the 5th division
of cavalry (Rheinbaben), and of the 6 th division of
cavalry (Duke William of Mecklenburg).

The command of the 12th Corps was assumed by
Prince George of Saxony in place of the Crown-Prince,

26 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER*

and that of Prince George's division, the 23d, by
Major-General von Months.

The 4th Coips stood already on the Strasburg-Paris
railway in connection with the Army of the Crown-
Prince of Prussia ; it naturally, therefore, became the
left of the Army of the Meuse.

The remaining troops of this new army left the
neighbourhood of Metz on the 22d of August, the
cavalry in advance, the 12th Corps on the right wing,
with the Prussian Guard between it and the 4th Corps.

The line of march of the 12th Corps was by Jeau-
delize, Haudiomont, Dieue on the Meuse, upon Jub^
court.

On the 23d of August the attempt upon Verdun
was made : the 23d division of infanjay marched
along the Estaui road, the 24th division of infantry
along the Fr^sne road, upon the town. Whilst the
advanced -guard of the 23d division occupied the
north-east suburb, Pav4 the artillery ascended the
heights, and thence bombarded the fortress, which
was at once summoned to surrender. This was re-
fused, and the Saxons having now fully oonvinoed
themselves that there was no urgent necessity for the
commandant to capitulate, continued their march.
The 48th brigade remained on the 24th of August to
observe the fortress, and was then on the 25th, on
which day the headquarters of the Corps arrived at
Jub^court, also withdrawn to the left bank of the
Meuse to Lempire.

ADVAKGE OF THE GERMANS ON CHALONS. 27

Meanwhile the 6tih, and on its right the 5th divi-
sions of cavahy, pushed forward towards Chalons
on the Mame, and across the Meuse into the Ar*
gonnes.

The head of the 4th division of cavalry of the
army of the Crown -Prince of Prussia appeared by
the evening of the 24tiL before Yitry. On the 25th,
when the greater part of the division had come up, the
town was summoned to surrender. It capitulated
at 1 1 A.M., and was then occupied by a squadron of
the 5th regiment of dragoons of the 1 1th Corps, First
Army.

In the fortress were found only 300 unequipped
Mobiles. Besides these, however, there were 5000
stands of arms, 3000 side-arms, and 17 guns.

The main body of the garrison, also consisting of
Mobiles, had withdrawn, as the Germans advanced,
to return to their homes. A part of the 6th division
of cavalry came upon a crowd of them, numbering
about 1000, on the 25th August, nineteen miles to
the eastward of Chalons, at Epense. After a &w
shells had been thrown among them, the Mobiles
were attacked by t^e 15 th regiment of Uhlans, were
routed, and a great number made prisoners. Many,
besides, were killed by the sabre and the lance. From
the Gkrman side it is related that these Mobiles were
minded to surrender themselves, but not knowing
what conventional sign would express their wish, had
halted and formed square as well as they could, and

28 THE WAB FOB THE RHINE FRONTIEB.

that in this manner the superfluous attack of the
German cavalry was occasioned.

Is it not possible that the universal hatred of an
invader for irregular formations of troops, of an arming
of the people, also played a certain part here ?

As a matter of fact, if such an arming of the people
were prepared long beforehand by an energetic nation
determined to resist to the last extreme — ^which was
by no means the case in France — every war of inva-
sioy would be rendered impossible.

ITapoleon I. was just as enraged with the Prussian
landwehr and landsturm, and with the Prussian
Volunteer Corps of 1813, as with the Spanish guer-
illas.

On the 28th of August — ^that is, a few days after
the affair at Epense — ^the King of Prussia issued the
following proclamation from his headquarters at
Clermont en Argonne: —

" The Commander-in-Chief makes known to the
inhabitants of the arrondissement, that every prisoner
whowiahea to be seated as a prisoner ofVar must
prove his quality of French soldier by an order
addressed to himself personally by the legitimate au-
thorities, showing that he is duly entered on the list
of a corps militarily organised by the French Govern-
ment. At the same time, the military position which
he holds in the army must be made recognisable by
military and uniform marks which are inseparable
from his equipment, and visible to the naked eye at

ADVANCE OF THE OESMAITS ON CHALONS. 2d

rifle-range. Individuals who have taken up arms
without complying with these conditions wiU not be
treated as prisoners of war. They wiU be tried by a
conrt-maxtial, and if not found guilty of any crime
which entails a severer punishment, will be sentenced
to ten years' penal servitude, and detained in Germany
until after the execution of such punishment/'

The French Government could certainly easily
supply to their Mobiles a ticket as demanded in this
proclamation, though there would alwa3rs be a risk of
its being lost But it woidd indubitably have been
more pleasant to the men, and it would have been
better in all other respects, to have received, instead
of the miserable clothing of which we have before
spoken, cloth clothes — ^in short, the imiform which had
been prescribed for the Mobile Guard at the time of
its institution. But just in this respect an unpar-
donable and incredible negligence and slowness were
evinced, of which, even at the end of October, we have
numerous examples.

The army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia advanced
along the Strasburg-Paris railway, and the head of
its columns of infantry reached the neighbourhood
of Vitry le Fran9ais on the 25th of August. The
Crown-Prince had left Toul on one side, and it was
for the present watched by a detachment of the 4th
Corps, which shortly afterwards was relieved. The
attack on the fortress we shall consider later on.

The Prussian cavalry, hastening on before the

80 . THE WAB FOB THE RHINE FBONTIEB.

fumy, occupied the town of Chalons without any
resistance on the 24th of August^ to the great dismay
of the Parisians^ who would gladly have seen the
open town defend itself. On the following day a
slight skirmish took place at the railway station at
Epemay between a patrol of Prussian cavalry and
some French engineer soldiers and Turcos who
chanced to be there, and whose conduct was most
highly extolled in the Paris journals. But the towns^
people in Epemay did not take up arms.

The King of Prussia wished to be present- in person
at the operations of the two Crown-Princes agarost
Chalons, and, as was now assumed, against Paris.
He moved his headquarters, therefore, on the 23d
of August, to Commercy, on the Strasburg-Paris line,
the town which is fioted for its confectionery, espe-
cially for its " Madeleines."

On the 24th of August the King advanced more
northwards to Bar le Due, the place where are made
the sweetest gooseberry and raspberry preserves.

He was still there, wh^n, on the evening of the 25th,
reliable intelligence was received that M'Mahon had
evacuated the Camp of Chalons^ and was marching
off towards the north.

M^Mahon had therefore four days' start, an abnost
inestimable stroke of good fortune; but we know
already how little use was madie of it.

It was instantly resolved in the headquarters of the
King of Prussia to follow the Marshal, to stop his

WBEJEJj OF THE GEK&CANS KORTHWABDS. 31

march upon Metz if possible, and, if this could no
longer be effected, to at least arrive there close upon
his heels.

To be able to accomplish this, the two armies of the
Crown-Princes of Saxony and Prussia, which were at
that moment marching upon Paris— that is, were
fronting to the west — must change front to the
north.

On the 25th they were, broadly speaking, deployed
upon one line, having their right wing, the Saxon
Corps, at Clermont en Argonne, and their left, the
11th North German Corps, at Vitry le Frangais.

The change of front, therefore, required a great
wheel to the right, in which the 12th Corps was the
pivot, and which would bring the two armies, from
the front, Clermont en Argonne, Vitry le Fran9ais,
upon a front, Clermont-Suippe.

It would undoubtedly have been an error to have
allowed the right wing to remain stationary until the
wheel to the right should be completed. For this
flank was nearest to the French ; and even if it could
not trust itself to fight a decisive battle alone, it was
at least desirable that it should annoy the enemy mov-
ing northwards, and thus retard his march, whilst the
Corps of the German centre and left (wheeling) wing
hurried up with all speed, and by the shortest roads,
to take up their positions on the newly-defined front.

In accordance with this view, new instructions
were given to the two Crown - Princes during the

32 . THE WAB FOB THE RHINE rRONTIER,

night firom the 25th to the 26th of August, and ou
the 26th of August the King moved his headquarters
to Clermont en Argonne, to be as near as possible to
the events which were about to take place.

Paris, which had expected to see the German
cavahy at its gates by the 1st of September, gained
by this change of operations a respite of at least
fourteen days.

CHAPTER XX.

THE SKIRMISHES OF BUZANCY ON THE 27TH OF AUGUST AND
OF NOUART ON THE 29TH OF AUGUST, AND THE ENCOUNTER
AT BEAUMONT ON THE 30TH OF AUGUST.

In consequence of the fresh orders issued, the 12th
(Saxon) Corps marched on the 26th of August from
its position at Clermont and Jub^court northwards to
Varennes, whence it was to gain the line of the Meuse,
and by moving down the river retard the French in
their probable passage of it. Accordingly, on the
27th, the 24th (Saxon) division was at Dun, on the
right bank of the Meuse, having the 48 th brigade
and the 2d regiment of cavalry pushed forward to
Stenay. These troops remained there until the 29 th.
Orders were also given for the whole of the 24th
division ix) follow; but before the movement was com-
menced, counter-orders were received, and the division
was directed to march upon Nouart, on the left bank
of the Meuse.

During this advance, the 24th brigade of cavalry
made a reconnaissance in a north-westerly direction
towards Youziers and Buzancy. In executing it, it

VOL. II.

34 THE WAB FOR TH]S RHINE FRONTIER.

came upon the 12th French regiment of Chasseurs
belonging to the 5th Corps (De Failly); sent for-
ward against it a battery of horse-artillery, and then
attacked with the greater part of the 3d regiment of
cavalry.

The French were routed. From the prisoners
brought in it was ascertained that a great part of
M^Mahon^s army was still in the vicinity of Vouziers
on the right bank of the Aisne. And such was
actually the case; for on the 27th the 7th French
Corps was directed upon Vouziers, the 5th upon Ger-
mont and Belleville, the 12th upon Le Ch^ne, the
1st from Yoncq upon Terrou (but it received after-
wards counter-orders), whUe Bonnemain's division was
moved to the left flank towards R^theL

Accordingly, while the 12th North German Corps
marched upon Nouart, the other Corps of the Army of
the Meuse and of the Third Army were directed upon
Buzaucy and Vouaiers.

' On the 29th, the 12th French Corps crossed the
Meuse at Mouzon, the 1st marched upon Ra^ucourt,
the 5th upon Beaumont, the 7th received orders to
move to La Besace, but only reached Oches, Mar-
gueritte's division arrived at Mouzon and Carignan,
and Bonnemain's at Sommauthe,

On the same day the King of Prussio. established
his headquarters at Grandpr^ ; the Emperor Napoleon
in Stonne, an unimportant village on the road from
Le Chdne le Populeux by Beaumont to Mouzon ;

SEIBMISH AT KQUART. 35

and the Crown-Prince of Prussia at Sennc on the
Aisne, 3^ miles to the south-west of Grandprd.

Meanwhile the Saxons, marching from Dun to
Nouart, came upon De Faillj at the latter place.
An advanced-guard aflFair ensued, which wm carried
on on the German side by the 46th brigade of in-
fantry. The French retreated, covered by their rear-
guard, northwards through the Bois des Dames to-
wards Beaumont.

The day before, on the 28th of August, the 4th
division of cavalry, on the left wing of the Germans,
had encountered at Vouziers the French, who were
marching off, but the latter declined to give battle.

After the events of the last days, and after hearing
the intelligence which had been obtained, the German
headquarters deemed it to be not impossible that
M^Mahon, when he found that he would not be able
to succeed in marching upon Metz, would seek refuge
in the neutral territory of Belgium. To prevent this,
it was resolved to foUow him vigorously, and force
him to turn and fight once again in the angle between
the Meuse and the Ardennes Canal.

To this end dispositions for the 30th of August
were issued on the evening of the 29th ; but before
giving them, we must narrate briefly the positions of
the several Corps of the two German armies on the
last-named day. Taking them from right to left,
they stood as follows : —

1. The Army of the Meuse :

36 THE WAB FOB THE BHINE FBONTIEB.

The 12th Corps to the east of Nouart^ towards La
Neuville ;

The 4th Corps to the north of Landres, 7 miles to
the west of Dun ;

The Guard in the second line, behind the two for-
mer Corps, at Dun on the Meuse.

2. The Third Army, Crown-Prince of Prussia :

The 1st Bavarian Corps, Von der Tann, with the
2d division at Sommerance, behind the left wing of
the 4th North German Corps, and the 1st division
more to the west at St Juvin, on the road from Var-
ennes to Grandpr6 ;

The 2d Bavarian Corps, Hartmann^ at Fl^ville,
behind the 1st ;

The 5th North German Corps, Kirchbach, at Bri-
quenai, and to the north thereof, at Authes ;

The WUrtemberg division, Obemitz, at Boult au
Bois, to the west of Briquenai ;

The 11th North German Corps, G^rsdorflf, at Vou-
ziers;

The 6th North German Corps, Tumpling, which
had only very recently been drawn from Germany
and attached to the Third Army, stood a day's march
to the south of Vouziers, on the roads from St M^n^
hould and Suippe :

The four divisions of cavalry.-namely, the 2d—
which, like the 6th Corps, had only just been called up
into the first line — ^the 4th, the 5th, and the 6th, all

MOVEMENTS ON THE 30TH OP AUGUST. 37

stood together on the extreme left, about Vouziers and
towards the Aisne, between Semuy and Bethel.

To these troops, then, thus situated, the following
orders were given for the 30th of August : —

The 12th Saxon Corps was directed upon Beau-
mont — ^the 23d division by way of La Neuville, the
24 th by Beaufort through the wood of Dieulet

The 4th, from Landres through the wood of Dieulet
upon Beaumont ;

The Prussian Guard was to follow these two in
reserve along the Mouse ;

The 1st Bavarian Corps upon Beaumont, the 2d
Bavarian to follow it ;

The 5 th North German Corps to the left of the 1st
Bavarian, upon Pierremont and Oches ;

The 2d division of cavalry upon Buzancy, to sup-
port the centre ;

The Wtirtemberg division upon Le ChSne le Popu-
leux;

The 11th North German Corps by Vouziers and
Quatre Champs, also upon Le ChSne le Populeux ;

The 4th division of cavalry was to follow the 11th
Corps to Quatre Champs, and to bend thence to the
north-eastward by Chatillon upon Oches ;

The 6th division of cavalry was to move upon Semuy,
and push forward its outposts as far as Bouvellemont
(Boullemont) to the north, and observe from that
place in the direction of M^zieres ;

38 THE WA£ FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The 5th division of cavahy, advancing to Tour-
teron, was to wateh the highway towards Le Ch^ne le
Populeux ;

The 6th North German Corps was to march upon
Vooziers, and go into cantonments about that place
towards the south and south-west, in the direction
of Eheims and the Camp of Chalons.

The King of Prussia removed his headquarters to
Varennes, famous through the flight and capture of
Louis XVI.; and the two Crown-Princes repaired in
the morning to the site of the expected battle.

With the knowledge which we have of the actual
marches of the French, and of the existing intentions
of M'Mahon, the direction given to the left wing of
the Germans may appear to be somewhat too diver-
gent towards the west. But the Germans on the
29th of August could not know all that we know
to-day. Had not M'Mahon, as late as the 27th»
still intended to commence a retreat firom Paris I
Was it not possible that, when he arrived at a know*
ledge of the true state of affairs, he might return to
his original idea, and attempt to carry it out in some
way or other ? It is not a good thing to have to say
in war, " I did not think of that.'' Therefore the em-
ployment of the 6th Corps in its post of observation of
Eheims and Chalons was not without good grounds.

Immediately after the commencement of the forma-
tion of the 12th Corps (Trochu, afterwards Lebrun),
a 13th Corps also was begun in Paris under General

POSITIONS OF THE FRENCH ON THE 30TH OF AUG. 39

Vinoy. This was to consist of three divisions of in-
fantry and one di^'isio^l of cavalry. By about the
23d of August, at least two of its divisions of infantry,
composed of fourth battalions, were gathered together,
under Gelierals d^Ex^ and Polhes, and a cavalry
division under Rdyau.

On the 23d of August the Emperor Napoleon tele-
graphed from Courcelles, near Rheims, to the Coxmt
of Falikao : —

" It is very important that strong forces should be
directed upon Bheims, which is the junction and main
point of the railways, to prevent hostile patrols cutting
oflF our communications 1 ''

Palikao thereupon immediately sent thither, by way
of Laon, a detachment of Vinoy 's Corps — D^Exda
division. This, it is true, arrived too late to take
any share in the decisive operations ; but the move-
ment shows that the Grermans did well to provide
against the possible arrival of supports from Paris to
the aid of M^Mahon.

On the French side, on the 30th of August, the
12th Corps, Lebrun, with its own division of cavalry,
Lichtlin, and also that of F^n^lon, stood at Mouzon
on the right bank of the Meuse, Lichtlin's horse being
placed under the command of F^n^lon. Marshal
M'Mahon was also in Mouxon, and the Emperor
Napoleon on the same day moved thither his head-
quarters from Stonne.

The 7th French Corps was at 1 1 a.m. on the march

40 THE WAR FOB THE RHIKE FRONTIER.

northwards towards Villers devant Pont below Mou-
zon^ and had only a weak rear-guard between Oches
and La Berli^re.

The 1st French Corps was at the same time moving
towards Kemilly, while the 5th Corps, De Failly, was
engaged in cooking close to Beaumont, and having
only airived there that morning after a long nighO
march, was not keeping a very vigilant look-out

The head of the 1st Bavarian Corps, the 4th
brigade, of the 2d diyision, marching by way of Som-
mauthe, arrived at about 11 a.m. in the vista be*
tween the woods of Dieulet and Beaumont. Thence
they saw the camp of De Failly's troops. Von der
Tann at once brought forward a few batteries, and
opened fire upon it The shells aroused the French
from their quiet repose (this time they were surprised
by artillery), and De Failly at once ordered a retreat
to be commenced as speedily as possible, leaving be-
hind the whole of his baggage and camp equipage.

Hereupon Von der Tann at once sent the 4ih
brigade forward in pursuit, and on its left the 3d,
as soon as it came up ; while at the same time the
head of the 4th North German Corps, advancing to the
east of Beaumont, appeared on the right of the 4th
Bavarian brigade.

De Failly retreated fighting upon Toncq, where
the Bavarians captured two guns.

Von der Tann, meanwhile, as soon as his 1st division
came up, sent it forward upon La Besace to attack

ENCOUNTER AT BEAUMONT, 41

thence the right flank of the French ; but this move-
ment was executed a little too late. More decisive
was that of the 4th North German Corps, which
threatened to cut oflF De Fallly from the Meuse, and
was supported by four battalions and two batteries
from the 2d division of the Bavarians ; for, pushing
forward against De Failly's left flank, it compelled
him to change the direction of his retreat, and
to fall back by Pouron and Brouhan upon Villers
devant Mouzon, instead of retiring direct upon Mou-
zon, where he would have found his nearest support.

From the 7th Corps De Failly had not received
any support, for it had continued its retreat upon
the Meuse without halting.

When the fight between De Failly and the 4th
North German Corps neared the neighbourhood of
Mouzon, General Lebrun desired to support the former
from the right bank by passing over his whole Corps
to the left of the Meuse; and Lichtlin's division
of cavalry, and Grandchamp's of infantry, were already
across, when Marshal M'Mahon caused the movement
to be stopped.

Lichtlin's division attacked the Prussians, but
encountered infantry in good order, and, sufiering
much from its fire and from that of the artillery, was
obliged to withdraw. But still its attack, and the
French artillery fire from the right bank of the
Meuse, which did not cease until 8 P.M., gained some
time for De Failly, so that he was able to reach Villers

42 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

devant Mouzon and cross to the right bank of the
Meuse comparatively unmolested.

To the left of the Bavarians, the advanced-guard,
and some of the artillery of the 5th North German
Corps, advancing from Buzancy agsiinst Oches, had
come under fire about noon. But the French detach-
ment at Oches was not willing to continue the action,
and as soon as it heard the cannonade on its left
flank, and almost in its rear, commenced a hurried
retreat through Storme, to which place the Prussian
advanced-guard pushed forward.

The 1st French Corps (Ducrot) reached Carignan
on the 30th of August between 3 and 4 p.m.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE BATTLE OF SEDAN OK THE 1ST OF SEPTEMBEB.

MaksfaTi M'Mahon ordered the concentration of all
his Corps upon the heights around the fortress of Sedan
and upon the right bank of the Meuse to be effected
upon the 31st of August

The Emperor Napoleon, oppressed probably with
evil forebodings, had sent his young son into secu-
rity in Belgium, not wishing to expose him to the
real work of a battle. He himself left Mouzon on
the evening of the 30th of August, and, joumepng
through the night to Carignan, and thence to Sedan,
reached the latter place about 10 A.M.

The King of Prussia, after receiving the report
of the proceedings of the 30th, despatched, on the
evening of that day, the following order from his
headquarters in Varennes : —

" The Army of the Meuse (Crown - Prince of
Saxony) will prevent the French left wing from
escaping to the east between the Meuse and the
Belgian frontier. The Third Army (Crown-Prince
of Prussia) wiU continue its march northwards and

44 THE WAE FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

attack the French wherever they may make a stand
on the left bank of the Mense ; for the rest^ it will
operate against their front and right flank in such a
manner as to hem them in between the Meuse and
the Belgian frontier/'

In compliance with these instructions, the Crown-
Prince of Saxony caused the Prussian Guard, and
afterwards the Saxon horsemen, to cross to the right
bank of the Meuse at Prouilly; the 12th Corps was
to effect the passage by a bridge of boats at L^tanne ;
and the 4th Corps, which was far in advance, was to
move from the neighbourhood of Mouzon down the
left bank of the Meuse.

On the evening of the 31st of August, the Guard
stood at Carignan on the right bank of the Chiers, with
its outposts at Pouru aux Bois and Pouru St Remy ;

The 12th Corps at Douzy (24th division of in-
fantry) and Mairy, with its outposts from Pouru St
JRemy to the mouth of the Rullebach in advance of
Douzy ;

The 4th Corps on the left bank of the Meuse
opposite Torcy, a fortified suburb of Sedan.

The Prussian cavalry of the Guard and the Saxon
horsemen rendered the railway from Carignan to
Sedan unsafe. The Prussians crossed to the right
bank of the Chiers at Sailly and Carignan. The
Saxon division of cavalry, after it had crossed the
Meuse on the 31st of August at Prouilly, remarked
from the Bois de Yaux a quantity of trains standing

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SEFTEMBEB. 46

in the railway station at Carignan ready to be
despatchecL Its batteries at once opened fire upon
them, and then descended the left bank of the Chiers
towards Douay. When in the neighbourhood of
Brevilly, French waggon - trains were seen on the
highway on the right bank of the Chiera The
cavaby regiment of the Saxon Guard at once crossed
the river and went in pursuit, but could not overtake
the convoys, as it met with a fire of musketry from
the French infantry and fix)m the inhabitants of
Poun. St Een^y.

The 1st Saxon regiment of Uhlans, No. 17, on the
other hand, succeeded in penetrating into Douzy, after
the horse-artillery battery had shelled the place, and
captured 40 waggons, the railway trains, and a num-
ber of prisoners. The French escort, vigorously pur-
sued aa f ar as Francheval, retired upon Douzy.

Of the army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia, the
1st Bavarian Corps was also, in pursuance of the
above order, to march on the 31st of August upon
Semilly on the Meuse, and the 2d Bavarian Corps
was to follow it to Boncourt

The 1st Bavarian Corps had the 1st brigade and
two batteries at its head; then followed the 2d
brigade, the reserve artillery of the Corps, and, lastly^
the 2d division (3d and 4th brigades).

At 9.30 A.M., the advanced - guard of the Corps
arrived on the left bank of the Meuse near Bemilly^
and thence saw the French columns of the 12th Corps

i$ .THE WAR FOB THB ,BHINE FRONTIER.

and the cavalry moving along the other bank towards
Sedan by way of Mairy, Douzy, and Bazeilles. The
jtwo batteries, which were joined by the artiUery from
the reserve as soon as intelligence was received of
what was going on, came speedUy into action, and
opened fire upon the French. These answered with
their artillery, but without eflfect, for the Bavarian
guns proved to be far superior in ax^curacy and
range.

At Bazeilles the railway crosses from the right to
the left; bank of the river, and only returns to its
original side above Donchery. The 4th and 9th
battalions of the Bavarian Rifles, inclining to their
left at Remilly, had succeeded in obtaining possession
of the railway bridge of Bazeilles, but could not
penetrate further into the town, owing to the heavy
fire from Chassepots and mitrailleuses— a fire. which,
it appears, was delivered in paxt by the inhabitants
of the houses.

Yon der Tann therefore drew back these battalions
to the left bank, resolving to defer the attack in
earnest upon Bazeilles until the Crown -Prince of
Saxony should descend the right bank of the Meuse ;
and to this end he caused two pontoon-bridges to be
Ijhrown across the river near Remilly.

In the interim the French made an attempt to blow
>ip the railway bridge of Bazeilles, but this was frus-
Ijrated by the Bavarian Rifles.
, After a while Von der Tann received the news.

BATTLB OF 8EDAK, 1ST OF SEPTEMBER. 47

that the Crown-Prince of Saxony would not be able
to attack in force on the 31st of August. Thereupon
he ordered the greater part of the Ist division to
remain in the position which it had taken up^ caused
the raUway bridge to be barricaded, and bivouacked
towards evening with the remainder of his Corps
between Bemilly and Angecourt. The 2d Bavarian
Corps encamped near Roncourt
; The 5th North German Corps stood on the same
evening (the 3 Ist of August) at Ch^hery; the 11th
between Fr^nois and Yillers sur Bar, opposite Don-
chery; the Wtirtemberg division at Boutancourt, to
the south-west of Dom le MesniL

The 6th North German Corps was to move forward
to Attigny and Semuy, on the Aisne and Ardennes
Canal, whence it could be easily pushed forward in
a north-westerly direction shotdd M'Mahon by any
chance be again seized with the idea of attempting
to gain Paris ; and in this case it would be supported
by the divisions of cavalry which were patrolling in
the neighbourhood

For the 1st of September, the Crown-Prince of
Prussia gave the following directions to the Third
Army : The 1st Bavarian Corps was to cross the
Meuse at Bemilly and attack Bazeilles ; the 2d Bava-
rian Corps was to post itself below BazeiUes at Wade-
Hncourt and Fr^nois — either to support the 1st
Bavarians or to keep up the connection between it
and the lllh North German Corps, at the same tijne

48 THE WAR FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

observing the fortified suburb of Torcy before Sedan ;
the 1 Ith North German Corps was to cross the Meuse
at Donchery, to advance northwards upon Vrigne aux
Bois^ and to wheel there to its right (eastwards)
against St Menges; the 5th Corps and the 4th
division of cavalry were to follow the movement of
the 11th Corps; the Wiirtemberg division was to
remain at Donchery, partly to act as a general re-
serve^ partly to be in readiness to resist a possible
sortie of the French from M^zieres.

In compliance with these instructions^ the 11th
Corps, in the course of the 31st of August, threw two
bridges* across the Meuse at Donchery, and commenc-
ing at once the passage of the river, stood by day-
break of the 1 st of September in full strength on the
right bank of the Meuse.

The advices which were received of the extremely
lively retreat of the French during the 31st of August,
awakened much anxiety in the headquarters of the
King, lest M'Mahon should be purposing to avoid the
decisive battle by retreating in some one or other
fitting direction.

This care was certainly, as a matter of fact, with-
out any cause. On the evening of the 31st, M^Mahon
did not in any way believe that there was a consider-
able force of Germans in his vicinity, and the French
troops therefore eik^mped around Sedan : the 7th
Corps on the right, towards St Menges and Floing,
having the cavalry reserve in rear of its left wing ;

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SEPTEMBER. 49

the 12th Corps towards Bazeilles; the 1st Corps to-
wards Daigny and Francheval ; and the 5th Corps on
the heights to the north of Sedan, it not even being
deemed necessary to communicate to them orders for
the following day.

Nevertheless the German headquarters did right to
assume that if M^Mahon really recognised his posi-
tion on the 31st of August, he would make every
effort to escape from it by some means or other. The
means might be badly chosen, but the desire must be
supposed to be present.

The King of Prussia, therefore, commanded that
even during the night, from the 31st of August to the
1st of September, three divisions of the left wing
(Army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia) should pass
over the Meuse, to be able to deploy at daybreak in
readiness to advance northwards to an attack upon
the road from Sedan to M^zieres. This order was
communicated to the Crown-Prince of Saxony, and
was already more than half executed ; for, as we have
seen, the 11th Corps was occupied during the night
in question in crossing the river. It only remained,
then, to transport across one more division, and for
this the Wiirtemberg was chosen. It was directed
to pass over the river between Dom le Mesnil and
Nouvion, and to take up a position to the north of
the latter place at Viviers au Court, awaiting there fur-
ther orders for its employment in either an easterly or
westerly direction. At daybreak the Wiirtembergers

VOL, II. D

50 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

threw a pontoon-bridge across at the point indicated,
and at 6 A.M. began to cross over by it At 9 A.M.
the head of the division entered Viviers au Court

The Crown-Prince of Saxony, for his part, as soon
as he received intelligence of this movement from the
royal headquarters, at once ordered the troops of the
Army of the Meuse to be alarmed By 5 a.m. on the
Ist of September the Prussian Guard and the 12 th
(Saxon) Corps were to be upon the line Pouru aux
Bois-Pouru St Kemy-Douzy, ready to advance
against the French front Givonne-MonceUe, Of the
4th Corps, the 7th division was to post itself in
reserve at Mairy, but the 8th and the reserve of
artillery were to move towards Bazeilles to support
the 1st Bavarian Corps.

From the positions of the French, and firom the
dispositions of the Germans, it followed that the
former had a clear front of about six miles, and that
on this they must, during the forenoon hours of the
1st of September, be driven together by seven and a
half German Corps — ^by a collective force of from
170,000 to 180,000 men, to which they could at the
most oppose a body of 120,000 men.

That the whole of M'Mahon's army could cut its
way through the Germans was impossible. It must
in any case have left behmd considerable portions to
retard the pursuit of the Germans at some points^
while the main body, following in some degree the
example set by Blucher in 1814 at Champeaubeit-

BATTLE OP SEDAN, IST OP SEPTEMBER. 51

Etoges, forced a passage through the line elsewhere
and won its retreat sword in hand. But let the
march of this portion be then directed whither it
might be, the Germans would, after they had once
come up, have remained constantly by M^Mahon's
side; and if they had simply contented themselves
with molesting him with their cavahy and artillery,
which no longer permits Xenophontian retreats, he
would yet have suffered enormous losses, and on the
third or fourth day German leadership would cer-
tainly have attained anything it might have failed to
accomplish on the first

And whither was M*Mahon to retreat ? With the
forces which, in the existing state of things, he could
convey away, and with these closely followed by
a German army, he could, instead of being free to
attack the blockading troops, under the most favour-
able circumstances only have thrown 40,000 to 50,000
men into the lines of Metz, and thereby would have
brought rather a burden than relief to Bazaine.

Or could he have fallen back upon any other free
fortress to draw breath for a while, and then again
seek farther safety in flight ?

There is, as we know, no lack of fortresses in this
neighbourhood ; but these small nests are not adapted
to afford a harbour of refuge to a large army. The
nearest stronghold which could in any way be made
to serve as such was Lille. But Lille is 108 miles
from Sedan.

. I

62 THE WAB FOR THE BHINE FBONTDSR.

A comparatiyely easier expedient remained. The
Belgian firontier is only five miles distant from the rear
of the position at Sedan on the road to Bouillon. It
cannot be doubted that, if the French had come to
the determination early on the morning of the 1st
of September, they could have succeeded in reaching
Belgian territory, and that, too, without very severe
fighting. But then they must have permitted them-
selves to be disarmed and interned by the Belgians ;
and French pride revolted against this. A few French
detachments might adopt this plan, but not a whole
French army. In short, M*Mahon's troops were
doomed.

The fatal battle was begun by the 1st Bavarian Corps.
General von der Tann had certainly received general
instructions not to advance to a decisive attack untU
he was sure of support from the Aimy of the MeuBe,
especially from the 12th (Saxon) Corps; but it was,
nevertheless, to be permitted to him to capture
Bazeilles, even during the night before the 1st of
September, if it should seem to him to be feasible to
do so; and in that case he was to be free to manoeuvre
further from that place when the fitting moment
should arrive.

The large village of Bazeilles, built entirely of
stone, contains the old castle in which Turenne spent
his youth, and also another one of more recent date.

At 4 A.M. a thick fog hung over the scene, and
Von der Tann set his troops in motion to attack

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SEPTEMBER. 53

BazeiUes, in and behind which Vassoigne's division
of marine infantay of Lebnin's Corps were posted.

At the head of the Bavarians marched the 1st
brigade (Dietl) ; the 2d brigade (OrflF) followed ; and
then came the 2d division (3d and 4th brigades).

Very soon afterwards the struggle for BazeiUes
began. The Bavarians penetrated into the village
and were driven out again by the French ; then the
former received reinforcements, and in their turn re-
pulsed the temporary victors. Soon the fight raged
furiously in the streets, and in the gardens and parks
enclosed by stone walls. Desperate fighting took
place for single houses. In these contests, it is said,
the inhabitante took part, and this is very possibly
true. The French deny it, and in revenge accuse
the Bavarians of many atrocious cruelties on women,
children, and grey-headed men. Without placing too
high a value on these recriminations, it ^may never-
theless be imagined that in such a bitter house-to-
house combat some ill-fated individuals were not too
leniently treated.

The artillery on either side could not take any part
in the fighting at this stage, neither could it directly
support its own party until the other had complete
possession of the town ; and therefore, in the move-
ments in which both sides were mingled confusedly
together, it was obliged to confine itself to firing at
the enemy's reserves and at the hostile batteries.

The Bavarian artillery was posted upon the heights

54 THE WAE FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

to the north-east of the town, and the French, com-
prising the mitrailleuse batteries of Lebrun's Corps> to
the west of La Moncelle.

It was 10 A.M. before Bazeilles was definitely in
the hands of the Bavarians. During the struggle for
the viUage, Marshal M^Mahon had been dangerously
wounded by a splinter from a shell, and at 7.30 A.M.
was obliged to give over the command-in-chief to
General Ducrot, and allow himself to be carried to
the rear.

Ducrot now formed the idea of taking up a position
behind Sedan on the plateau of Illy — ^an intention
which can only be understood to signify that he wished,
in any case, to keep open the road of retreat on to
Belgian territory. He had already given instructions
for this movement, and it had been commenced by
several detachments, when he also was compdled to
resign the command.

We have before mentioned General von Wimpffen,
who, recalled from Africa, was to take command of
the 5th Corps in place of De Failly. He had arrived
in Sedan on the 31st of August, and directly he
heard that M'Mahon was wounded, he, as the senior
general of division present next to De Failly — ^whose
claims, after what had gone before, could no longer
be considered — at once demanded the commander-
ship-in-chief of the army, and this Ducrot gave over
to him at 9 A.M.

General von Wimpffen, bom 1811, after leaving

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OP SEPTEMBEB. 55

the School of St Cyr, passed the greater part of his
time of service in Algeria. He became a brigadier-
general in the Crimea in 1855. In Italy, he com-
manded, during the first part of the campaign of
1859, a brigade of the Guard ; and in the same year,
after the battle of Magenta, was appointed general of
division. Soon after the war, he was again sent out
to Africa. There he commanded, in 1870, the pro-
vince of Oran, and conducted the operations against
the tribes on the Morocco frontier. These operations
have been very variously criticised ; but, in any case,
they were of a very different nature to those of a
campaign against Germany.

Wimpffen, who had the renown of possessing great
bravery joined to cool-blooded calculation, made him-
self acquainted with the state of affairs from the
heights of Balan, and matters did not seem to him to
be desperate. He therefore caused the movement
which had been begun by Ducrot to be stopped, and
ordered Ae tooopa ^re Jn to fteir f„mer^4oi«.

A» fortune was reaUy setting very much against
the French, this double change of commanders within
a few hours certainly could not improve their chance
of success. The last recalls vividly to the recollec-
tion the transformation of the Austrian General Staff
at Koniggratz on the morning of the 3d of July 1866.

On the German side, the Crown-Prince of Saxony
directed the 12th Corps to move from Douzy through
Lamecourt upon La Moncelle ; and on its right the

56 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

Prussian Guard, which was further in rear, upon
Villers-Cemay.

The 48 th brigade of the Saxons — the advanced-
guard of the 24th division — came into action near La
Moncelle at 6.30 a.m. The batteries of the advanced-
guard, and soon afterwards the whole of the artillery
of the division, moved up to the east of La Moncelle, to
the north of the Bavarian batteries; and after the vil-
lage was taken, two more batteries from the reserve
artillery of the Corps joined them. Posted there, the
Saxon artillery suffered at times not only from the
French guns, but also from the fire of infantry pro-
ceeding from the bottom of the valley of La Moncdla

To the right of the 48th, the 47th brigade of in-
fantry pushed forward in the direction of Daigny, and
captured there three mitrailleuses.

Towards 9.30 A.M., the 46th brigade, belonging to
the 23d division of infantry, came up, and from La
Moncelle completed the communication with the Bava-
rians; the 45th brigade was also sent to La Moncelle;
and the batteries which gradually arrived formed at
length a single line with those of the 1st Bavarian Corps.

At 8 A.M. the head of the Prussian Guard arrived
at Villers-Cemay, and towards 9 a.m. several of its
batteries came into action on the heights between
that place and Givonne. Li general, the Guard was
directed to ascend the Givonne brook towards Fleig-
neux, as soon as the position between Daigny and
Givonne was won; the 12th (Saxon) Corps was then^

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SEPTEMBER. 57

turning to its right, to follow this movement. To
cany out these orders, therefore, the 1st division of
the Guard advanced in the first place against Givonne,
while the reserve artillery of the Corps took up a por-
tion to the north of the batteries which had abeady
opened fire, to support this movement.

We turn now to the left of the German army, to
see how the battle progressed on that wing.

The 11th Corps had crossed the Meuse at 6 A.M.,
and its head reached Vrigne auz Bois an hour
later. On its left the Wurtemberg division com-
menced to pass over the river at the same time at
Nouvion.

To the right of the 11th Corps stood the 2d Bava-
rian Corps (Hartmann) opposite Torcy; having the
4th division (Count Bothmer) at Fr^nois, and the
reserve artillery with the 3d division (Walther) at
Wadelincourt.

The 5th North German Corps was, at 6 a.m., on
the march through Cheveuges going towards Don-
chery ; the 4th division of cavalry followed it.

The 6th Corps had, as we have already seen, a
special destination, as had also the greater number of
the divisions of cavahy.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia had quitted his head-
quarters, Ch^mery on the Barbach, at 4.30 A.M., and
arrived towards 6 a.m. on the battle-field, to the west
of Fr^nois ; and thither the King of Prussia also re-
paired from his headquarters at Yendresse.

58 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The detachments of cavalry which had been Bent
forward brought in news that the road to the west,
to M^zieres, was quite free from French. The 11th
Corps could therefore now be turned without hesi-
tation against the army of M'Mahon in position at
Sedan, especially as the 5th Corps was to follow it
immediately on to the right bank of the Meuse^ and
as, moreover, the Wiirtemberg division was ready to
observe the before-mentioned highway.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia therefore, towards
7 A.M., gave the order that the 11th Corps should turn
to its right against St Menges. General Gersdorff,
who at that time was chief of the Corps, received the
command about 7.30 a.h. at Briancourt, to the south-
east of Vrigne aux Bois, and at once gave directions
for its execution. Towards 9 a.m. the advanced-guard
showed itself to the west of St Menges, attacked the
village, and after a stubborn contest, obtained posses-
sion of it, the French garrison (belonging to the 5tli
Corps) retreating upon the main position of their
Corps on the heights between Illy and Moing. The
commandant of the 11th Corps at once caused his
artillery, which was up with him, to move to the
south of St Menges, and the infantry to deploy be-
hind it.

The 5th Corps, which immediately followed the
1 1th, marched behind it with the reserve artillery in
advance, and then deployed to the left of it at Fleig-
neux. By 11 a.m. the greater number of the batteries

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SEPTEMBER. 59

of the 5th and 11th Corps were engaged there and at
St Menges in a heavy fire against the extreme right
of the French.

As the road to M^zieres was found to be clear, the
Wurtemberg division received orders, which reached it
at 1 0.30 A.!! at Viviers au Court, to return to Donchery
and place itself in reserve there, whUe the 2d division
of cavalry was also drawn into the same place. The
Wtirtembergers therefore took up with the bulk of
their forces a position at Donchery; but nevertheless
Hiigers brigade was posted on the left bank of the
Meuse at Dom le Mesnil towards M^zieres.

The 4th division of cavaby, which had foUowed
the 5th North German Corps on to the right bank
of the Meuse, placed itself at Troifontaine, to the
south of the 11th Corps, and to the west of the
peninsula of Iges formed by the Meuse; and its
horse-artillery batteries opened fire from the eastern
edge of the woods there, at a range of 4000 paces,
against the French position at Floing.

"When the Crown -Prince of Prussia appeared at
Fr^nois, the battle was, as we know, raging somewhat
furiously upon the right wing, where the Army of the
Meuse and the 1st Bavarian Corps were engaged.
He therefore, at 7 a.m., ordered Walther's division of
the 2d Bavarian Corps to move towards Eemilly, to
support thence the 1st Bavarian Corps at Bazeilles ;
and to this end Bothmer's division was also to march
from Fr^nois to Wadelincourt. Two of its batteries,

60 THE WAK FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

together with the reserve artillery of the Corps, were
advanced upon the peninsula of Iges, to concentrate
their fire upon Floing, as the batteries of the 4th
division of cavalry and a great number of those of
the 11th Corps were already doing.

We have hitherto only followed the battle on the
right wing of the Germans — the Army of the Meuse
and the 1st Bavarian Corps — ^up to 10 A.M.; pointing
out, at the same time, the course which could and
would most likely be followed : the fight on the left
— the main mass of the army of the Crown-Prince of
Prussia — which only commenced later on, we have
considered up to 11 a.m.

It is manifest now that at the latter hour Wim-
pflFen's army was so ensnared that only two, and they
barely practicable, ways of escape remained. It might
possibly still break through to the north or to the
south ; to escape to the west or to the east was, accord-
ing to aU human calculation, impossible.

On the north, the gorge between Fleigneux and
Givonne, and through the woods of Daigny and
Terme, a passage barely 4000 paces wide was opeu
by which to retreat on to Belgian territory. The
highway in the same direction to Bouillon was
already no longer practicable for the French army.

On the south, there was still a possibility of
issuing through the fortified suburb of Torcy in
the direction of Vouziers and Rheinis. And this
movement would be in the beginning the least ex-

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OP SEPTEMBEIL 61

posed to danger. What the ultiinate result would
be, no one can say: but in war it is always
neeese^y in . deqlte situation to venture some-
thing. To entertain the idea of escaping by this
way would certainly have required much resolution.
The success of the enterprise, if undertaken, would
depend upon extreme simplicity and clearness in
the dispositions, and upon the unconditional obe-
dience and self-sacrifice of aU the individual Corps
commanders. From information which we have re-
ceived fix)m various quarters, it appears to be very
doubtful whether — especially as the Emperor was
present in Sedan — General Wimpffen woidd have
had the authority necessary to carry out successfully
the plan indicated by us. But independently of this,
it would seem that no one in the army even thought
of this road of retreat. As is generally the case after
a misfortune, numerous controversial writings have
been published as to who is to bear the burden of the
catastrophe of Sedan, but in none of these has the
idea of breaking through to the south been discussed.
As regards General von Wimpfien, he seems to have
cherished for a very long time the hope of being able
to succeed in repulsing the Germans, and to have
held that then would be the moment to think of
marching off. And it was in accordance with this
idea that until 4 p.m. no general orders were given.
Every Corps commandant, even every divisional com-
mander and brigadier, acted almost independently,

62 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

striving to maintain himself in his particidar position,
or to drive back his own especial adversary. The
chief of the army appears rather to have observed,
first here and then there, these detached efforts, than
to have attempted to direct them to a common end,
or arrange them with a general object.

When at last General von Wimpffen was con-
strained to abandon his first hope, he turned to the
idea of escaping in the direction of Carignan. But it
was then, as we shall see, much too late to entertain
the project of a general breaking through.

We return now for the present to the right wing
of the Grermans — ^to the Army of the Meuse and the
1st Bavarian Corps.

After the latter had at 10 a.m. obtained pos-
session of the village of Bazeilles, it was not able
at once to debouch from it, for the troops, mingled
confusedly together in the local fighting, had to be
collected together and re-ordered, and had to estab-
lish themselves in the place.

Towards 11 A.M. Walther's division of the 2d
Bavarian Corps, which division had been sent by the
Crown -Prince of Prussia to aid the 1st Bavarian
Corps, came up across the railway bridge. Von der
Tann at once caused it to advance along the right
bank of the Meuse against Balan, and afterwards
supported it in this movement by a part of the 8th
division of the 4th North German Corps, a battalion
of which had already taken part in the struggle for

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SEPTEMBER. 63

Bazeilles. At the same time he concentrated the 1st
and 4th brigades and the reserve artillery of the 1st
Bavarian Corps upon the heights to. the north-east of
Bazeilles, in readiness to resist any by chance success-
ful offensive blow which Lebrun might attempt to
the east through Balan.

After a severe engagement, the Bavarians, and the
Prussians of the 4th Corps, who were supporting
them, took the village, and maintained themselves
in it, although it was heavily shelled by the French
artillery in Sedan.

About 4 P.M. the French troops in this neighbour-
hood were directed to retreat upon Sedan, but many
large detachments of troops had already retired
without orders in that direction. This command
did not proceed from General von Wimpffen, but from
the headquarters of the Emperor. At this same time
General von Wimpffen proposed to Napoleon to at-
tempt to break through the enemy towards Carignan
in order to rescue his person. Before he received
the answer of the Emperor declining the offer, he had
communicated his intention to General Lebrun. The
latter answered, " You will sacrifice 3000 more lives,
and it will do no good ; but if you like to attempt it,
I go with you." And forthwith Wimpffen and Lebrun,
with the men they had with them, be^kn to advance.
Walther's Bavarian division was driven out of one
part of Balan, but it was at once supported by the
1st Bavarian brigade. At the same time the reserve

64 THE WAR FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

artilleiy of the 1st Bavarian Corps opened a murder*
ons fire. Wimpffen, who saw on the one hand that
the enemy was perfectly prepared to receive him, and
on the other hand was overwhelmed with astonishment
when he began to count, and discovered the smallness
of the force which was at his disposal, recognised
that his attempt was a vain one, and stopped the
movement, retiring into Sedan, pursued to its very
gates by detachments of Prussians and Bavarians.

To the right of the Bavarians and of the 8th divi-
sion of the 4th North German Corps, the whole of the
23d division of infantry of the 12th (Saxon) Corps
had concentrated behind La Moncelle. Towards mid-
day it received the order to march northwards along
the valley upon Daigny, and thence to mount the
heights which lie to the west towards La Garenne.

The division pushed forward up the valley, sus-
taining numerous encounters with various French
detachmeuts of the 1st and 7th Corps, and towards
3 P.M. its advanced - guard ascended the heights to
the west of Daigny. Ducrot oflfered a most stubborn
resistance, but was finally overpowered. The Saxons
took two mitrailleuses, and made more than a thou-
sand prisoners ; and at 4 p.m. Ducrot began his re-
treat upon Sedan.

In the combat which, as we have before related,
took place between the Bavarians and the 8th North
German Corps on the one side, and Wimpffen on the
other, the Saxons partook to this extent, that they

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SBPTEMBEE. 66

detached a regiment in its direction, which, however,
did not come into action.

Of the Prussian Guard, the 2d division marched, at
1 1 A.M., against Daigny and Hoybes ; but as the 12th
Corps shortly afterwards gained possession of the
former village, the Guard could now turn more to the
north against Givonne, and thence against Illy. Here
it brought the whole of its artillery into action, and
by 3 P.M. it came, at lUy, into communication with
the 5th Corps — ^that is, with the extreme left of the
German army. It may be said that in this hour the
net was closed: the expression may be somewhat
trivial, but it tells the truth ; a glance at the map
wiU prove that.

By this time the fate of the French army was
sealed. Separate detachments, especially of cavalry,
might by good luck have broken out ; but the army
could do so no longer. But it was precisely the best
troops that did not wish to separate their lot from
that of the others ; they made most honourable and
gallant efforts, but only to oblige the adversary ta
pay dearly for his victory, and to cover the retreat of
their friends— not to win an advantage for themselves^
which they would not value unless it could be gained
for all.

On the left wing of the Germans, after an artillery
battle had r^ L soMe tbne. the ix^try of th^
llth Corps advanced, soon after 11 A.M., from St
Menges to the attack of Floing, the 19 th brigade of

VOL. n. B

66 THE WAR FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

infantry from the 5th Corps joining on to its left.
The fighting there was very stubborn, especiaUy with
the 7th French Corps. The French infantry and
cavaby vied with one another in bravery, but. acted
without unity, working by regiments and by brigades.
At 11.30 A.M., four French regiments of horse made
the last attempt of importance at this point. Thrown
back by the steady fire of the German infantry, they
were obliged to seek refuge in the woods to the north
of Sedan, and by 2 p.m. the French here were in full
retreat upon the town.

The 5th North German Corps marched to the left
of the 11th, upon Illy, to complete the enclosure,
which was accomplished at 3 p.m. by the junction
of the former Corps with the Army of the Meuse, as
we have before related. Several gallant rallies were
made by the French here also, but, as everywhere else
on the field, without any general leading idea or any
guiding authority.

Following the advance of the infantry of the 11th
and 5th Corps, tiie 4th division of cavalry had
marched, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, from Troi-
fontaine up the heights to the north of Illy, and had
been directed thence by the Crown-Prince of Prussia
towards the road from ^Sedan to Bouillon, to embar-
rass the retreat of the French along it into Belgium,
should they attempt such a movement.

From the WUrtembergers a detachment had to be
sent along the left bank of the Meuse against a sortie

BATTLE OP SEDAN, 1ST OP SEPTEMBEB. 67

of the garrison of M^zieres, which, however, was re-
pulsed without any great trouble.

At 5 P.M. the heads of all the German columns
pushed forwards towards Sedan; the fortress was
bombarded by the field-guns, and the town was soon
in flames, as were also the adjacent villages.

In the town of Sedan, where the whole army of
M'Mahon was crowded together in narrow streets,
a confusion reigned which mocks any attempt to
describe it Napoleon HI. resolved to capitulate;
but he did not regard himself as commander-in-chie£
General von Wimpffen, who had commanded during
the day, was to arrange the capitulation of the army.
Napoleon surrendering his person only.

General von Wimpfien found the matter very dis-
tasteful, as can easily be understood. He now de-
manded his dismission from the Emperor Napoleon,
but the latter refused to grant this, and with reason.
Wimpffen had, on the morning of that same day,
claimed the commanderdiip-in-chief because of his
seniority, when he might very well, under the cir-
cumstances, and without in any way prejudicing his
o™ righ„, have left it i. tte LdTof Da««>t, who
had taken it over from M'Mahon.

Wimpffen therefore was obliged to submit to the
refusal of the Emperor. For the rest. Napoleon had
not waited for the consent of the commandant of the
army, but had already hoisted the flag of truce over
the gates of Sedan.

68 THE WAR FOR THB RHINE FRONTIER.

When the King of Prussia remarked from the
heights of Fr^nois that Sedan was ahready in flames,
he ordered the bombardment of the town to cease,
and sent forward an officer of the General Staff,
Lieutenant-Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf, with a
flag of truce towards the fortress. On the road,
Eronsart met with a Bavarian officer, who informed
him that the white flag was waving over the gate of
Sedan. He therefore continued his way, was admit-
ted into the town, and at once conducted before the
Emperor. When he communicated his commission
to the latter, which was to summon the army and the
fortress to surrender. Napoleon remarked that Bron-
sart must enter into negotiations to that end with
Wimpffen, the commander-in-chief of the army.

The Emperor had wished to give to Bronsart a
letter for the King of Prussia ; but now he bethought
himself of another messenger, and despatched the
writing by one of his adjutants. General Reille, who,
with Bronsart, reached the King about 7 p.m.

Napoleon's letter began : " As I have not been
able to meet death at the head of my troopcf, I lay
down my sword in the hands of your Majesty.''
For the rest, the Emperor surrendered only for his
person, as he had not conducted the command-in-
chief. From various circumstances which we have
had occasion to relate, it may be concluded how
doubtful this assertion really was.

The King of Prussia returned late in the evening

BATTLE OP SEDAK, 1ST OP SEPTEMBER, 69

to his headquarters at Vendresse, where he arrived
about 1 1 P.M. Before this he had commissioned Gen-
eral von Moltke to arrange the conduct of the trans-
actions relative to the capitulation, and had directed
Bismark also to assist in the same.

These transactions were conducted in Donchery, on
the French side by General Wimpffen himself, who
hoped at first to secure more favourable conditions
than were really arranged. Towards midnight,
Moltke declared that on the German side the only
terms which would be accepted were that the French
army should lay down their arms ; and then added,
that if the capitulation was not concluded by 9 a.m.
on the 2d of September, the bombardment of Sedan
would recommence. Wimpffen requested an adjourn-
ment until 1 A.M. to consider the matter. After this
interval, the negotiations took a more rapid course,
so that soon after 6 a.m. the terms of the surrender
were drawn up, and only required the ratification of
the King of Prussia. This consent Moltke obtained
from him at 8 a.m. on the battle-field, whither the
King had again repaired from Vendresse.

By the capitulation, the French army became
prisoners of war; the officers were permitted to
retain their freedom, their arms, and their personal
property, on giving their word of honour not to fight
again in this war against Germany. All arms and
mat&rid of war were to be handed over by a French
to a Germau commission, and the fortress of Sedan

70 THE WAR FOR TH£ RHINE FRONTIER.

was to be delivered oyer to the King of Prussia at
the latest on the 2d of September. The disarming
and stirrender of the troops was to follow on the 2d
or 3d of September.

Moltke at once issued dispositions for carrying out
these conditions. By them the surrender of the
French troops was to take place upon the terrain in
the elbow of the Meuse, from Villette to Iges, before
the 1st Bavarian and the 11th North German Corps.
The sending off of the French prisoners of war was
to be carried on along two lines : 1. By Stenay^ Estain,
and Gorze, to Bemilly on the Metz-Saarbrticken rail-
way ; 2. By Clermont en Argonne and St Mihiel, to
Pont h. Mousson.

The number of French who became prisoners of
war by the capitulation of Sedan amounted to 83,000
men, including 4000 officers ; to these must be added
25,000 men who were taken prisoners during the
battle, 14,000 wounded, and 3000 who had escaped
to Belgium. All these give a total strength of
125,000 men to M^Mahon's army, naturaUy coimted
by the ration list, and including the garrison of Sedan ;
or of 130,000 men, if the losses at Buzancy, Nouart,
and Beaumont are reckoned also.^

* A French author, an officer in the Bhine Army, gives the foUow-
ing numbers :—

Losses in the battles of Nouart—
Beaumont, BazeiUes, up to 31st of August inclusiTe, 9,000
At Sedan, including prisoners made during the battle, 46,000
Capitulated (officers included), .... 70,000
Escaped to Belgium, 16,000

Total strength of M'Mahon's aimj, . . 140,000

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SEPTEMBER. 71

Over 400 field-guns, 70 of which were mitrailleuses,
150 fortress-guns, 10,000 horses, and an abundant
war matSiiel of every description, fell into the hands
of the Germans.

The losses of the Germans at Sedan are calculated
at 13,000 men, kUled and wounded.

Although Sedan is a fortress, the capitulation of
the army of M'Mahon or of Wimpffen must be de-
sigaated, as it everywhere has been, as a capit^ation
in the open field; for Sedan, destitute of detached
works, is far too small to receive such a mass of de«
fenders as the army consisted of. And as a capitu*
lation in the open field, that of Sedan is, in regard
to the magnitude of the host which surrendered, an
event which stands without a parallel in history. A
superficial comparison of it with Prenzlau, Ratkau,
Baylen, Villagos, wiU suffice to prove this.

But in our opinion the occurrence acquires a much
greater political importance by the capture of the
Emperor Napoleon. His assertion that he could not
find his death on the field has been much ridiculed ;
but we believe that he really sought it there. It has
been said he only did not go near enough to the
enemy. But, in the first place, a too close approach
would be prevented by his followers ; and, secondly,
it is by no means certain that such an act would
necessarily have insured his death. There was an
equal chance of its leading to his being made prisoner
on the field of battle. There remained, certainly, the

79 THE WAB FOR THE BHINE FBONTIEK.

perfectly sure expedient of suicide. But it has very
mucli astonished and troubled us, that perfectly pious
people, who elsewhere condemn this act most unspar*
ingly, should demand it here from the most faithful
son and firmest support of the ChurcL

But, apart from this, we are convinced that the
death of the Emperor would have had no other politi-
cal result than his surrender; while, if he had escaped
with life and liberty from the bloody field of Sedan,
many things would have turned out differently to
what they have dona

At 6 A.M. on the morning of the 2d of September,
Bismark received word in Donchery, by General
Eeille, that Napoleon wished to speak with him, and
was on the way to Donchery. Upon this Bismark at
once rode out and met the Emperor near Fr^nois.

The Emperor expressed a wish to converse with the
King of Prussia ; and when the Chancellor of the
Confederation informed him that the latter was at
that moment very far off, in Vendresse, Napoleon
demanded whether the Ring had yet determined upon
the place for his present imprisonment, and what were
Bismark's views on the matter. The latter offered
him, for the time being, his own quarters in Donchery,
which he would at once prepare for him. The proces-
sion set itself in motion towards Donchery; but
before it arrived at the bridge over the Meuse there^
Napoleon saw on the roadside a lonely workman's
house. He halted and asked Bismark if he could

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SEPTEMBEIL 73

dismount, and the two men had there, in a poorly-
furnished room, an hour^s conversation.

The Emperor was, in the first place, especially
troubled by the severe terms of the capitulation which
the army of M'Mahon must submit to. Bismark
wotdd not enter upon this subject, as it had been
settled between Moltke and Wimpffen, and when
Napoleon returned to it, simply declined to discuss it.
On his side, he asked the Emperor what he thought
about peace negotiations. Napoleon answered, that
as a prisoner it was impossible for him at present to
commence treating, and that only the existing regular
Government in Paris, with the Empress-regent at
its head, was competent to do so.

It would be interesting to know whether Bismark
or Napoleon himself, after the events of the 1st of
September, in any way believed in the continuance of
the Government of the Empress. That Bismark did,
seems to us to be doubtful in the extreme; as he him-
self says, in his report to the King, that after the
utterances of the Emperor it appeared to him to be
doubly true that, beyond its military advantages, the
present situation offered nothing of practical moment.

After a long conversation in the room, the Emperor
went out in front of the house, and sat down there
in the open air with Bismark It was here that
Napoleon made the statement that he himself had
never wished for war, but had been forced into it by
the pressure of the public opinion in France.

74 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

We for our paxt have throughout expressed our
conviction that the Emperor Napoleon never particu-
larly desired this war; but in honour of truth it must
be said that that public opinion which forced him to
make war was created by his own party — ^by the press

tinuous prosecutions against untimely manifestations
of a free opinion — ^by the official candidates — ^and by
other like institutions, — ^and that the Emperor him-
self was not quite innocent of all these elements and
foundations of the Csesaric-Bonapartic public opinion.
This public opinion, which certainly greatly influenced
the Emperor, was in no way that of Franca

While the Emperor and Bismaxk were conversing,
the latter received notice that on the south of the
village there was a small and comfortably-furnished
house called Castle Bellevue, which was not occupied
by the wounded. Bismark iuformed Napoleon of this,
and added that he would propose it to King William
for the place of meeting, if the Emperor would agree
to it, and if he would repair thither at once, as he
must at all events need some repose.

Napoleon proceeded, then, with Bismark to Bellevue,
where also were now assembled General von Wim-
pffen, his Chief of the Staff, the Prussian General
Podbielski, and Lieutenant-Colonel V. Verdy, await-
ing the ratification of the capitulation. On the French
side some of the conditions were again referred to, and
an attempt was made to introduce alterations in thenu

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1ST OF SEPTEMBER. 75

But while this controversy was taking place, an
adjutant of Moltke's brought Bisiloark a communica-
tion from the former, saying that he had met the King
upon the battle-field, and that King WUliam would
not grant the Emperor an interview until the military
capitulation was completely settled.

Bismark now, in order to inform the King of the
state of things, rode towards him, but on the way
met Moltke with the text of the capitulation as it had
been sanctioned by the King. Both now turned back
together to Bellevue, and the definite signing followed
wiLu. any tether delay. "^

About noon Bismark and Moltke brought to the
King the signed capitulation, and the latter, accom-
panied by the Crown-Prince, then repaired to Bellevue,
where he had a quarter of an hour's interview with
Napoleon.

As a temporary residence, the Castle of Wil-
helmshohe near Cassel was apportioned to the Em-
peror — the place where once his jovial uncle, Jdr6me,
had lived as King of Westphalia, and where the
Electorate-Prince of Hesse has left so many of his
historical footsteps.

Napoleon quitted the Castle of Bellevue on the
morning of the 3d of September, and, much impeded
by trains of troops and of waggons, and also by
French guns which the Germans had captured, arrived
at Bouillon only on the morning of the 4th. Proceed-
ing then through Belgium by Verviers and Cologne,

76 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

he reached Wilhelmshohe on the evemng of the 5tli,
where preparations for his reception had been aheadj
made.

For some days after these events the Prussian news-
papers talked as though they were really convinced
that the German armies arriving before Paris would
have to deal with a regular Government — ^they meant
the Regency of the Empress Eugenie — and concluded
that after the repeated^ and in many cases signal,
defeats of the French regular army, there was every
probability of a speedy peace. Circumstances very
soon rendered it impossible to continue such language.

CHAPTER XXIL

PABIS AT THB END OF AUGUST AKD IK THE BEGIKlOKa
OF SEFTEMBEB — ^THE BEPUBLIC PECLABED.

Afteb the communication which the Count of Palikao
made to the Corps Legislatif on the 22d of August,
and of which we have made mention, the Minister of
War appeared as seldom as possible in the Chamber.
He excused his absence on the groimd of his labours
in organising fresh forces, which must not be inter-
rupted for secondary reasons. In reality he must
have found it tedious ever to repeat that all was
going on well, that the deep " plan '* was being exe-
cuted — ^that he had the best possible news, but that
he, as they would understand, could not communicate
it, because success depended upon secrecy, because
all might be ruined if the Prussians, who were spy-
ing about everywhere, heard anything of " the plan."
In time these general forms of speech might become
suspicious even to the Chamber, if it compared them
with the statements contained in the Prussian tele-
grams^ which certainly only came into Paris in very
small numbers. Palikao himself had not that trust in

78 THE WAB FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

the course of events with which he so easily inspired
the majority of the Chambers, and he, more than any
one else, was filled with a feeling of the necessity of
keeping the Emperor and the army of M'Mahon away
from Paris. We have before seen the steps he took
to effect this.

The business which the Minister of War resigned,
the official and semi-official journals took up. Ac-
cording to these papers the doom of the Grerman
armies was signed and sealed — *^ the plan " was being
executed. As regards *' the plan " itself there were
many contradictions. Some of the newspapers held
stubbornly to the victory of Bazaine on the 18th of
August^ on which day three Prussian Corps had been
thrown into the quarries of Jaumont, the site of
which still remained an unsolved enigma. According
to them, Bazaine was master of all the roads, and had
abeady left Metz to unite with M'Mahon upon the
fields of Champagne, where now, instead of the crosa-
bows and catapults of the Romans, Chassepots and
mitrailleuses would do their work, and annihilate the
red-haired barbarians of the East^ Other journals, to
whom, as time went by, the march of Bazaine from
Metz seemed to become doubtful, asserted that he
wished to remain in and about Metz. That was ex-
actly " the plan.'* The Germans, advancing incau-
tiously and arrogantly, would find themselves between
two fires, &c. Fluently dilated upon, this strategical
imbecility was to be read even as late as two days after

PARIS AT THB END OP AUGUST. 79

the battle of Sedan. There was not a single sensible
word in all these sensation articles, but the masses
were imposed upon by the confused, high-toned, and
fine-sounding military expressions, as we have seen to
be similarly the case often enough in Germany (1859
Guilay, 1866 Benedek).

And together with " the plan," the situation of the
Germans especially occupied the above-named Paris
journals.

He who read believingly the things there said,
would certainly not have given a centime for the Ger-
man armies, and would be unable to comprehend
why they did not very speedily retire £rom France.
According to the ' Yolontaire,' the Germans had, by
the end of the 16th of August, lost 144,000 men,
killed and wounded — ^the dead being in an enormous
proportion ; the remainder were dying of starvation ;
the last reserves were being called up from Germany,
"La landwehr'' and "La landsturm'^ — old men of
sixty years of age, with flint-muskets, canying an
enormous tobacco-pouch on the right side, a still
larger spirit-flask on the left, and a long clay-pipe in
the mouth, panting under the burden of a knapsack, in
which they carried their coflee-mill and elder-tea, and
who moved, coughing and spitting, from the right to
the left bank of the Ehine, cursing those who had
torn them from the embraces of their grandchildren
and great-grandchildren, to lead them into the arms
of death.

80 THE WAA FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

Between the Crown-Prince of Prussia and Prince
Frederic Charles, again, serious quarrels were said to
have arisen, so that the one would no longer support
the other. The news from the German side, which
could not be altogether ignored, was simply dealt with
as ^* the notorious Prussian lies.'' Lastly, it was spread
abroad as a certain fact that the King of Prussia had
become insane (fou). The genesis of this last news,
which could only be traced by watchful observers, was
highly interesting. The * Libert^,' namely, one day
stated in an article, the contents of which can easily
be condensed, that the King of Prussia must have
become insane; because he had ventured to penetrate
between two French armies and march upon Paris.
On the following day a second journal brought out an
article with the title, " The King of Prussia is mad,"
and gave in it, in fuller detail, the explanations of
the ' Libert^.' On the third day, a third journal an-
nounced : " On the best authority, we hear that the
King of Prussia has gone beside himself about the
state of his army, and has become mad. This is
naturally kept secret, but it is necessary to watch
him very closely." To every impartial observer, it
was manifest that then, less than any other time, had
the King of Prussia occasion to go mad.

With suchlike tales, then, were the intellectual
Parisians, and Frenchmen generally, fed by the per-
sons whom the Empire had brought up to educate
the people through journalism.

PAKIS AT THE END OP AUGUST. 81

We await here the question. But why, then, did
the intellectual Parisians and Frenchmen generally
believe such things 1 But such credulity was only
natural Imagine people who heard and read literally
nothing else whatsoever ! Could they be expected to
believe that everything that was told them was a
pure lie? Was so much to be expected of them
when that which they necessarily wished for was
told them day by day in comforting lies ? Let the
trial be made under like circumstances on the right
bank of the Ehine, and we shall see whether the
result would not be precisely the same; perhaps
only the people there would be more disposed to
depression, and therefore to doubt.

The very few independent and truthful journals
in Paris lost courage, as can easily be understood.
They disclosed such facts as they were obliged to,
but they did not trouble themselves any longer to
point attention to the disclosures by writing leading
articles on them.

When the army of the Crown-Prince began its march
upon Paris, and before the departure of M'Mahon
from Chalons to the north was determined on, which
must necessarily alter the dispositions for it, General
Trochu was appointed, on the 1 7th of August, Gover-
nor of Paris, and commander-in-chief of the collective
forces assembled for the defence of the capital.

Trochu, bom 1815, passed through the School of
St Cyr, and then the School of Application for the

VOL. II. p

82 THE WAR FOB THE BHIKE FBONTIER.

General Staff, and left the latter early in 1840 as
lieutenant on the Sta£ - In 1843 he became a cap*
tain. In Africa, where he had served since 1841^ he
drew upon himself, by his prudence and bravery, the
attention of Marshal Bugeaud, whose adjutant he was
from 1845 to the death of the Marshal in 1849 ; and
aa the Marshal fiiUj recognised the merits of his
adjutant, so did the latter also love and respect the
memory of the former, whom he ever regarded as his
real teacher in the art of war. In 1 853 Trochu became
colonel, and at the outbreak of the war in the East^
St Amaud chose him to be his adjutant. Promoted
to the rank of general at the end of 1854, he remained
as adjutant to Canrobert until this latter resigned the
chief command, when he undertook the command of
a brigade of infantry, which he led with brilliant
bravery. On the 8th of September 1855 he was se-
verely wounded by a shelL In the begiiming of the
campaign of 1859 in Italy, he again led a brigade, but
was appointed general of division on the 4th of May,
being at the time only forty-four years old. With
his division, which was hurried up to support Niel,
he played a peculiarly brilliant part in the battle of
Solferino. After the Italian campaign, the General
fell most markedly into the background ; most likely
because his connection with Marshal Bugeaud, whom
he remembered with just pride, had gained for him at
the Court the unpleasing name of Orleanist More-
over, to Trochu, a man of soldier-like simplicity and

GENERAL TROCHU. 83

of the highest honour, the reckless desire of gain and
enjoyment which, under the influence of the Second
Empire, pervaded all society, and spread even into the
army, was very repulsive. He feared that such things
would be fatal to it ; and not being able to respect
the persons who then enjoyed the highest outward
consideration, he kept himself personally far away
from the circles of the Court

In the year 1867, on the occasion of the Army

Reform Question, he published his book ^L'Arm^

Fran9aise/ Filled with love for the French army, and

with respect for its excellent qualities, he yet could

not overlook its shortcomings in organisation, and

brought these clearly to view. The truth was here,

as elsewhere, not listened to with pleasure ; and even

those officers who justly appreciated the penetration

and love of truth displayed in the work, found, for

the most part, that the book was inopportune, and

that it was not just then the time to unveil to all the

world the faults of the French system. The hidden

adversaries of the Greneral became more and more

hostile to him, and the Government passed him by on

every occasion. When the war of 1870 broke out,

General Trochu was only a member of the Committee

of the General Staff*, a post which gave him but little

to do. Trochu, when he saw the war conjured up in

such a frivolous manner, and saw, moreover, how the

troops, barely formed or equipped, were marched with

all haste to the frontier through the streets of Paris

84 THE WAE FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER,

with the cry, " A Berlin ! h, Berlin ! " was much
d^ressed, and foreseeing a disastrous issue to this
manner of proceeding, did not in any way hide his
opinions from Marshal Leboeu£ Trochu, therefor^
remained at first altogether unemployed Only when
the 12 th Army Corps was being formed did this man,
acknowledged to be one of France's most distinguished
generals, receive a command, and was finally, as we
have seen, called by the Ministry of Palikao to be
Grovemor of Paris — to a post which manifestly in
the course of the war must become a most important
and decisive position.

This appointment of Trochu could only be regarded
as a token of a breaking off from the purely Imperial-
istic Bonapartic performances of the last lustre^
and as a sign that the Ministry of National Defence
wished to employ every good Frenchman in his fit-
ting place, without regard to his peculiar opinions
— ^without heeding whether he was an unconditional
supporter of the Empire or not

That s]ich a signification was to be attached to the
nomination of Trochu was shown by Palikao also, in
the speech in which he informed the Corps Legialatif
of it.

Trochu announced his acceptance of the office in a
proclamation, which was posted up at every street-
comer, and which was received with universal accla-
mation. It concluded thus : '' And to complete my
task, which done, I shall, I assure you, retire again

PAMS AT THE END OF AUGUST. 85

into the daxkness &om whicli I have emerged, I take
one of the old devices of the province of Brittany,
where I was bom ; ' With the help of God for our
country/ " No word in the proclamation made men-
tion of the Emperor or of the Empire, and this omis-
sion was evilly spoken of by some of the Mamelukes
of the Chamber ; but to the Parisians it was very
pleasing. In Paris but few men spoke any more
of the Emperor, of the Imperial Prince and Court,
or of the Empress, and when they did, it was with
expressions of the deepest contempt The Empire
had been buried since the 7th of August. Even they
who had basked in its brilliancy turned from it as
did the others — they could not pardon it that it had
been unfortunate, and that it now threatened by its
misfortune to injure them also ; and thus they who
still had in some comer of their hearts any sympathy
for fallen greatness, did not dare to speak of it.

With General Trochu was associated a Committee
of Defence. Over its composition much strife arose,
which was not completely soothed before the catas-
trophe of Sedan. The Corps Legislatif wished to
strengthen the Coiomittee with a number of Deputies to
be chosen by the Chamber. The Govemment, on the
contrary, declared that if members of the Chambers
were in any case to form part of the Committee, they
must be nominated by the Govemment itself.

Until the appointment of Trochu but little had
been done to place Paris in a state of defence. The

86 THE WAB FOB THE RHTNB FBONTIEB.

General now began the task with the greatest zeal.
The works which he introduced were : —

1. The arming of the fortifications ;

2. The arming of the artillery ;

3. Providing Uving forces ;

4. Provisioning;

5. Instituting measures for internal safety.

Paris, which had become in 1841 a giant fortress,
the like of which does not now exist elsewhere, nor
has been seen since the days of Babylon and Nineveh,
required immense labour to render it presentable as
such to the enemy; for modem Europe and the
Parisians themselves have seldom in later years
thought at all of Paris as a fortress, or considered that
it might at some time be required to play the part
of one.

The ramparts in the detached forts, as well as in
the principal enceinte, required to be levelled for the
reception of guns and men, banquettes had to be
marked out, embrasures cut, and the thickness of
the parapets regulated. Ditches had to be excavated
before the various gates, drawbridges constructed,
and cover provided. The entrances of the eight
railways into the town had also to be secured. The
exits of the canals of St Denis and of De I'Ourcq were
strongly bridged over, and parapets raised upon this
bridging ; the ditches of the main enceinte were filled
with water ; the entrance and the exit of the Seine

PARIS AT THE END OF AUGUST. 87

were secured by new works; a flotilla of gunboats
was formed upon the river ; and then the construc-
tion of well-covered powder-magazines in the enceinte^
which were altogether wanting, was taken in hand ;
and^ lastiy, the system of detached forts was to be
completed by the erection of new works. These
tasks required time for their execution; but they
were all at least begun by the first days of Septem-
ber; and, as we shall see, time was gained for the
completion of the most important

As regards the artillery armament, the detached
forts had already, since 1867 — since the Luxemburg
aflfaii-that which was necessary for security against
an attack de vive force or by surprise. This was now
completed ; and, at the same time, steps were taken
to give to the main enceinte the guns necessary for
its safety.

Of regular troops there were in Paris the 13th
Corps (Vinoy), of which we have abeady q)oken, and
the depots of the Guard and of various regiments of
the line. By drawing in the marching regiments and
the remaining depots of the line, and by completing
them with men of the reserve, with men who had
served and were recalled to the colours, and with
recruits, it was thought that it would be possible to
form another Army Corps ; so that then the regular
troops would amount to some 60,000 men.

Further, 12,000 sailors, among whom also were
some marine infantry, were drawn into Paris and

98 THS WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

united in a marine division^ under the command of
Vice-Admiral la Eoncifere le Noury. Under him,
Kear-Admirak de Saisset and Pothuau were ap-
pointed brigadiers. This division was destined to
defend the principal detached forts on the north and
east sides of Paris. In each of the forts assigned to
it a captain of the fleet had the special command.
The sailors were particularly intended to work the
heavy guns with which the forts were armed, and in
the service of which they were practised.

9000 custom-house men were formed into a
division to watch the ramparts. 6000 wood-rangers
made a brigade of Rifles of two regiments.

In addition to these troops, which collectively must
be regarded as more or less regular and accustomed
to discipline, there were the Municipal Guard of
Paris, infantry and cavalry, and various formations
of the gendarTnerie of the departments.

The total of the above-enumerated forces would
amount to at least 90,000 men.

To them 100,000 men of the Mobile Quard &om
the provinces were next to be drawn in ; ami, lastly,
the Sedentary National Guard of Paris, which was to
be brought up to a strength of 266 battalions, with
at least 200,000 men. Of the latter, a portion, con-
sisting of the young or unmarried and stronger men,
could be mobilised, and be used then for service out-
side the ramparts. Finally, with all these were

PABIS AT THE £XD OF AUGUST. 89

sociated volunteer formations of various kinds, under
the names of Franc-tireurs, Eclaireurs, and so on.

The total number amounted to 400,000. The
arming, clothing, and equipment of the Corps, which
had to be absolutely improvised, only progressed
slowly; and as long as Palikao's Ministry and the
Empire existed, this was no doubt owing to the
unwillingness of the Government to place arms in
the hands of the whole male population of Paris.

And speaking of these things, we must not omit
to mention the affair of the firemen (pompiers) of
France.

After Palikao's Ministry had succeeded to power,
owing to the impression made by the totally unex-
pected, and therefore astounding, events of the be-
ginning of August, and after the feeling then
aroused had been strengthened by the pitiable
despatches of the Emperor firom Metz, the new
Minister of the Interior, M. Chevreau, issued an.
order to all the prefects to send to Paris as speedily
as possible all firemen under forty years of age. The
capital seemed to the Ministry to be at that time
threatened firom day to day. To call out the citizens
appeared to it to be a hazardous proceeding ; and so it
wished at first to base the defence of Paris upon the
firemen firom the provinces, who were in some degree
disciplined, and who had very little in common with
the Parisians.

90 TH£ WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

From the 15th of August^ then, these men streamed
into Paris. Everywhere were to be seen the most
wonderful uniforms, surmounted hj hehnets of das-
sieal design. There came in the crowds not only
young men below forty years of age, but many
decided antediluvians, with the most beautiful white
beards, and with the thinnest legs, the spareness of
which was rendered yet more conspicuous by the
tightness of their pantaloons. No preparation had
been made for their reception. Most of them had no
idea wherefore they were called to Paris, but rather
imagined that a great conflagration was going on,
which they were to extinguish. The pr^ence of
these brave, devoted men could only occasion em-*
barrassment; for by the I7th of August, 60,000 of
them had arrived. On that day the Minister of the
Interior instructed the prefects to stop forwaiding
any more, and began to try to get rid as soon as
possible of those who were already come. This was
effected after a time; but a great number of pro-
vincial firemen had at all events had the pleasure
of admiring the wonders of the capital, which but
few of them had seen before — and tiiis in itself
was some satisfaction.

The Committee of Defence wished to provision
Paris for six months, and thus render it independent
for that period ; but for so large a town this was an
immense undertaJdng. It was, it is true, rendered
somewhat easier by the amount of money amassed

PAEIS AT THE END OF AUGUST. 91

in Paris, by the trade and business connections of
the capital with the whole of France, and by the
space which there was within its walls for the accum-
nlation of great quantities of supplies, Abeady in
the third and fourth weeks of August numerous
trains arrived from Nantes, Havre, and Rouen with
com, rice, forage, and salt meat. A cattle-park was
established in the Bois de Boulogne. New mills
were erected ; so that very shortly two and a half
times as much com could be ground in the town
as in ordinary times. But still the gathering in of
stores sufficient to furnish with rations a town like
Paris — ^a town of 1,800,000 of population — ^was a
work of great difficulty, even if the supply was limited
to the most necessary food, as on board ship. And it
must be remembered that the inhabitants of Paris are
somewhat spoiled; and although certainly not such
large eaters as are to be found elsewhere, they still
all of them in every grade know how to appreciate
the good things of this world. It was almost impos-
sible to guarantee fresh meat for six months, if only on
account of the quantily of forage which the requisite
number of live cattle would consume in such a length
of time; and, in addition to this, the year 1870 had
been throughout France an exceptionally bad one for
crops, on account of the drought which had pre-
vailed* Salt, one of the most indispensable neces-
saries of life, generally falls short first in invested
towns, because, as a rule, people have no idea of

92 THE WAR FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

the enormous quantities usually consumed in modem
life. Whence, too, were to be procured eggs, butter^
and fowls for six months'? Whence were to come
fresh vegetables, which can generally be bought in
Paris at such moderate prices, and of such an ex-
cellent quality 1 Of fish we will not speak. The
Seine certainly suppUes a few, but they are very
indifferent; and the fish from the sea, and other
maritime products, would naturally be shut out
when once the investment had taken place.

It might, then, perhaps be possible to provision
Vm> fo? i m<LL ma comestibles sui » a«
supplied to ships, although even that, spite of all
zeal which might be expended upon it, would be no
light task; but to provide for it food, such as all
classes had long been accustomed to, was clearly
impossible.

On the 25th of August, General Trochu caused
a great raid to be made upon the quarters of the
town in which the higher demi-nionde and its Mends
resided. Many of these were seized, and among
them were found an enormous number of foreigners
— a fact which is worthy of notice, as a certain party
in Germany are always discoursing with virtuous
indignation on the immorality of the French. These
ladies, together with their intimately were speedily
expelled from Paris. This measure met with uni-
versal approbation — among other reasons, because
this society, thus summarily disposed of, was ready

PARIS AT THE END OF AUGUST. 93

for anything, even to the extent of assisting intrigues
against the defence of Paris.

Another measure which followed very shortly was
not so generally approved of. On the 28 th of
August^ placards on the street - comers announced
that all foreigners who were subjects of the States
with which France was at war must leave Paris and
its neighbourhood within three days, and must either
return to their homes or retire into the Departments
to the west of the Loire. Any who claimed to be
exempted must obtain a special licence from the
Governor of Paris. Gleneral Trochu remarked that
this banishing appeared to be also necessary for the
sake of those expelled.

A similar expulsion has scarcely occurred since the
days of antiquity, for there were 80,000 Germans in
Paris. Much hardship was caused; for the decree
affected, among others, many men who had been resi-
dents in Paris fifteen and twenty years — ^who had
founded families and businesses there — whose wives
were Frenchwomen, and whose children had been
bom in France. Now at three days' notice they were
driven from the country which they had made their
own, and obliged to return to a home which had
long become foreign to them. There was even dis-
covered a chief of battalion of the National Guard,
who, German by birth, had never been naturalised.
Much misery was consequently seen everywhere.
Considering the generous and humane character of

94 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

the French in general, and of the Parisians in par-
ticular, one involuntarily asks one's self' on what
grounds such a measure could appear to be necessary.

It is true that there were Germans, guests of France,
who had sought and found there a livelihood which
their own country denied them, who now manifested
in public places their joy over the German victoria
in a manner which amounted to brutality, and which
must have deeply wounded every Frenchman ; there
were also people who loudly proclaimed their approval
of the most severe behaviour of the German armies
towards France. Among the uneducated classes of
German workmen, also, threats were made of conspir*
acies and deeds of violence on their part when once
the German hosts should appear before Paria But
such cases were exceptional, although here and l^ere
rough treatment ensued, which supported the state-
ment of General Trochu that the banishing was for
the good of those banished. People also whom the
decree of the General did not^iffect, such as German-*
speaking Swiss, and Austrians, began to depart One
of these^ on being questioned, replied, *^ What does it
avail me that I am Swiss ? I speak perhaps a word
of German to a countryman ; a gamin calls out, Un
Prussien! un espion Prussien! I am surrounded,
arrested, perhaps mobbed to death on the way to the
Commissioner of Police. All the reclamations of our
ambassador would not then restore me to life.''

Let us look at things as we may, at the bottom of

PARIS IN THE BEGINKIKG OF 8EFTEMBBB, 95

this banishment of the Germans lies the awakening
of national hate.

And this awakening of national hate — its awa-
kening on both sides, not on the French alone — ^is
for Europe the greatest curse of this war, compared
with which aU material sufferings, aU material losses,
great and pitiable though they may be, are as no-
thing. It was the anxiety to ward off this misfor-
tune, which they saw was inevitable if war broke
out, that caused a number of single-minded men of
both nations to strive for years with all their power
to postpone its advent

The expulsion of the Germans was not confined
to Paris or the fortresses, but even tiiose who lived in
the open towns were hunted away. One of the men
who first incited the measure was M. Gambetta, who
was shortly aAierwards called upon to play a great
part in the history of his country.

On the forenoon of Saturday, the 3d of September,
the first news of the cat^ustrophe of Sedan reached
Fans, and though it was not at all complete or de^
finite, great excitement had arisen on the Boulevards
by noon*

The session of the Corps Legislatrf was opened
at 3 P.M., when Falikao announced important events.
He commenced with describing a sortie of Bazaine from
Metz, which had been repidsed. This, he acknowledged,
was not good news. Then first he began to talk of a
battle fought between M^zieres and Sedan, in which

96 THB WAB FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

first success, then misfortune, had been on the French
side ; then he stated that M'Mahon was wounded, —
and all this he told in confused and obscure language,
that still left grounds for hope, dwelling especially on
the fact that the intelligence was not official But he
repeatedly declared that the news was most important,
and that by it the Grovemment was compelled to
appeal to the living power of the people.

After Palikao's explanation, a lively diBcussion at
once ensued. Jules Favre first brought some order
into it, in a speech which, far superior to his usual
declamations, demanded : " What is the truth 1 The
truth is, that the French army has, under all circum-
stances, whenever it has met the enemy, behaved with
heroic courage. You know the miracle of bravery
which Marshal Bazaine wrought when he sought to
rupture the circle of the far superior forces which sur-
rounded him. Without counting the enemy, in spite
of all obstacles, knowing that France required his
sword, he sought to set himself free. On the other
hand, a general not less brave set out to support
him in this enterprise. He has succumbed. There
was no want of bravery. What was wanting was
freedom of command. It is notorious that troops
were demanded from him to protect the Emperor.
He refused to send them, and then the Council of
Ministers despatched some of those which were
destined to defend Paris. That is well known, and
such a state of things ought not to continue. We

PARIS IN THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER. 97

must know how we stand with the Government.
Is the Emperor in communication with his Ministers?
Does he give them orders 1 ^'

To this question Falikao answered distinctly,
"No."

" Then/* continued Jules Favre, " the Government
has practically ceased to exist ; and if you are not in-
credibly blind, if you have not an obstinacy which is
no longer patriotic, you must admit that it is your
duty to demand from the country those resources by
which deliverance can be effected. I will not examine
the question more deeply. The answer of the Minister
has cleared up the main point — the Government has
ceased to exist''

Hereupon arose furious interruptions by the Mame-
lukes. The President, Schneider, stood up and spoke :
" On every occasion it would be my duty to protest
against such words. Under the present circumstances
especially, I must protest against everything that may
cause a weakening of the countey."

Jules Favre — "A weakening! What I seek is
moral power; and it Ues in a Uberated country, which
must only rely upon itself and upon its representa-
tives, no longer trusting to those who have plunged
it into destruction. (Great noise from the Mame-
lukes.) In this extreme crisis I have but two words
to add — France and Paris, both equally threatened,
both united in resisting by a close solidity, are re-
solved not to lay down arms imtil the enemy is

VOL. ir. Q

98 THE WAR FOB THE RHINE FBONTIER.

driven back. The country knows that in it. and in it
alone, lies the remedy. (Applause on the Left.) It is
necessaiy that, to avoid confusion, aU parties step back
in fav^ of a nulitary man, who will teke upon him-
self the defence of the nation. His name is well
known and dear to the country. He must take the
place of all others ; before him all the phantoms of
Government must disappear. That is the remedy : I
say it in the sight of the country — may the country
hear me 1 (Very good ! on the Left, and correspond-
ing cries on the Right.) "

This distinct recommendation of making Trochu a
sort of dictator was very displeasing to the Count of
Palikao, and he reminded the Chamber that a con-
stituted Government existed, and that it was their
duty to rally round it

During the subsequent part of the sitting, tiie
Corps Legislatif waa principaUy occupied in discussing
the urgency of calling in the collective male population
of all ages between twenty-five and thirty-five years^
instead of, as up to the present, only soldiers of the
higher age who had already served ; and afterwards
with the question of the election of officers for the
National Guard of Paris, which had been already
postponed for a long tima

The Chamber finally adjourned until 3 p.m. on the
4th of September.

But it was destined to meet again ere that. When
the sitting closed it was 4.30 p.m.; and only at a

• ^.

PARIS IN THE BEGINNING OF SBPTEMBEIl. 9ft

later hour was intelligence brought by telegrams from
Belgium and Switzerland which showed the catas-
trophe of Sedan in its true light.

Groups immediately formed on the Boulevards,
and paraded them singing the Marseillaise. One of
these mobs proceeded to the Luxemburg, at that time
the headquarters of the Governor of Paris, and there
demanded that the deposition of the Emperor and of
the dynasty should be proclaimed.

Palikao himself could not as yet credit the whole
extent of the misfortune ; and in the evening tele-
graphed to the French consul in Basle to inquire if
L Germaa news of the ct«ta,phe of Sedan ™ to
be believed. He received for answer, that by all
accounts there could be no doubt of the truth of what
was stated.

Meanwhile several of the deputies had hurried to
the President, Schneider, and communicating to him
what they had heard, had importuned him to assemble
the Chamber as quickly as possibla This he con-
sented to do, and, sending toLprivate dwellings of
the members, summoned them to meet at midnight
between the 3d and 4th of September.

At 1 A.M. on the 4th, the sitting was opened. The
Count of Palikao was present also. In spite of the
telegram from Basle, he had lain himself down to
sleep peacefully, without consulting the Ministry, and
was first awakened and caused to arise by the messen-
ger from Schneider.

■*

«• •

100 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The Count was the first speaker, and now confessed
the truth.

" Our army," he said, " has, after heroic efforts,
been thrown back by overwhebning forces on Sedan.
Resistance was no longer possible. The army has
capitulated, and the Emperor has been made pris-

oner."

After communicating this serious intelligence,
Palikao demanded an adjournment until the morrow.
Properly speaking, this would be until the 5th of
September, but he meant only until some later hour
in the day of the 4th.

The President, Schneider, supported the motion,
and Jules Favre, speaking in the name of the Left,
did not oppose it ; but he at the time laid before the
Chamber a motion with the following contents : —

1. ^^ It is declared that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte
and his dynasty are deposed from the power which
the constitution bestowed on them.

2. ^* The Corps Legislatif nominate a commission J
of government, composed of . . . The same is in-
vested with the full authority of a government, and
has the special task of resisting the invasion to the
utmost, and of driving the enemy from the territory
of the nation.

3. ^'General Trochu is confirmed in his post of
Grovemor-General of the town of Paris.''

The ex-Minister Pinard alone ventured to remark,
" We have not the right to proclaim the deposition ;"

PAKIS IN THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER. 101

and the Chamber then adjourned until noon on the
4th, the whole sitting having lasted but twenty
minutes.

In the morning hours of the 4th, a proclamation of
Palikao's Ministry was found on all the street-comers :
" Frenchmen 1 a great disaster has happened to the
country. After three days of heroic battles deliv-
ered by the army of M'Mahon against 300,000 of
the enemy, 40,000 men have been made prisoners.
General Wimpflfen, who assumed the command in
place of Marshal M'Mahon, severely wounded, has
signed a capitulation. But this cruel blow does not
shake our courage. Paris is to-day in a situation to
defend herself. The military forces of the land axe
being organised. In a few days a new army will
stand under the walls of the capital. Another army
will be formed on the banks of the Loire. Tour
patriotism, your unity, your energy will rescue France.
The Emperor has been taken prisoner in the battle.
The Government, in harmony with the public force,
wiU adopt all the measures required by the importance
of the events."

At 1 P.M. on the 4th of September, the President,
Schneider, opened the sitting of the Corps Legislatif.
The Count of Palikao had surrounded the place of
meeting, the Palais Bourbon, with numerous troops^
and occupied the Place de la Concorde.

Against this Count K^ratry protested ; and in the
course of a debate, in which it was demanded that

102 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

the Corps Legislatif should be guarded only by the
National Guard, Palikao adopted a very high tone,
and spoke at times in most unmeasured terms. Then,
in opposition to the motion which M. Favre had
brought forward in the midnight sitting, he moved
the following governmental one, and demanded that
the debate on it should be declared urgent: —

1. "A council of government and of national de-
fence is hereby formed. The same to consist of five
members — each to be chosen by an absolute majority
of the Corps Legislatif.

2. " The nomination of Ministers shall be subject
to the approval of this council.

3. "General the Count of Palikao is nominated
Governor-General of this council

"Given in the Council of Ministers, the 4th of
September 1870.

"For the Emperor, and by virtue of the power
which he has intrusted to us.

(Signed) " Eugenie."

Hereupon Jules Favre demanded that his proposal
also be declared urgent.

M. Thiers moved a conciliatory proposition. He
inclined to the view of Favre, but he held that, for
the sake of unity, a sacrifice should be made. His
motion, which was supported by forty-seven members,
ran: —

" In view of the existing state of afiairs, the Cham-

PARIS IN THE BEGINNING OP SEPTEMBER. 103

ber nominates a commission of government and of
national defence. A Constituting Assembly will be
convened as soon as circumstances wiU permit."

By a decision of the Chamber all three of these
motions — of Favre, of Falikao, and of Thiers — were
recognised as urgent They were to be examined
by a committee of nine members, to be named by
the Bureau ; and during the consultation of this, the
President adjourned the sitting at 1.40 p.m. until
2.30 P.M.

But before that time the state of affairs was greatly
changed.

In the course of the forenoon a number of battalions
of the National Guard had assembled in their arron-
dissements. In the afternoon they traversed the
Boulevards, and were greeted everywhere with the
cry, ** The deposition 1 the deposition ! " " Long live
the National Guard 1 long live the Nation ! " And
between these arose every now and again the shout,
" Long live the Republic ! **

After parading the streets, these men finally posted
themselves in crowds by the palisades which shut off
the court of the Palais Bourbon from the Quai d'Orsay.
A gate in this was at first partly opened, but a ques-
tor of the Corps Legislatif shut it. Thereupon the
National Guard and people both demanded that it
should be reopened. A deputy from the Left, M.
Steenackers, came then from the Palais Bourbon, and
promised the mob that this should be done if they

104 THE WAE FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

would enter without arms. A number of the National
Guard then took the bayonets from their muskets,
and announced themselves as a deputation; where-
upon, by an order from Steenackers, the gate was
thrown open. The National Guard entered, the
people thronged in behind it, and soon a confused
multitude overran not only the tribunes, but also the
floor of the Chamber.

When the deputies wished to return from the
Bureau to resume the sitting, most of them shrank
back affrighted. By 3 p.m. the whole palace was
filled with people who did not belong to it, but who
made themselves perfectly at home there. After the
nominal reopening of the sitting no one could make
himself heard, and therefore, at 3 p.m., the President
adjourned the Chamber, a great number of deputies
belonging to the majority and to the Centre retiring
to a room in the H6tel du President to consult as to
what further steps should be taken.

While the nature of a new government was being
deliberated upon there, the members of the extreme
Left, the Irreconcilables, accompanied by a mob of
the National Guard and of citizens, proceeded to the
Hdtel de Ville, and being there nominated by the
latter to be members of government, a Bepublic was
forthwith proclaimed.

Upon information of this being received by the
deputies assembled in the President's house, three of
them were deputed to repair to the H6tel de Ville,

PABIS IN THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER. 105

and there enter into negotiations with the Provisional
Government.

The deputation found that this government con-
sisted of all the deputies for Paris, excepting only M.
Thiers. M. Jules Favre, one of its members, after-
wards returned to the Palais Bourbon and thanked
the members who were still there for the offer of their
co-operation, but regretted that the Government must
decline accepting it, as no good could result from it ;
and stated, further, that the dissolution of the Corps
Legislatif had been therefore decreed.

Simultaneously with this the Senate was also pro-
rogued. It had been opened at 12.30 p.m. by the
President, M. Eouher. At first there had been a suc-
cession of violent declarations of adherence to the
Empire and the dynasty; and when news of the
proceedings in the Corps Legislatif arrived, the sena-
tors had protested against this anarchy, and expressed
their deepest disgust at it. But when the question
was discussed whether, under the existing circum-
stances, the Senate should not sit en permanence, to
be able to act at once vigorously, as events might
require. Messieurs les Senateurs lost courage, and
separated with the resolve of meeting again at the
customary hour on the 5th, without regarding what
might happen outside, to consider any proposals which
the Legislature might bring forward.

But this sitting was never to take place. The Pro-
visional Government declared the Senate to be not

106 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

only dissolved, but abolished. The senators dispersed
to all quarters of the compass, as the members of the
Eight and Centre had done, and none dared to oppose
the revolution. Their place of sitting, as well as that
of tlie Corps Legislatif, was .then sealed up and
watched by the new authorities.

While thus the sitting of the Chambers closed
amid tumult, and the Republic was proclaimed firom
the H6tel de Ville, a crowd of people, and of the
National and Mobile Guards, broke, at 3 P.M., from
the Place de la Concorde into the gardens of the
Tuileries, and advanced towards the reserved garden
of the palace, which was occupied by troops of the
depot of the Imperial Guard, under General Mellinet.
A man of the Mobile Guard was sent forward with a
white flag to open negotiations on the part of the
mob. General Mellinet pointed out that the tricolor
flag no longer waved over the building, a sign that no
member of the Imperial family was within it, and
declared himself ready to withdraw his men if the
National Guard would at once occupy the palace.
The troops raised the butts of their rifles in the air,
and the gates were opened. The National Guard
took possession, and the people streamed in, not only
from the west, but also from the east side, from the
Place du Carrousel, without being guilty of the slight-
est disorder, save only that they removed the nu-
merous golden N's, the emblems of the fallen power.

FLIGHT OF THE EMPBBSS. 107

The Empress Eugenie had left the Tuileries at 1
P.M., accompanied only by a subordinate servitor of
the palace, and crossed on the evening of the same
day the Belgian frontier at Maubeuge, whence she
shortly afterwards repaired to England, whither her
son was also sent. The whole of the Court servants,
high and low, had dispersed, and had left to her fate
the lady whom, but the day before, they had wor-
shipped on their kneea There remained behind only
the kitchen domestics, who perhaps felt themselves
tied to the place by the certainty of good cheer, and
a faithful subaltern employS, the secretary of General
Lepic, Marshal of the Palace. This official was the
only one who pitied the Empress in her abandon-
ment and felt for her solitude in the last hours of
her sojourn in the Tuileries.

The last member of the Imperial family to leave
Paris was the Princess Clothilde, wife of Prince Napo-
leon. After hearing mass, she quitted the Palais Eoyal
at 3 P.M., and journeyed to Prangins in the Canton
Wadt, a possession of her husband, where her children
had been already sent. The husband himself had,
after the first misfortunes which the French army
experienced, left the camp, the air of which was al-^
ways disagreeable to him, and under pretence of a
diplomatic miflsion, had found tiie opport^ty of
breathing more freely in Italy, in the vicinity of his
royal father-in-law.

108 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The Provisional Govermnent of the Republic and
of National Defence was composed of M. Emanuel
Arago, Cremieux, Jules Favre, Ferry, Grambetta^ Gar-
nier-Pagfes, Glais-Bizoin, Pelletan, Picard, Rochefort,
Jules Simon, and General Trochu, who was confirmed
in his post of Governor of Paris, and appointed at the
same time President of the Government.

The Ministerial posts were distributed thus: —
Foreign Affairs, Jules Favre; Interior, Gambetta;
War, General Le Flo ; Marine, Admiral Fourichon ;
Justice, Cremieux ; Finance, Picard ; Public Instruc-
tion and Art, Jules Simon; Agriculture and Com-
merce, Magnin : as Mayor of Paris, a title which was
now revived, Etienne Arago ; as Prefect of Police,
Count K^ratry ; and as Director of the Post-Office
and Telegraphs, M. Steenackers, were appointed.

Most of these men are sufficiently well known. The
Mayor of Paris, an old Republican, brother of the
celebrated astronomer Francis Arago, was bom in
1802, his nephew Emanuel in 1812.

Vice- Admiral Fourichon, bom 1809, entered the
Naval School in 1826, and became "captain of line-
of-battle ship '' in 1848. As such he was, after the
coup d'Stat, Governor of Cayenne ; and the political
prisoners who were sent there by the decrees of Presi-
dent Prince Louis Bonaparte, assert that he carried
out to the utmost the sentences of deportation — ^a
somewhat remarkable recommendation for a Minister
of the present Republic, which was founded upon the

MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC. 109

ruins of the Empire and Bonapartism * Fourichon
was promoted to Vice- Admiral in 1859 ; and at the
outbreak of the war in 1 8 70, he received the command
of the North Sea Squadron; and the decree which
appointed him Minister of Marine under the Eepublic
reached him on board the ironclad ship Magnanime,
before Wilhelmshafen (Bay of Jahde).

Le Flo, bom 1804, became brigadier in 1848, and
in the same year was elected for the Assembly.
There he sat on the Right, and was a promoter of the
Bonapartic policy until the Prince President fell out
with that side also, when Le Flo took part against
him. He was therefore arrested on the 2d of Decem-
ber 1851 and exiled from France, whither he first
returned in 1859. From that time until 1870 he took
no part in State affairs.

Leon Gambetta, bom in Cahors in 1838, springs
from a Genoese family. In his youth he displayed
many traits of great energy, which may also be ex-
plained by the nervous excitability of the Southern
character. In the year 1859 he became an advocate
in Paris, where, towards the end of 1868 and in the
beginning of 1869, he made himself especially cele-
brated by his defence of the men accused in the Bau-
din affair, and also on the occasion of the " emancipa-

* It was Fourichon who ezpreefily ordered the EepublicaiiB trans-
ported to Algeria, after the success of the coup (THcUy to be fastened
to the "spit" during their passage. The "spit" is a long iron bar
which is run through the chains of fifteen or twenty of the galley-
slayes.

110 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

tion " of Toulouse. In the latter year he was retnmed
to the Corps Legislatif for Paris and for Marseilles^
and decided to sit for the latter place. As a deputy,
he, in spite of protracted sickness, became the ac-
knowledged leader of the extreme Left — ^the Irrecon-
cilables.

Count K^ratry, of an old Brittany family, was bom
in the year 1832, entered the French cavalry as a
volunteer in 1854, went through the campaigns in
the Crimea and in Italy, and after the last, towards
the end of 1859, became a sub-lieutenant. In 1861
he went with the 3d regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique
to Mexico. In 1864 he served for a time in the contre
guerilla force of Colonel Dupin, became then orderly
officer to Marshal Bazaine, and in 1865 took his dis-
charge. He then devoted himself to literary occupa-
tions, and wrote those articles in the ' Eevue Contem-
poraine' which essentially placed weapons in liie
hands of the Opposition to attack the Government
and Bazaine concerning their behaviour in the Mexi-
can war, and which involved the author in a verbal
and written controversy with M. Rouher. In 1869,
K^ratry was elected for the Corps Legislatif ; and he
it was who, after the prorogation of July, made the
proposal that the Chamber should, if not summoned
before, reassemble on the 26th of October by its own
authority. We have already related the fate of this
proposition.

Bochefort, as a member of the new Govenmient,

MINISTEBS OF TH£ BEPUBLIO. Ill

had in the first place to be released from the prison of
Ste Pelagie, where he was still confined. With him
numerous other Eepublicans were set free who had tried
to raise the flag of their cause on the 14 th of August.
The attempt failed, principally because by an error the
simultaneous uprising of the difierent sections of the
conspiracy did not take place. The ringleaders who
were captured were tried by martial law and sentenced
to death, as Paris was already in a state of siege ;
but luckily the sentence had not yet been carried
into effect, and the Eepublicans of the 4th of Sep-
tember could not consistently cause it to be executed
upon the Eepublicans of the 14th of August.

M. Steenackers, bom in Lisbon in 1830, was only
naturalised as a Frenchman in 1866. His parents
were Belgians. He originally intended to be a sculp-
tor ; but soon giving up that idea, he devoted him-
self to politics and to historical researches. In 1869
he was, after he had been for some time member of
the council of the Upper Mame, returned to the
Corps Legislati£

M. Isaac Adolf Cremieuz was bom in Nimes in
1796, and has been an advocate since 1817. As such
he has been engaged in political processes of every
nature, and conducted them with great cleverness,
both for men of liberty and for the tyrants of the
world. During the Oriental question of 1840 he
entered zealously into the cause of his eviUy-entreated
co-believers, and secured the acquittal of the Jews of

112 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER,

Damascus. In the year 1848 lie pronounced for the
declaration of the Republic, and entered the Govern-
ment as Minister of Justice, although he had never
before been estranged from the House of Orleans, and
although he had even in the last hours promoted the
regency of the Duchess of Orleans. He, however,
soon resigned his post, as he would not consent to the
prosecution of Louis Blanc. He was then returned
to the Assembly. There he did not show himself at
all pleased with the Grovemment of Cavaignac, and
favoured the election of Prince Louis Napoleon to be
President. But when the latter was so chosen, he
opposed him in the Legislatif, and had the honour of
being arrested during the coup d'Stat. When he was
liberated, he retired altogether from politics, and
devoted himself to advocacy. Throughout he showed
no hostility to the Bonapartic rule, neither had he
any antipathy to the family. In the year 1869 he
was elected by the 3d district of Paris in the after-
elections for the Corps Legislatif.

It certainly cannot be said that there was much
homogeneity in the constitution of the Provisional
Government, but it can be asserted that all its mem-
bers entered it with the firm conviction that after the
catastrophe of Sedan nothing remained for France
but a Eepublic — that a government of some kind
must be given to it, and that this took upon itself a
heavy burden. In truth, it required much ill-feeling
to assume or to give out that the new Ministers ex-

MnnSTERS OF THE REPUBLIC. 113

pected to derive much pleasure from their tenure of
office.

They all knew well that their Government was
not a regular one — that it was only a makeshift,
which had, however, to be accepted. All understood
thoroughly that by the political law of France the
general voice of the people was required to confirm it
in power, or to form from it another. But divers
opinions prevailed a^ to the moment in which the
French nation should be called upon to give its vote ;
and tins, under the existing state of affairs, is easUy
to be comprehended, without accusing the members
of the Government of fearing that an immediate
appeal to the people would cost them their places.

The next question, of the greatest interest to the
whole civilised world, was, How would the revolution
in France affect the continuation of hostilities 1 Could
it lead to a speedy peace 1

Most of the men who now formed the Provisional
Government had, before the commencement of the
war, protested most decidedly against it. It might
therefore be assumed that they would strive to bring
about its cessation. But then they indubitably could
not conclude a peace. Only a regular government
could do that. Even supposing that the Provisional
Government had the whole of France on its side, it
was nevertheless not regular. The government of a
great country can neither be chosen nor confirmed
in office by acclamation. In order that it may be

VOL. n. H

114 THE WAB FOE THE RHINE FRONTIER.

regarded as regular, it requires formal sureties, which
in this case could only be obtained by means of a
general vote.

The Provisional Government, therefore, created in
the H6tel de Ville in Paris, could not seek to conclude
peace with the Germans, and the Germans could not
be expected to accept from such a Government that
which itself it dared not venture to seek.

But this Government could take one step towardB
bringing the war to a close. It could at all events
conclude an armistice which would not formally bind
France to accept peace. The Germans also could
arrange such a temporary cessation of hostilities with
it; and the essential object of such an agreement
must be to enable France to recognise by her generd
vote the Government already formed, or to create a
new and regular one.

But with all this it is clear that the German inter-
est would not allow such an armistice, unless it would
presumably lead to a peace — to a peace which would
answer her demands ; and therefore the Provisional
Government must not only itself recognise these, but
must be nearly convinced that France also would
agree to them.

But when the Provisional Government entered into
office, the state of a£fairs between the two nations had
assumed a very different aspect to that which they
wore when Napoleon III. sent his declaration of war
to Paris ; for now a great gulf yawned between the

ALSACE AND LORRAINE. 115

two nations which it seemed impossible to bridge
over.

We have seen how nobly and moderately the Ger-
man rulers and press expressed themselves before and
at the commencement of the war. Germany accepted
the challenge which was thrown down before it, but
it desired only to defend its territory and its inde-
pendence — ^it accused the French Government of wil-
ful offence, but not the French nation.

But of this feeling there was soon nothing more to
be seen.

On the 1 3th of August the King of Prussia ordered
that the conscription should cease in the districts of
France occupied by German troops. This measure
was perfectly in order ; for manifestly in war it can-
not be required of any one that he place weapons in
the hands of his adversary, or leave him those which
he can take away. Moreover, it was self-evident that
the order was only provisional, and would cease to
have effect as soon as through any circumstances the
Germans ceased to hold the territory to which it
applied.

On the 14th of August, two governments-general,
Alsace and Lorraine, were instituted. To the former,
General Count Bismark-Bohlen was appointed, who
at first, until the capture of Strasburg, established
his headquarters in Hagenau ; and with him was
associated, as civil commissioner and president of
the government, Herr Ktihlewetter. The governor-

116 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

general of Lorraine was General von Bonin, with his
seat in Nancy, and with Count Villers as civil com-
missioner and president of the government

These appointments also aroused no suspicion. The
German governments could not leave the provinces
they occupied without any administration; neither
could they allow this to remain in the hands of their
adversaries.

But it was somewhat diflFerent with an order of the
30th of August, by which a new department of the
Moselle was formed, composed otherwise than the
hitherto existing French one had been, and united
vrith the government-general of Alsace.

This new department was to include the arrondisse-
ments of Metz, Thionville, and Saarguemines of the
old French department of the Moselle, and the anon-
dissements of Chateau Salins and Sarrebourg of the
old French department of the Meurthe.

By this opportunity it was intimated, in a very
plain manner, that Germany intended to separate
from France, and definitely to gain as a new province
for the German Empire, the newly-formed govern-
ment-general of Alsace, now augmented by the re-
cently-created department of the Moselle (the so-
called German Lorraine), which further included the
French departments of the Upper and Lower Bhine.

The tone of the greater part of the German papers
had also become very significant after the first victo-
ries of the German soldiers ; and these journals now

ALSACE AND LORRAINE. Il7

demanded that " the old provinces of the German
Empire, Alsace and Lorraine, which had been con-
tumeliously torn away from Germany, should be
again united to it/'

The men who first from their comfortable easy-
ohata ^t forth thi. cry were old men of Uttei
whose views and doctrines had been long deemed to
be defunct. But, alas 1 they began now to gain more
followers than could have been expected.

In reply to the arguments which they published,
we wish briefly to oppose the following facts : —

1. Alsace and Lorraine were not taken from the
German nation, but from the Holy Roman Empire of
the German nation, which notoriously troubled itself
very little about the nationalities of those whom it
took to its bosom, but, when possible, would have
embraced, as ruler, all the world — Germans, French,
Italians, Croats, Poles, and others. Alsace and Lor-
raine were torn from this Holy Roman Empire at a
time when no German nation whatsoever existed, but
only dynasties of a German name, which seized any
territory that yielded anything without regard to its
nationality — which daily conspired with foreign
princes "against Emperor and Empire" to enrich
themselves and forward their djmastic interests.

2. Alsace and Lorraine were ceded to France little
by little, by treaties which were perfectly regular
and universally recognised by the public law of
Europe, and can therefore only be separated from it

118 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

and given to another state by similar treaties, as long
as the present international law of Europe has a spark
of validity.

3. Alsace and Lorraine only arrived, and could obIj
arrive, at a feeling of nationality through the great
French Revolution — and the feeling which they then
gained was French. They attached themselves, with
body and soul, to the great French nation. Language
does much, but certainly not everything; for there
are sympathies and interests which unite and bind
without the aid of a common speech.

We believe that these three statements are indis-
putable, and that only a self-conscious partiality can
deny their justice.

The historical arguments for the recovery of the
"purely German" countries, Alsace and Lorraine,
are of just as doubtful nature, and tend just as much
to annihilate all historical truths as those of certain
Poles for the restoration of Poland in her old bound-
aries as a middle-age, feudal state.

It is some satisfaction to us to be able to state that
the leading German statesmen have not made use of
the ** historical" argument to justify the "recovery"
of these provinces. They employed another, that of
the public weal, against which in itself we, fix)m oui
point of view, have nothing to say.

Count Bismark declared — may we be excused for
anticipating events a little — ** We demand the cession
of the government-general of Alsace (including the

ALSACE AND LOBRAINK 119

new department of the Moselle, Gennan Lorraine)
in the interest of Germany, in order to be able to
combat France under circumstances favourable for us
should the war break out again, as we presume
it must."

Here manifestly the so-called strategical questions
come into consideration. From the "higher strate-
gical " point of view, however, nearly everything can
be proved — the necessity for France of the " natural "
Rhine frontier just as clearly as the necessity for
Germany of the new Germanic -Lorraine -Alsatian
boundary. These points are open to discussion ; but
we believe it is better to leave them to the young
officers of both nations who wish to enter the general
staff of their armies, and are desirous of showing
themselves worthy of them, and who are permitted
to bring prominently forward such elements of dis-
cussion as they may require for the one side, and
take no heed of them for the other.

According to our belief, the best frontier, even from
a strategical point of view, is that which encloses a
nation which regards itself as solidly imited.

Since, then, the Alsatians and the people of Lorraine
have regarded themselves as completely French since
the great Revolution, and as this feeling has con-
tinually grown stronger as time has gone by, we
cannot deem the acquirement of Alsace and German
Lorraine to be a gain for Germany.

Count Bismark has acknowledged this : he has

120 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

spoken of a heavy burden which Germany has taken
upon herself with this annexation, but which she was
obliged to assume. Wherefore 1

Certain learned men in Germany undertook to
make the load light. If the people of Alsace and
Lorraine are not wiUing to be Germans, said they,
they must be treated as Helots until they get under-
standing ; if the French will not consent to separate
from themselves the German Alsatians and inhabi-
tants of Lorraine, the Germans must rack them till
the blood squirts out from their naHs. It is compre-
hensible how soldiers become imbittered in the heat
of battle, even unto cruelty ; but the endeavours of
men who are safely sheltered themselves, and who
pretend to be the advocates of liberty, to incite others
to deeds of cruelty, and to give to war, which neces-
sarily brings enough sufferiug in its train, a yet more
barbarous character, can only make a most repulsive
impression upon the impartial observer.

We have examined the one side of the abyss, let us
now look to the other.

As early as the 6th of September, Jules Favre
addressed a circular to the diplomatic agents of
France abroad, in which he related the declaration
of the Republic, and pointed out the position of the
Government. In this writing he announced that
both it and the country desired peace, and that this
was possible now that the man who had conjured up
this war to further his dynastic interests had been

ALSACE AND LOBRAINE. 121

displaced ; for had not the King of Prussia himself
in his earlier proclamations declared that he did not
fight against France but against Napoleon?

•* Will the King of Prussia continue a godless war,"
asked M. Favre, "which will be at least as ruinous to
himself as to us ? Will he exhibit to the world of
the nineteenth century the cruel spectacle of two na-
tions annihilating one another, and heaping up ruins
and corpses — heedless of humanity, of reason, and of
science ? He can do it ; but if he does, he must take
upon himself the responsibility of answering for it
before the world and in history. If he throws us a
challenge, we shall accept it. We will not give up
an inch of our territory nor a stone of our fortresses.
From a shameful (honteiise) peace a war of extirpation
would speedily arise, but we wish to treat for a last-
ing peace. Our interest is here that of all Europe ;
and we have grounds for hoping that the question will
be so viewed without any dynastic prepossessions in
the councils of the Governments. But even if we
remain alone, we shall not be weak.''

The Government had at first determined to allow
the elections for a Constituting Assembly according
to the election law of 1848, to take place on the 16th
of October, but it afterwards reconsidered the matter,
and named the 2d October as the day. To justify
this measure, M. Favre issued another circular. In
this he treated the question of peace as he had done
in the former one, and denied the assertion which

122 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

was now made on the German side that the French
nation had desired the war.

In fact, in the abandoned chambers of the ImpOTal
house, in those of M. Ronher and of other dignitaries
of the Second Empire, a correspondence had been
found which was printed at the instance of the Pro-
visional Government, and which gives the clearest
explanation on this point. From it it is manifest
that the French nation was just as astonished as the
German by the commencement of this war ; from it
is seen also what disreputable personages, of various,
especially of secondary nations, the French warlike
Court party made use of, to gain information and to
set the war in motion. It certainly requires an expert
brain to discover from these writings that the French
nation wished for the war of 1870, but some of the
German papers possessed such necessary inteUects.

But Jules Favre, while defending the French nation
against such accusations, acknowledged, nevertheless,
that it could not free itself from all responsibility,
since it had for so long endured the Imperial Govern-
ment, and that it must make sacrifices and recom-
pense the victor — only not by cession of territory, as
that would be shameful to France, and she must
prefer destruction to dishonour.

Thus, while on the German side a resignment of
land was, partly on historical grounds and pardy
from reasons of utility, most decidedly demanded, it
was refused with equal decision by the French ; and

ALSACE AND LORRAINE. 123

hereby was formed the great gulf which separated
the two nations.

It will be worth while to consider this stumbling-
block — this question of the cession of territory —
more minutely.

In the first place, it is established that the inter-
national law of the present day recognises fuUy the
right of acquiring land by conquest. We will not ex-
amine whether this is good or not ; it is suflScient for
our purpose to state the fact. It can therefore be no
disgrace to a nation conquered in war to cede to the
victor some of its territory.

Notoriously Napoleon III. would, had he been
victorious, have demanded from Germany the left
bank of the Rhine ; thereof there can certainly be no
doubt. Germany, or the German governments, would
scarcely have refused the required concession because
it was shameful ; they would rather have asked them-
selves whether they might yet hope for success in
arms, and would have formed their resolve according
to the answer which they must give.

Eussia after the Crimean war was compelled by
the terms of the Peace of Paris to give up territory,
and one of the victorious Powers which forced this
condition upon her was France.

France allowed Savoy and Nice to be ceded to her
by Italy in 1860, in requital for aid rendered to the
latter. It is true that this transfer was justified by a
pUbiscite in the territories in question, but the agree-

124 - THE WAB FOB THE BHINE FBONTIEB.

ment had been long before concluded between the
Emperor Napoleon and King Victor Emanuel; and
the pUhiscite was as admirably arranged as possible.

After aU this, why do the French maintain that it
is shameful or disgraceful for thei^ to be compelled to
give up territory to the victor ?

The answer is very simple. While in Germany the
principle of legitimacy in respect to the relations be-
tween the Government and the people still completely
dominates, in France, since the great Revolution, the
idea of the right of the people to vote has permeated
everywhere, and no Government has succeeded in
driving it out The French say, therefore, We are
to give up Alsace and Lorraine; but they are no
naked lands — ^upon them dwell people who are alto-
gether French in sentiment, who desire to remain
French. How can we cede them to another nation ?
Such an act would be nothing more than leaving our
friends in the lurch, and therefore cowardly and dis-
graceful.

In their ideas of conquest, the French also take a
very different view from the Germans. They cannot
understand how any one can be so stupid as not to
wish to be a Frenchman. We cannot find any other
expression to describe the feeling. Now this may seem
to many to be very ludicrous, but it has certainly not
always been so laughable. At the time of the great
Eevolution, millions of Germans became Frenchmen
not unwillingly ; and who can say whether, if that

JOUKNEY OF M. THIERS. 125

Revolution and the war consequent on it had not
arisen, Germany would not to-day have been a great
fallen state? Under any circumstances, we must
confess that the naive French assumption pleases
us better than the ideas of some of the "learned
men" and statesmen of Germany, who would will-
ingly, though we believe wrongly, identify the Ger-
man nation with themselves, and who would, with
brutal humour, make the resisting people of Alsace
and Lorraine into their Helots.

M. Jules Favre had allowed a sort of appeal to the
European Powers to be manifest in his circular des-
patch of the 6th of September ; and soon afterwards
M. Thiers, the celebrated historian of the ' Consulate
and the Empire/ commenced a journey to visit the
European Courts, London, St Petersburg, Vienna, and
Florence, to represent to them the situation of France,
and invoke their mediation. The grey-headed states-
man — he was then 73 years of age — moved by a
touching love of his country, subjected himself with-
out hesitation to the physical fatigues and the pre-
sumably moral unpleasantness of this long tour. In
Germany the news of this appeal to the European
Powers was very badly received, and, as though by
command, a whirlwind of addresses signed by com-
munities and corporations arose, all adjuring the King
of Prussia not to allow the intervention of European
nations in the quarrel between Germany and France.
These Powers had not done anything eamestiy to pre-

126 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

vent the outbreak of the war, or to deter Napoleon
III., or, as was now ever more constantly said, France,
from the attack ; why should they then now arrogate
to themselves the right to interfere ?

We are inclined to doubt whether the Chancellor
of the North German Confederation was well served
by this language, which really demanded that Gee-
many should stand alone in Europe.

The pride with which the French spoke was abo
displeasing to the Germans. They would willingly
have seen the French nation bow down humbly and
cover their faces before the brilliancy of the victories
won by the German soldiery. It is, nevertheless, very
easy to be kind, when successful, to those followed by
misfortune— very easy, when victorious, to be lenient
to the defeated. But in the tone of a great part of
the daily press there was no clemency. After eveiy
victory gained by the German army, certain jonr-
nalists became only more rudely and unreasonably
abusive towards the French nation. But when one
regarded them liiore attentively, it was found these
" real Grerman men '' very often bore about them un-
mistakable signs of an Oriental origin.

It can be easily seen that, under these circnm-
stances, the prospect of a speedy restoration of peace
was in the month of September extremely small But
how noble would have been the position of the Ger-
mans had they now, even with pretended sacrifices,
held out the right hand of fellowship to their foes !

INFLUENCE OP THE REPUBLIC UPON THE WAR. 127

But the events which really took place oblige us to
ask again, how the declaration of the Kepublic would
influence the further conduct of the war 1

We have before remarked that, up to the time of
the battle of Sedan, there were no symptoms of a
revolutionary uprising of the French nation. Spite
of the shutting up of Bazaine in Metz, spite of all
past and prospective defeats, Palikao's Ministry had
adhered in all its preparations as much as possible to
the already existing — ^it had indeed talked of extra-
ordinary efibrts, but had not in reality taken any
sufficient steps towards realising its promises.

Would the whole of France now be inspired with
the revolutionary spirit ? Would she, if peace as she
desired it was unattainable, rise up as one man ?
Would she find leaders to organise her material forces,
and to retrieve the long neglect of the past 1 Would
the Germans allow her time for these things ?

We only suggest these questions ; the answer we
leave to be found in the narrative of what followed.

But one thing was certain, if hostilities were con-
tinued, it would, precisely because of the imperfection
of the French formations, and of the desperate strug-
gle which would be thereby engendered, lead to the
poisoning of the war, and to the increase of that
national hate which has never yet served the ends of
a nation, but only the dominion of some.

128

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE MARCH OF THE GERMANS UPON PARIS— THE INVBSTICEIT
OF PARIS — THE CONFERENCE OF FERRIERES.

Immediately after the capitulation of Sedan, the
Army of the Meuse (Fourth Army, Crown-Prince
of Saxony) and the Third Army (Crown-Prince of
Prussia) commenced anew their march on Paris.

The Army of the Meuse, on the right, moved along
three roads — ^by Creil and Ecouen, by Compiegne and
Senlis, by Soissons and Dommartin. Its advanced
troops reached the neighbourhood of Pontoise on the
16 th of September.

The Third Army turned at first southwards to-
wards the Mame, crossed it at Epemay and Chateau
Thierry, and advanced then along the left bank of
the river, between it and the Seine, towards Parii
Its foremost troops arrived on the 15th of Septemte
at Nogent sur Mame and Creteil. The headquarters
of the Crown-Prince of Prussia, which had remained
on the 2d and 3d of September in Donchery, were
moved on the 4th to Attigny, on the 5th to War-
mereville, on the 6th to Rheims, on the 9th to Bour-

MARCH OF THE G£RMANS UPON PARIS. 129

sault near Epemay, on the 12th to Montmirail, and
on the 15th to Conlommiers.

The headquarters of the King of Prussia were at
Varennes on the 4th of September, moved thence on
the 5th b^^t M^n^hould to Bheims, on the 14th to
Chateau Tlneny, and on the 15th to Meaux.

The Prussians encountered no opposition on their
march to Paris until they were under the walls of
the capital. The 13th Corps (Vinoy) had certainly,
upon the repeated representations of M^Mahon and of
the Emperor Napoleon, been sent from Paris by Sois-
sons and Laon in the direction of M^zieres and Sedan,
to the support of the army of M'Mahon ; but when
he arrived at Laon, Vinoy received the news of the
catastrophe of Sedan. He therefore only remained
long enough in that neighbourhood to draw in the
uselessly small garrisons from the fortresses in his
vicinity, and a number of fugitives from the captured
army, and then returned to Paris by the railway, his
troops reaching the capital on the 6th and 7th of
September.

Soissons, which refused to surrender, was obUged
to be invested, and afterwards regularly besieged.

On the 8th of September the 6th division of
cavalry, Duke of Mecklenburg, approached the neigh-
bourhood of Laon, which was occupied by half a
company of soldiers of the line and 2000 men of the
Mobile Guard. Half a squadron of the 1 5th North
German regiment of Uhlans was sent forward to

VOL. TT. 1

130 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FROmiEB.

reconnoitre the town, and its leader gave liunself the
pleasure of summoning the town and citadel, which
were under the command of General Theremin
d'Hame, to surrender. The General requested a few
hours for consideration, until 4 p.m. Upon being
informed what had happened, the Duke of Mecklen-
burg sent forward Colonel von Alvensleben with the
15 th brigade of cavalry, the divisional horse-artillery
battery, and the terms of capitulation. At the same
time a horse-artillery battery from the reserve of the
4th Corps was pushed forward to St Quentin, and
the 4th battalion of Rifles to Eppes, to the east of
Laon. On the morning of the 9th of Septenoiber, the
1 4th brigade of cavalry and the horse-artillery batteiy
of the 4th Corps also moved forward to Eppes.

Colonel von Alvensleben, on arriving at the town
with the terms of the capitulation, had found fresh
difficulties had arisen with General Theremin, and
had granted him another respite until 9 a.m. of the
morrow ; but when, later on, the Duke of Mecklen-
burg arrived at Eppes, the capitulation was already
signed, by which the citadel, with its troops and
matiriel of war, was to be delivered up to the Prus-
sians at 11.30 A.M.

The Duke at once caused one company of Bifles to
occupy the suburbs^ two more the market-place, and
the fourth the citadel, into which he and his escort
entered to witness the surrender. When this and the
disarming was completed in the court of the fortarcss,

EXPLOSION AT LAON. 131

the French infantiy of the line were led out as
prisoners of war, and the men of the Mobile Guard
released under condition that they should not bear
arms again against Germany.

As the last men of the Mobile Guard marched
through the gate of the citadel, a terrible explosion
took place. Nearly all the German and French
officers who remained in the courtyard were killed or
woimded ; of the 4th company of the 4th battalion
of Rifles 50 men were killed and 45 wounded; and
of the French Mobiles nearly 300 were more or less
injured. The Duke of Mecklenburg himself received
a contusion on the upper part of the thigh, and Gen-
eral Theremin was so wounded in the head that he
died from his injuries some time afterwards.

On the Gennan side a suspicion was at first ex-
pressed that the explosion, which was caused by the
blowing up of the powder-magazine, had been in-
stigated by General Theremin ; but a strict inquiry
showed that this was unfounded, and that the maga-
zine had presumably been ignited by a guard of the
armoury {garde d'artillerie).

According to the general plan for the investment
of Paris, the army of the Crown-Prince of Saxony
was to surround it on the right bank of the Seine and
lower Mame, somewhere on the line from Argenteuil
by Montmagny, Le Blanc Menil, through the wood of
Bondy to Goumay on the Mame. For the army of
the Crown-Prince of Prussia there remained then the

132 THE WAB FOB THE BHIKE FBOITriEB.

line on the left bank of the river from Goumay
through Bonneuil (on the Mame), Choisy le Boy (on
the Seine), Thiais, Chevilly, Sceaux, Meudon, S&vres,
to Bougival (on the Seine). The two armies weie to
join hands on the peninsula of ArgenteuiL

From various signs it is apparent that immediately
after the battle of Sedan the Germans did not calcu-
late on any prolonged resistance from Paris. They
foimded expectations upon the want of a firm stand-
ing by the Provisional Government, and upon inter-
nal discord, expecting also, very possibly, the imme-
diate fall of some of the forts.

The Fourth Army was allowed to take up its
appointed positions without resistance, and was not
much molested during the month of September. The
Crown-Prince of Saxony established his headquarters
at Grand Tremblay.

The army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia, on the
other hand, could not complete the investment with-
out some fighting, and was also, later on, disturbed by
sorties from Paris.

In advance of it, Prussian Uhlans showed themselves
on the 1 7th of September on the height of Clamart

On the same day, the 5th North German Coips
had thrown a pontoon -bridge across the Seine be-
tween Villeneuve St Georges and Ablon. To pro-
tect its formation, General Ejrchbach had posted the
17th brigade of infantry (Bothmer), reinforced by
two squadrons and two batteries, on the right bank

INVESTMENT OF PAMS. 133

of the river, on the heights between Limeil and
Boissy St Leger. These troops were at 2 p.m. at-
tacked at the wood of Brevannes by a French de-
tachment from Creteil, but they repulsed the on-
slaught with small cost; and afterwards the 2d
division of cavahy, followed by the 5th Army Corps,
passed over the Seine.

On the 18th of September this last-named Corps,
marching on Versailles, reached with the 9th division
(right wing) Bifevre, and with the 10th division (left
wing) Palaiseau — ^the former having to sustain a small
skirmish with French detachments which pushed
forward from Plessis-Picquet. A patrol of Hussars
from the 2d division of cavalry reached Versailles on
the same day.

On the 19th of September the 10th division started
early in the morning from Palaiseau through Jouy
en Josas for VersaiUes, the 9th division leaving
Bifevre in the same direction, while the 1st Bavarian
Corps followed the 5th North German.

The 9th division was attacked immediately after it
set out, and was obliged to form front; and the way
they encountered the enemy was this : —

On the 18th of September General Ducrot had
taken up a position on the heights to the south of
Paris, between Meudon and Villejuif, with four divi-
sions of very varied composition, selected from the gar-
rison of Paris. We have already frequently before
made mention of this General. After M'Mahpn was

134 THE WAB FOB THE BHINE FBOKTIEB.

wounded at Sedan, he succeeded to the conunand-in-
chiefy and when superseded in this by Wimpffen,
again led the 1st Corps. He was included in the
capitulation of Sedan, but escaped fix>m his imprison-
ment at Pont-k-Mousson. On the German side it is
most positively asserted that General Ducrot had
then (on the 12th of September) already given his
word of honour not to serve again against Germany
in this war. On the French side, this is as ene^
getically denied* But, in short, General Ducrot had
taken the shortest road to Paris, and had there placed
himself at the disposal of General Trochu, who had
long been his £riend, and who placed the greatest
reliance in him.

On the 19th of September Ducrot andertx)ok a
great reconnaissance southwards, and they were his
troops thus engaged on the plateau of Yillaooabhiy
that the 9th division met, and by whom its maidi
was, as we have seen, retarded. The Germans re-
pulsed them at first, and were continuing their
advance, when large bodies of French troops appeared,
and forced them again to form front.

The first support which the 9th division received
was brought by the 1st Bavarian brigade of infantiy
(Dietl), which fell upon the left flank of the French;
and, moreover, General Kirchbach ordered the 10th di-
vision to march to the rescue as soon as its head arrived
at Jouy en Josas, to the north-east of Villaconblay.

The 2d Bavarian Corps was, on the 1 9th, on the

INVESTMENT OF PAfilS. 135

march from Longjxuneau to Chatenay. The 3d
division, which was at its head, reached the latter
place at 10 A.M., and sent a brigade towards Petit
Bicestre to the direct support of the 5th North
German Corps, while the others advanced through
Sceaux*

Of the 4th Bavarian division the 7th brigade
moved upon Bourg la Reine, to the north-east of
Sceaux, while the 8th brigade remained halted in a
reserve position at Croix de Bemi, to the east of
Chatenay.

By 11.30 A.M. the 5th German Corps had thrown
back the right wing of the French at Villacoublay
and Petit Bicestre. The retreat of the French troops
of the line engaged there degenerated into a disorderly

very severe measures. General von Kirchbach there-
upon, complying with his instructions, marched with
the 5th Corps to his left towards Versailles, to occupy
the parts of the investing line assigned to him there,
leaving the Bavarians to accomplish anything that
might be further necessary on the field of battle.

At the same time General Ducrot was preparing an
offe.«ivc ad™nce with to left wing, whiS. ™ppoLd
itsdf upon a newly-constructed intrenchment armed
with eight guns, near Moulin de la Tour, upon the
north-eastern spur of the heights of Plessis-Picquet.

General von Hartmann directed the 7th brigade
and the one which was in Sceaux to confine them-

136 -THE WAB FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

selves to the defence of Bourg la Heine and Sceaux,
and pushed on the 8th brigade to Chatenay. A com-
bat of firearms ensued, and towards 3 o'clock General
Ducrot caused the guns in the earthwork to be spiked,
and retired behind the detached forts, some of the
troops of the 3d Bavarian division following him
through Sceaux and Plessis-Picquet, and taking pos-
session of the deserted intrenchment.

The 6th North German Army Corps had followed
the 5th across the Seine on the 19th, partly by tie
bridge at Villeneuve St Georges, partly by another
which had been thrown across for its use, and followed
through Villeneuve le Roi towards the line Choisy le
Roi-Chevilly. It was met with a fire from another
newly-built advanced work at ViUejuif, and con-
tented itself with placing outposts on the front Choisy
le Roi-Chevilly. These were repeatedly attacked by
French detachments, but the latter failed to force
a way through them.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia's headquarters were,
on the 1 8th of September, at CorbeiL On the forenoon
of the 19th he was present on the heights of Sceanx
at the fight of the Bavarians, and established his
headquarters on the same day at Palaiseau.

During the night from the 22d to the 23d of Sep-
tember, the Germans remarked that the French had
evacuated the still unfinished intrenchments at ViUe-
juif, and forthwith they occupied them themselves. On
the morning of the 23d, the French from Forts Bicfitrc

SOBTIE OF TH£ 30TH OF 8EPTEMBEB. 137

and Ivry commenced a heavy cannonade upon these
works. The Germans were unable to maintain them-
selves in them under this fire, and so retired. Whilst
they were thus withdrawing, the division of General
Maud'huy emerged from the above-named detached
forts and pursuexl them, but were checked at the Ger-
man line of outposts, and afterwards compelled to turn
hack again.

On the same day Rear- Admiral Saisset on the north
side undertook a yet greater reconnaissance towards
Le Bourget and* Drancy, and another was directed
from St Denis against Pierrefitte.

On the 24th of September several of the French
ironclad gunboats on the Seine cannonaded from
SurSnes the German outposts at St Cloud and Sevres.

On the 30th the French made again a great sortie
on the south side with the 13th Army Corps (Vinoy),
when a main attack by the centre was prepared for
arid supported by two false attacks on the wings.

The demonstration on the right was directed from
Fort Issy against the positions of the 5th North Ger-
man Corps, that on the left from Fort Charenton
against the 11th North German Corps.

The main attack from Montrouge and Bic6tre aimed
at the 6th North German Corps, and especially at the
12th division (Hoffinan). The fighting took place
principally about Villejuif, Chevilly, Thiais, and Choisy
le Roi, and by 11 A.M. the French had been driven back
with considerable losses upon the detached forts. In

138 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

this encounter General Guilliem was killed, the officer
who had commanded the French garrison brigade in
the States of the Church.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia on the 20th of Sep-
tember removed his headquarters to Versailles ; thofie
of the King of Prussia were established on the 19th
partly at Lagny on the Mame, partly at Rothschild's
castle of Ferri^reSy famous for the many pleasant
hours which Napoleon passed there when at die
summit of his power.

We conclude here for the present the narrative of
the mUitaxy evente about Paris, but append, before
we pass on to the interesting diplomatic negotiatioDB
of Ferri^res, some description of the great capital of
France, especially in its aspect as a fortress.

If with the Louvre as centre, and with a radius of
7000 paces, a circle be described, it will give, veiy
roughly certainly, the present circumference of Pam
The town is traversed by the Seine^ which, in its courae
through it, forms a bow open towards the south, and
divides the city into two very unequal parts, the
larger on its right bank, and the much smaUer one
on its left.

The existing boundaries of Paris are fonned by the
main enceinte of its fortifications and by the new
exterior Boulevards, and those of the town of Paris
as it existed up to the year 1861, by the old exterior
Boulevards, which follow the course of the ancient
city toll- (octroi-) walL These excluded from the town

PABIS. 139

a number of populous communities, who were, never-
theless, within the fortifications built in 1 84 1 . Lastly,
the boundaries of Paris as they existed up to the time
of the great Revolution are still marked by the in-
terior Boulevards.

The town inside the old exterior Boulevards was
divided into twelve arrondissements, to which eight
more were added on the abolition of the old octroi-
walL

Of the fourteen arrondissements on the right bank
of the Seine, four lie between the river and the in-
terior Boulevards — ^namely, the Ist, UArrondissement
du Louvre; the 2d, De la Bourse; the 3d, Du
Temple ; the 4th, De THdtel de Ville : five between
the interior Boulevards and the old octroi-walls —
namely, the 8th, De I'Elys^e ; the 9th, De FOp^ra ;
the 10th, De TEnclos St Laurent; the 11th, De
Popincourt; the 12th, De ReuiUy: five between
the old octroi-walls and the main enceinte — ^namely,
the 1 6th, De Passy ; the 1 7th, De Batignolles ; the
18th, Des Buttes Montmartre; the 19th, Des Buttes
Chaumont ; the 20th, De Menilmontant.

Of the six arrondissements on the left bank, three lie
between the Seine and the old octroi-wall — ^namely,
the 5th, Du Pantheon; the 6th, Du Luxembourg;
and the 7th, Du Palais Bourbon : three between the
octroi-wall and the main enceinte — namely, the 13th,
Des Gobelins ; the 14 th, De TObservatoire ; and the
15th, De Vaugirard.

140 THE WAR FOE THE RHINE FRONTIER.

In the year 1801 Paris had 552,686 inhabitants in-
side the line of the inner Boulevards; in 1856 there
were 1,174,346 of population within the octroi-wall;
and in 1861 there were within the main enceinte,
therefore, inclusive of the eight new arrondissements,
1,696,141 inhabitants. At the last census in 1866,
1,825,274 human beings were returned. This num-
ber had imdoubtedly increased up to 1870, but it
was diminished shortly before the investment by the
compulsory and voluntary departures from the city ;
though, on the other hand, it was again increased by
arrivals. The regular garrison was not reinforced;
for, besides the Imperial Guard, another Corps — ^the
Army of Paris — ^had always been quartered in the
town and in its immediate vicinity ; but the Mobile
Guard, the sailors, the custom-house people, the wood-
rangers, &c., who were called into Paris from the pro-
vinces, were aU additions to its ordinary population.
Further, when the investment became imminent, Gen-
eral Trochu ordered the demolition of the numerous
buildings without the ramparts, but within the zone
of defence of the main enceinte, or of the detached
forts; and the greater part of their inhabitants en-
tered Paris in the last days of August and the
first of September, with their furniture and house-
hold gods. During the time of this migration
from without to within the walls, a confused crush
of wonderful and wonderfully-packed conveyances
choked up many of the gates of the fortifications

DAILY CONSUMPTION OF PARIS. 141

from early morning to late evening, and. dragging
their weary way along the Boulevards with long
foUowings of men, women, children, dogs, domestic
pets, and cattle, imparted a new and unwonted as-
pect to these resorts of the gay idlers of Paris,

Taking aU these additions into account, the popu-
lation of Paris at the beginning of the investment
must be estimated at the least at 2,000,000.

The daily consumption of the capital before the
investment is given from credible sources in the fol-
lowing numbers:. 19,725 hundredweight of bread,
and, moreover, 4990 sacks of flour; 490 oxen, 130
cows, 430 calves, 2963 sheep, 2150 hundredweight
of salted and smoked meat, 1150 hundredweight of
poultry and game, 1490 hundredweight of fish (two-
thirds of which sea-fish), 2950 hundredweight of pota-
toes, 5000 hundredweight of other vegetables, 1120
hundredweight of butter, and 280 hundredweight of
cheese. Of the quantity of groceries^ the consumption
of which in Paris is proportionately very great — of
milk, eggs, and drinks of all kinds used daily — we
have no reliable accounts; but stiU an estimate of
them, taken at the average number of the population,
and considering the average state of prosperity of the
inhabitants^ would be an enormous one.

The Seine above Paris flows mainly from south to
north; shortly before its entrance into the town it
receives the Mame at Charenton. The whole of the
lower Qourse of this latter river is very tortuous ; and

142 THE WAR FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

just before it joins the Seine, it fonns by a bold curve
the pemnsula of St Manr, which turns its contracted
neck towards Fort Yincennes.

The Seine, on quitting Paris, flows in a south-
westerly directiop, but at Billancourt it makes a
sharp bend, and runs to the north-east as &r as
St Denis, where, with another sharp turn, it again
resumes its south-westerly direction, only to bend
again to the north-east at Bougival. These wind-
ings form three peninsulas dose below Paris. Upon
the first, that of Boulogne, lies a part of the town
(Auteuil and Passy) and the Bois de Boulogne, which
extends up to the main enceinte ; the second penin-
sula may be named after the principal poiut on it, the
Mount of Valerien or of Nanterre (the favourite home
of the queen of the roses) ; and so also may the third,
the peninsula of Argenteuil.

The height of the level of the Seine at Paris above
that of the sea is generally taken to be in round nnm-
bers 30 metres ; more exactly, it is, with the average
depth of the water, 27.4 metres where it enters the
walls, and 25.9 metres where it leaves thenL The
width of the river at its exit from the city is about
600 feet

The main enceiute of the town is formed by a
simple bastioned line with revetted escarps, without
ravelins or similar outworks. There are no peiman-
ently-casemated spaces in the bastions. Of these last
there are ninety-four in the whole circumference of

PARIS AS A FORTRESS. 143

the enclosing rampart ; they do not bear names, but
are distingaished by numbera Bastion No. 1 lies on
the right bank, and at the entrance of the Seine into
the towiL From that point the numbers run in suc-
cession along the right bank to the exit of the river,
and then from the same point along those on the left
bank to the entrance again, so that bastion No. 94 is
exactly opposite to bastion No. 1.

The Lyons railway leaves the circumvallation be-
tween bastions Nos. 2 and 3 ; the Eastern railway (to
Mulhausen and Strasburg), between bastions No& 27
and 28 ; the Northern railway, between bastions Nos.
34 and 35 ; the railway to Bouen, between bastions
No& 44 and 45 ; the Western railway, by Versailles
(left bank), between bastions Nos. 75 and 76 ; the
railway to Orleans, between bastions Nos. 92 and 93.

These data offer an easy means of identifying indi-
vidual bastions.

The bastions are not all alike in form, but the pre-
vailing type is flat, the faces containing a very obtuse
angle ; they are very long, and the flanks are propor-
tionately short. Owing to the great extent of the
circumference, it is manifest that a considerable num-
ber of bastioned fronts must lie very nearly in one
straight line. This is always advantageous to the
defence, especially in the modem days of rifled ord-

great in the enceinte of Paris as it would have been
if the bastions themselves had been built with more

144 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

salient and acute angles. In the construction of the
fortifications it was not so much intended that this
main enceinte should withstand a regular siege, as
that it should secure the town against a surprise or an
attack de vive force. The real defence against a foimal
attack was intrusted to the detached forts, a giidle of
which surrounds the circumvallation of the town.

Paris lies in a basin. It is surrounded on all sides
by heights, the basis of which is a chalk formation,
and the crests of which are at one time close to the
town, at another time more removed from it — at odc
time towering up steep and sharply defined, at an-
other time rising softly and imperceptibly — so that
they appear to be almost depressions when compared
with the neighbouring landscape. These heights
could not be utilised everywhere as positions for the
detached forts, especially at a time when the present
range of guns was not dreamt of ; but they all stand
in close connection with the works, and therefore we
must consider them somewhat more minutely.

The heights of Pierrefitte, to the north of St Denis,
rise up to an altitude of 265 feet* above the level d
the Seine ; those of the Wood of Bondy, to the south-
east of it, to an average height of 280 feet Between
these two there is a depression of about 80 feet, in
which several brooks, especially the Sausset and the
Molette, run down by St Denis to the Seine.

* The heights given in this description are above the level of tbc
Seine, unless it is specially otherwise mentioned.

HEIGHTS AROUND PARIS. 145

To the west of the heights of the Wood of Bondy,
divided from it by the narrow and in some parte
defile-like col through which the railway to Miil-
hausen and Basle reaches the Mame, are the two
nearly equally high groups of .hills of Montreuil and
of Romainville. These fall to the north with rather
steep slopes to .the Ourcq Canal, and to the east to-
wards the before-mentioned railway, but decline gently
to the south towards the Seine and Marne, forming
thus the almost flat plateau of Yincennes. To the
westward the main enceinte continues along Belleville
and the Buttes de Chaumont.

To the west of the heights of Belleville, separated
from them by La Villette, and also within the main
enceinte, rise the Buttes Montmartre, 330 feet high
at their most elevated point

In the south and south-west , the pleasant chain of
hiUs is to be remarked which, much broken, runs
from Bourg la Eeine towards Bougival, and separates
St Cloud and Sevres on the Seine from Versailles.
The summits of this same chain at Clamart and
Chatillon have an altitude of 440 feet. Spurs from
them jut out also into the main enceinte at Yaugirard.
In the hiU of Vaugirard Napoleon III. has discovered
the theatre of the battle which Labienus, after he had
beaten Camolugenus between Sevres and Meudon,
fought with the Gallic reserves, which, originally des-
tined to observe the right bank of the Seine, had hur-
ried up when they heard the noise of battle at Meudon.

VOL. II. K

146 THE WAE FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The chain of hills Bourg la Reine-Bougival throws
o»t a ,ur on to Ae p^nill. of Naote^. «id to
ridge terminates in the Mount of Valerien, which
rises up conically to a height of 300 feet.

To the eaat of Bourg la Reine, and on the right
bank of the Bifevre brook, the chain of heights gradu-
ally subsides. Ascending to the west of ViUejuif in
a solitary elevation of 310 feet, it has to the south of
Vitry sur Seine an altitude of only 240 feet, and then
falls rather steeply to the valley of the Seine, which,
to the east of Vitry, is 104 feet above the level of
the sea.

The detached forts of Paris are, in plan, bastioned
squares or pentagons. They are amply provided with
casemated quarters, are well defiladed, and altogether
are well arranged.

Smaller enclosed works exist here and there, separ-
ated from the forts, and placed to command points
which cannot be seen from the latter. These are
called redoubta They are of various forms — some
have a tenaille trace, others are merely salient
angles, and others again have small bastions at the
comers.

To get a clear idea of the whole system, the de-
tached forts of Paris are divided into four groups,
called after the four cardinal points of the compass.

The greater part of the works of the eastern group
crown the outer edge of the heights of Bagnolet-
Montreuil. Their extent is v^ry approximately de-

DETACHED FORTS BOUND PARIS. 147

termined by describing a semicircle with the Mon-
treuil gate, between bastions Nos. 11 and 12, as
centre, and with a radius of 6500 paces.
The works which form this group are :—

1. The Fort of Romainville, a square with an
irregular homwork, and an annexed work advanced to
the north, which two outworks connect it with the
Canal De TOurcq, and along it with the enceinte of
the town towards bastion No. 27. Fort Romainville
lies 1700 paces distant from bastion No. 19 of the
main enceinte ;

2. The Redoubt of Noisy ;

3. The Fort of Noisy — a square with a homwork
pushed out in a north-easterly direction ;

4. The Redoubt of Montreuil ;

5. The Redoubt De la Boissiere, a tenaiUed work ;

6. The Fort of Rosny — a square with a homwork
advanced to the eastward, 6000 paces from bastion
No. 16 of the main enceinte ;

7. The Redoubt of Fontenay, in the form of a small
homwork closed at the gorge ;

8. The Fort of Nogent — a square with a homwork
thrown out to the eastward ;

9. The Redoubt De la Faisanderie ; and,

10. The Redpubt De Gravelle.

The two last-named works are joined by an in-
trenched line, and close the neck of the peninsula of
the Marne from St Maur; and all the works from
Fort Romainville to the Redoubt De la Faisanderie

148 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

were connected in September by intrenched lines,
which followed the crest of the heights, so that a sort
of second enceinte arose there.

11. The Fort of Charenton — a pentagon in the
angle between the Seine and the Mame. This work
is 4000 paces distant from bastion No. 5 of the main
enceinte, and answers the purpose of a tSte-dvrpont
for the bridges thrown across the Seine and Mame
near their junction.

Most of the works of the eastern group lie very far
removed from the main ramparts ; but a sort of rSdiiit
to the whole is formed by

12. The Fort of Vincennes, which is situated 2200
paces from bastion No. 8. This work, to the south of
the town of Vincennes, is composed of the old castle,
and of the new fort to the eastward of this latter.
The former, whose origin can scarcely be traced, was
built in 1183 essentially on its present plan, but has
been continually improved up to the present day;
and in 1832 especially, its fortifications were better
^ranged, and it was provided with miUtary estab-
lishments. The centre tower, the donjon, which has
walls 10 feet thick, and has frequently been used as
a state prison, has a height of 183 feet; and from its
roof an extensive panoramic view is obtained. The
new fort, a long rectangle, with its longer faces run-
ning east and west, contains immense depots of all
sorts for the artillery.

Within the eastern group stands the Wood of Vin-

DETACHED FORTS ROUND PARIS. 149

cennes Burrounded by a wall. In this park there are
commodious ranges for infantry and artHlery^ and the
manoeuvring ground for the troops in the Camp of
St Maur.

The southern group of forts extends from bastion
No. 94 to No. 68 of the main enceinte. It consists of
the five forts of D'lvry, De Bic^tre, De Montrouge,
De Vanves, and Dlssy. The forts of Montrouge and
Vanves are bastioned squares, the other three bastioned
pentagons. Of this group, Fort Bicetre lies nearest
to the main enceinte, only 1500 paces from the bas-
tion No. 87 ; and Fort Issy, the most remote, being
3000 yards from bastion No 91.

As is apparent from our description of the country
in the neighbourhood, there are comparatively im-
portant heights from 1500 to 2000 yards in front of
this group, and these General Trochu, when he imder-
took the defence of Paris, determined to occupy with
strong field intrenchments. Such a work was thrown
up on the height of Motdin de la Tour, before Chatil-
lon, and this was the one which the Bavarians ob-
tained possession of on the 19th of September. A
second intrenchment was constructed on the right
bank of the Bifevre, between it and the village of
ViUejuif ; a third to the east of Villejuif, near the
Moulin Saquet ; and, moreover, the villages of Ville-
juif and of Vitry sur Seine were fortified.

Behind this advanced line the five forts of the
southern group were connected by lines of earthworks ;

150 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

80 that on this side also there existed a continuous
exterior enceinte.

The labour on all these fortifications was continu-
ously carried on, even after the investment had been
completed by the besiegers.

The western group consists of only one, but that
one a most important work — ^the fortress (forteresse)
of Mont Valerien on the left bank of the Seine, on
the peninsula of Nanterre. The work itself is a large
bastioned pentagon, with exterior sides of 1200 feet
long, with powerful batteries, and an ample supply of
casemated spaces for all military requirements. But
in spite of its size, it nevertheless, by reason of its
solitude, leaves the west front apparently somewhat
exposed. It is 5000 paces distant from the main
enceinte, nearly 15,000 paces from the works of St
Denis, and 9000 paces from Fort Issy. The designer
of the fortifications of Paris must have calculated
chiefly upon the reach of the Seine from BiUancourt
to St Denis for the covering of the west front. "When
General Trochu commenced his task, he held it to be
expedient to strengthen somewhat the outer works of
this front, and accordingly a tSte-du-pont was con-
structed to protect the bridge of Neuilly; another
work was thrown up on the hiU of St Ouen; and yet
another was projected for the heights of Montretout,
near St Cloud, but this last was never executed.
On the other hand, later on, an intrenchment was
formed at Villeneuve la Garenne, opposite St Denis,

DETACHED FORTS BOUND PARIS. 161

in connection with the fortifications of the last-
named place.

The northern group is formed by Fort Auber-
villiers and the fortifications of St Denia

Fort Aubervilliers, on the road to Lille, 2300 paces
distant from bastion No. 28 of the main enceinte, is
a bastioned pentagon.

St Denis, a town of 27,000 inhabitants, is sur-
rounded by a simple enceinte, rendered stronger by
inundations and swamps, and by three forts. These
are the Fort de la Briche, a bastioned rectangle open
at the gorge, close to the right bank of the Seine ;
the Northern Double Crownwork {Double Couronne
du Nord), with three whole and two half bastions,
open towards the town ; and the Eastern Fort {Fort
de VEsC)y a closed bastioned square in the south-east
of the town. And to these must be added the re-
cently-constructed intrenchment on the left bank of
the Seine, before Villeneuve la Garenne, of which we
before made mention.

The main communications of Paris were, as in
these days they are for all the world, the railways,
which radiate in every direction from the eight sta-
tions of the town. We have already named the
points at which the principal ones quit the lines.

It was necessarily of paramount importance for the
success of the German investment that these lines
should be cut, and this was forthwith eflFected; so that
Paris was now obliged to have recourse to other and

152 THE WAE FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

unwonted means of communication, which, however,
could not supply all its requirements.

Very important for the defence of the capital was
the girdle line {chemin defer de ceinture), which ran
round the town inside the main enceinte, and for the
most part not very far distant from it.

To close this chapter, we have yet to speak of the
interview of Ferrikes, which was destined to widen
the gulf which already yawned between France and

By the mediation of England a conference was
brought about between Jules Favre, the French
Minister of Foreign Aflfairs, and the Chancellor of the
North German Confederation. More than a week
was lost in discussing matters of form which perhaps
ought not to have been regarded as such. At last, on
the 18th of September, when the Germans actually
stood before the gates of Paris, Jules Favre resolved,
being assured of the agreement of Bismark, to seek
out the latter, and on the same day succeeded in
arriving at ViUeneuve St Georges, where the head-
quarters of General von Tiimpling (6th Army Corps)
were established. There he learnt that the head-
quarters of the King of Prussia were at Meaux, and
he therefore sent a message to Bismark to inquire
where he could speak with him. On the 1 9th, at six
o'clock in the morning, an officer, who was to accom-
pany him back, brought M. Favre the answer that
Bismark awaited him in Meaux. He therefore at

CONFERENCE BETWEEN FAVBE AND BISMARK. 153

once set out ; but on arriving neax that place, Jules
Favre heard from an adjutant that the King's head-
quarters had been removed to Ferriferes.

The- first meeting of Favre with Bismark actuaUy
took place in the chateau of Haute Maison at Montry.
During it the two men did not arrive beyond a
theoretical discussion about the principles for the
conclusion of a peace ; and we know what an abyss
separated France from Germany in respect to these.
In the interval which had elapsed between the battle
of Sedan and the interview at the Haute Maison, the
latter country had become yet more excited, espe-
cially by two circulars of the German Chancellor to his
diplomatic agents abroad. In the first, dated Bheims,
the 13th of September, Bismark spoke, contrarily to
the earlier proclamation on the German side, no longer
of a war against the French Government, but of a
war against the French people. According to his
view, the latter would, as soon as they could, even
if a peace were now arranged, again take up arms ;
and to ward ojff this expected new attack, Germany
required sureties, which could be found only in an
advance of her western frontier. Cession of territory
by France was therefore, from this time forth, offi-
cially demanded as a condition for the conclusion of
peace. In the second circular from Meaux, on the
16th of September, Bismark expressed his fear that
peace would only be still further postponed if the
neutral European Powers should in any way strengthen

154 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FROKTIER-

the hope of France of obtainiDg their diplomatic or
material intervention, and that this might be occa-
sioned by the journey of M. Thiers. He further most
expressly stated that he required the fortre^ases of
Strasburg and Metz for Germany.

In the general conversation in the Haute Maison^
Count Bismark, as he says, could not succeed in con-
vincing M. Favre that the honour of France was not
differently constituted from that of other coimtries.
Favre was willing to agree to any monetary recom-
pense, but not to a cession of territory. Finally, the
two came to discourse on the armistice, and were
agreed that a cessation of hostilities would be desirable,
in order to carry on the elections for a Constituting
Assembly which could render the Government regular.
The details were to be discussed in another conversa-
tion on the evening of the same day in Ferriferes.

M. Favre arrived at 9.30 A.M. in Ferri^res. There
the armistice was again talked over, principally as to
its duration, and in a more general way as to its con-
ditions. Regarding the latter, Bismark desired to
obtain military counsel; and the two statesmen
agreed at midnight to continue their conversation
on the 20th.

When the day arrived, Favre was again at Fer-
ri^res at 11 a.m. Bismark was still with the Eikg,
but returned from him at 11.45 A.M.

As a military equivalent for the consent to a cesisa-
tion of hostilities, which must always be more or less

CONFERENCE BETWEEN FAVRE AND BISMARK. 155

to the disadvantage of the victorious army, while
under the existing circumstances it must necessarily
be of great use to France for the organisation of her
forces. Count Bismark demanded the evacuation of
the fortresses of Toul, Pfalzburg,* and Strasburg.
The garrisons of the two former were to be free to
depart ; but as Strasburg was already reduced to the
utmost extremity, the soldiers within it were to
become prisoners of war.

The surrender of these fortresses would give the
Germans an assured railway communication, and was
therefore important to them. For the rest, Toul and
Strasburg were so near their fall, that with them it
was only a question of holding out for a few days
longer. Pfalzburg the Germans could dispense with
for their object. But nevertheless Jules Favre would
hear nothing of this condition, and became especially
violently excited when Bismark demanded that the
garrison of Strasburg should be regarded as prisoners.
Bismaxk, who had merely spoken as a man of business,
and was but little prepared for outbreaks of feeling,
strove in every way to pacify M. Favre, and even
promised him to speak again with the King on this
point. This he also did, but the King of Prussia held
firmly to the demand.

In and before Metz hostilities were to be continued

* In Bismark's report, Bitche is named ; in that of Favre, Pfalzbnig.
Perhaps Bismark demanded both these places ; at all events, Pfalz-
bnrg was, by its position, the more important.

156 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER,

within a certain cordon, to be afterwards more accu-
rately determined. About this there was no con-
troversy.

But now came the third point — ^Paris. Favre had
akeady on the 1 9th expressed the presupposition that
the Constituting Assembly would meet in Paris ; and
by this occasion the question arose whether Paris
should be reprovisioned or not during the period of
the armistice, the duration of which was assumed to
be two or three weeks. K free intercourse was to be
permitted during this time between Paris and the
country, with a view to reprovisioning the former,
Bismark again demanded a military equivalent — ^in
this case the delivering over of the fortress of Mont
Valerien to the Germans. At this M. Favre again
lost control over himself ; he declared — and certainly
with reason — that Bismark might just as well ask for
Paris at once. Bismark replied — also with reason —
that the reprovisioning of Paris for three weeks im-
plied that the Germans must remain just so much
the longer before it, to reduce it by famine in case
peace should not result from the meeting of the
Assembly. For the rest, he proposed another ex-
pedient. He had no objection to the CJonstituting
Assembly sitting at Tours, as Favre himself had sug-
gested, in which case the status quo could be strictly
maintained during the armistice, and neither Paris
reprovisioned nor a detached fort handed over to the
Germans.

CONFERENCE BETWEEN PAVRE AND BISMARE. 157

M. Favre finally parted from Count Bismark firmly
convinced that fte German, desired to hnmiliate
France — to drive it under the Caudine Forks, and to
annihilate it. Count Bismark remained behind in
Ferriferes, most fully persuaded that he had shown
the greatest desire to meet the advances of the Pro-
visional Government. He felt, we have not the
slightest doubt, just as deeply as Jules Favre did, the
endless misery which the continuation of this wax
would entail, in that it would again evoke the feel-
ing of national hate without there being any ori-
ginal ground — a feeling which it is more difficult to
exterminate when the masses are led away by it
than when only some few highly-educated people are
infected, and which certain journalists and writers
incite all the more recklessly, from ignorance or
interest, if they are able to keep themselves clear of
its workings.

But — ^thc Germans were the victors, and Bismark
had already raised a storm which he could not alto-
gether rule. Spirits had been evoked which, when
once called up, are very difficult to lay again.

The Provisional Government in Paris, upon re-
ceiving the report of M. Favre, determined that
an armistice under these conditions was not to be
thought of, and that therefore the war must simply
be continued.

When the Germans were approaching Paris, the-
Government had sent a delegation to Tours. This

158 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

was to maintain a regular correspondence with the
departments in case Paris should be surrounded, and
to endeavour to carry on the same with the invested
capital. It consisted of directors and subaltern em-
ploySs for each of the Ministerial departments. The
members of the Government at its head were MM.
Cremieux and Glais-Bizoin, to whom shortly after-
wards Admiral Fourichon joined himself.

Upon receiving information of the negotiations of
Ferri^res and of their result, the Delegation issued
from Tours the following proclamation to the French
people : —

" Before the investment of Paris, M. Jules Favre
determined to seek out Count Bismark in order to
learn the intentions of the enemy. The following is
the declaration of our foe ;

" Prussia intends to continue the war, and reduce
France to a Power of the second rank.

" On the grounds of the right of conquest, Prussia
demands Alsace, and Lorraine as far as Metz.

" For her consent to an armistice Prussia dares to
demand the surrender of Strasburg, of Toul, and of
Mont Valerien.

" Rather would exasperated Paris bury herself in
her ruins. To such arrogant demands there is no
answer other than war to the last extremity.

'^ France accepts this combat, and counts thereby
upon the assistance of all her children.'^

Count Bismark answered this proclamation by a

PROCLAMATION OF THE TOURS DELEGATION. 159

circular despatch dated Ferri^res, 1st of October. In
it he directed his reply exclusively against the asser-
tion that Prussia wished to degrade France to a
Power of the second rank. The territory, he said,
which Germany demands from France, together with
Metz and Strasburg, is of about the same superficial
area as the- provinces of Savoy and Nice, which
France gained in 1860 without having been before
only a second-rate Power. In population Alsace and
German Lorraine certainly exceeded Nice and Savoy
by about three - fourths of a million; but in 1866
France had, without Algeria, 38,000,000, and with
Algeria, " which now supplied an essential part of
the French forces " (the poor Turcos), 42,000,000 of
inhabitants. How, then, could the loss of three-quar-
ters of a million in any degree alter the importance of
France with regard to foreign countries, and reduce
her to a second-rate Power ?

Negotiations were for the time broken off; M.
Thiers was still on his diplomatic tour to the Courts
of Europe ; and when Bismark issued his answer of
the 1st of October, Toul and Strasburg were already
in the hands of the Germans.

160

CHAPTER XXIV.

TAKING OF THE FORTRESS OF TOUL.

Towards the end of August the 1 7th North German
division of infantry (Schimmelmann), together with
the l7th brigade of cavalry (Ranch) and the 2d
active (Brunswick) division of landwehr (Selchow),
were sent into France, and there formed into an
Army Corps (the 13th North German), under the
command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin.

The 13th Corps was employed from the 4th (and
in part also from the 1st) to the 10th of September in
the investment of Metz, and on the latter day received
orders to protect the rear of the armies marching on
Paris by occupying Chalons and Rheims, and by sur-
rounding and regularly besieging Toul.

Since the middle of August the fortress of Toul had
been constantly observed by small detachments — ^in
the last days exclusively of landwehr — ^and had also
been several times cannonaded, but only with field-
guns, and afterwards with old French garrison artil-
lery which had been transported thither after the fall

TAKING OF TOUL. 161

of Marsal, but which was not even 80 effective as the
German field-ordnance.

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg directed his
landwehr division, together with the 17th regiment
of dragoons and two light batteries, upon Rheims ;
with the rest of the artillery of his Corps, with the
17th division of infantry, the ISth regiment of
dragoons and the 11th of Uhlans, he marched upon
Toul, before which he arrived on the evening of the
12th of September.

In order to undertake the siege, it was necessary to
wait for the arrival of the siege-ordnance, which was
to be brought up from Cologne and Magdeburg ; and
therefore at first the Grand Duke confined himself to
drawing the investing line closer in than heretofore,
at the same time disquieting the place with his field-
guns.

The fortress was garrisoned by about 2500 men,
mostly of the Mobile Guard, and had 197 guns, 48 of
which were rifled. The commandant was Squadron-
Chief * Huck, formerly of the 7th regiment of Fusi-
liers.

By a decree, dated Meaux, the 16th of September,
the King of Prussia established a new govenmient-
general of Rheims. This was to embrace all territory
occupied by German troops not already included in

* The sqnadron-cldef on the General S1a£f has the same rank in the
artQlery and cavalry that the battalion-chief has in the infantiy. In
the cavaliy the sqnadron-chief commands two squadrons.

VOL- II. L

162 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

those of Alsace and Lorraine. The Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg - Schwerin was appointed to its com*
mand, and therefore repaired to Rheims, leaving the
troops before Toul under the orders of Lieutenant*
General von Schimmelmann.

Schimmelmann at once caused three rifled 6-
pounder batteries to ascend Mont St Michel, which
lies to the north of the town, and completely com-
mands it, and thence he kept up an unceasing fire
upon it. The artillery of the fortress answered
vigorously, but without eflfect. On the afternoon of
the 18th of September, Toul was bombarded for two
hours by seven German field-batteries.

On the 19th of September Schimmelmann was
ordered to send the d3d brigade of infantry (Eott^
witz) and the II th regiment of Uhlans to Chalona
He then retained before Toul the two Mecklenburg
regiments of infantry Nos. 89 and 90, the Mecklen-
burg battalion of Rifles No. 1 4, the 1 8th regiment of
dragoons, four field-batteries, and two companies of
pioneers; and to these were added on the 20th of Sep-
tember the heavy siege-artiUery, consisting of ten
rifled 24-pounders and sixteen rifled 12-pounders.

On the 21st the positions for the siege-batteries
were selected — they were to surround Toul on the
north in a large semicircle, from Mansuy in the east
over the slopes of Mont St Michel and the Mont de
Barine away towards the road from Ecrouves in the
west. On the 21st and 22d the battery depots were

TAKING OF TOUL. 163

built ; and towards the evening of the 22d the siege-
guns were transported to the rear of the points where
the batteries were to be, and at dusk the construction
of th^e was commenced without any opposition from
the besieged.

On the morning of the 23d the batteries w6re not
only completed, but also armed with the artillery
which had been placed in readiness, and the bombard-
ment was immediately begun, the field-guns likewise
assisting in it

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had also come
up from £heims to witness the spectacle.

By 9 o'clock in the forenoon a part of the town
was already in flames; an hour later three more
fires broke out. The besieged kept up in TCply an
incessant but measured fire — ^by 11 o'clock they had
set in flames the suburbs of Mansuy in the east and
of St Evre in the west, which were occupied by the
Mecklenburgers. But as afternoon came on, the gar-
rison itself could no longer keep under the conflagra-
tion which the German artillery had caused, and at
4 P.M. the commandant hoisted the white flag upon
one of the towers of the cathedral

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, who had looked
on at the bombardment from the Mont de Barine, at
once sent his chief of the staff*. Colonel von Erensky,
towards the Porte de France. On his way the Colonel
was met by a flag of truce from the garrison, and the
capitulation was arranged without diflficulty by the

164 THE WAR FOR TH£ RHINE FRONTIER.

commandant and Yon Erensky. The capitulation
of Sedan served essentially as a pattern. The only
defenders exempted from becoming prisoners of war
were the oflficers, who were released on giving their
word of honour, and men who had been inhabitants
of Toul before the investment. Further, an article
was added by which, in case of any event happening
similar to that which had taken place at Laon, the
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had the right of dealing
with the whole garrison as he thought fit This con-
dition seemed the more necessary, as the conqueror of
Laon was also a Duke of Mecklenburg.

The delivering over of the maWrid^ and the march-
ing out of the garrison, took place on the evening of
the 23d ; and at the same time the gates and public
buildings were occupied by German troops.

On the 24th of September the Grand Duke» at the
head of the whole investing force, entered the con-
quered town.

165

CHAPTER XXV.

THE 8IEGE AlH) TAKING OF STRASBUBG.

Afteb Alsace had become French by the Peace of
Westphalia, the old city of Strasburg stUl remained
a Grerman imperial town. On the 30th of Septem-
ber 1681, the French occupied the town; but long
,' before that event, there had existed in it a consider-

able French party, as is only too explicable by the
position of the town on the left bank of the Rhine,
' and by the miserable condition of the German Empire

j at that time. The French party, which was strongly

represented in the Council, had laboured for years to
bring about the dismissal of the mercenary troops,
/ and the neglect of the military concerns of the town.

The French, therefore, in 1681 found the town de-
fenceless, in spite of its ramparts. Lately, much has
been said of treachery, whereby Strasburg was lost
to the so-called German Empire. But, historically,
it would be more correct to talk of treachery com-
mitted by the Empire towards the town, and by
which it delivered over the city to France. By the
Peace of Ryswick in 1697, Strasburg was, in the most

166 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

formal maDner, separated from '* Emperor and Em-
pire," and made over to France. For the rest, it
maintained its old free-town constitution and privi-
leges until the great French Eevolution, when it lost
these also. But then it attached itself most thoroughly
— as did the whole of Alsace — ^to the great French
nation; and though it is true that the lower orders of
the tradespeople and the workmen still speak German,
it must nevertheless be said that Strasburg, in the
feeling of its inhabitants, is one of the most French
towns that exist. And, in truth, what had the small
dynastydom of the German tribes— which even to
the present day is preserved, with all that appertains
to it^ as a precious jewel — to oflfer in comparison to
the fact of belonging to a sreat nation, which has
a.w.p uader^L to ^r^. ^ oheridi. if
not political freedom, at all events the more humane
feeling of equality — ^a feeling priceless ip those who
have once become acquainted with it. "

Strasburg had, in the last census (1866), about
85,000 inhabitants. Its extreme eastern works lie on
the left bank of the main stream of the Rhine, about
a short two miles removed from it The ''Small
Ehine,'^ an arm which, separating from the river
above the town, bends to the left and joins it again
about two and a quarter miles below the point where
it leaves it, forms with the Rhine the He des Epis,
and at its most western bend flows close to the most
eastern work, the citadel.

STRASBURG. 167

The 111, which above the town runs nearly parallel
to the Rhine and about four mUes from it, divides
iteelf in the town into two arms— the western one
called the Canal des Faux Bemparts — ^and flows lower
down, at Wanzenau, into the Khine. Above the
town the 111 receives the Brttsch, which in parts is
piade into a canal.

Near Strasburg, on the south, the Bhine-Bhone
canal joins the 111, and near the town on the north
the Bhine-Maxne canal; and this latter, with an
eastern continuation, imites the HI to the Bhine at
the lower end of the lie des Epia

The ramifications of all these waters form to the
north and south a number of idands, especiaUy on
the eastern side of the town. Of these we must
particularly name the island of Wacken, the Bobert-
sau, and the Sporeninsel.

The greatest length of the town is from west to
east, measuring, on the average, 3600 paces from the
west to the citadel, which closes the fortifications on
the east ; in the west, the town is 2300 paces broad
between No. 7 bastion and No. 12 ; and in the east,
along the esplanade which separates the town from
the citadel, only 800 paces.

The chief railway station lies inside the town, close
to the west side of the fortifications. After the line
has quitted Strasburg under arched tunnels, which in
July 1870 were being altered and enlarged, it bifur-
cates close to lunette No. 44. One branch runs to the

168 THE WAR FOB THE BHINE FRONTIER.

north, to divide again at Wendenheim, whence one
line goes by Zabem to Paris, and the other by Hag-
enau to Weissenburg and Saarguemiind ; the other
branch bends at first southwards and then eastwards
round the town, and has another station close to the
Austerlitz gate. It then crosses the Rhine by a mag*
nificent bridge, a monument of modem architecture,
traverses Eehl, and joins the Baden Railway. The
bridge has a length of 801 feet between its shore
buttresses, and has two tracks and two footpaths.
The centre part is solid; the two ends are turn-
bridges, so that communication can be stopped at
pleasure, either on the French or Grerman side ; and
both at the Baden and French end is situated a forti-
fied post. The building of the bridge waa begun in
the year 1858, and finished on the 6th of April 1861.
Of its destruction on the 22d of July 1870 we have
already spoken. To the south of this permanent
bridge is the older bridge of boats.

From the last-named line — ^that is, from the line
which joins the Baden Railway — ^a branch separates
close to the town and runs southwards to Basle ; and
from this other lines bifurcate to the Vosges, to Was-
selonne, Mutzig, and Barr.

Besides the establishments directly connected with
the fortifications, Strasburg has barracks for 10,000
men, a school of artiUery, a miUtary hospital with
1800 beds, a school for military physicians, a large
armoury, and extensive military workshops for the

STRABBUBG. 169

artdlleiy and for the regiment of pontoniers quar-
tered there. The most celebrated building in Stras-
burg is the cathedral or minster, which was begun
as early as the year 1015, and essentially finished
in 1439. The northern tower, the only one com-
pleted, rises up 492 feet above the surrounding
streets. It is the highest building in Europe, and
only 7 feet lower than the highest pyramid in
Egypt. From the platform, which is 235 feet
above the pavement, there is a most extensive view
of the plains of Alsace and Baden, and the tower is
therefore admirably adapted for a military observa-
tory. The Strasburg library is renowned for its large
collection of valuable and rare manuscripts.

The present lines of Strasburg were planned by
Daniel Speckle, who was bom there, the same who
wrote the first good German book on permanent forti-
fication — * Architectura von Festungen ' — ^which was
published in the year of his death, 1589.

After the town had passed into the possession of
the French, Vauban, in the years 1682-1684, built
the citadel, a regular bastioned pentagon of limited
space, strengthened by two homworks towards the
north and east. From Vauban date also most of the
outworks— -homworks and lunettea

The main enceinte has, without the citadel, 17
bastions — ^therefore with it, 22. Nos. 1 to 7 (Fort
Blanc) form the south side, numbering from east to
west ; Nos. 7 to 12 (Fort de Pierre) the west side.

170 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

numbenng from south to ' north j , Nos, 12 to 17 the
north side, numbering from west to east Of the
5 bastions of the citadd, Nos. 18 and 22 faibe the
town.

. The principal outworks are the homworks Nos,
40 to 42 before the front 8 and 9, and Nos. 47 to
49 before the front 10 and 11 ; the lunettes Nos. 52
aaid 33 before the front 11 and 12. and the horn work
Finckmatt before the front 12 to 14.

In more modem times very little has been done
on a large scale for Strasburg. In 1867 hollow tra-
verses were commenced upon the ramparts there a£i
in all fortresses ; corredtions were undertaken where
the revetinents were not sufficiently protected — the
covering works were heightened and prolonged ; the
three powder-magazines of the citadel, and also some
elsewhere, were altered so as to be more protected
from the devastating effects of the fire of rifled guns.
In the homworks Nos. 40 to 42 and 47 to 49, as
well as in No. 53 lunette, central traverses were con-
stracted which divided each of these works into a
right and left half, and thereby defiladed the whole
better, besides affording, in their bomb-proof interiors,
space for barracks and shelter for the unoccupied part
of the garrison. Moreover, in bastions Nos. 7, 9, and
11 OH' the west side, new powder-magazines were
formed.

. No. 12 bastion, which is shut off from the town
by a wall across the gorge, is an extremely weak

STRA8BURG. l7l

work^ pwmg to its very small dimensioiiB and to the
acuteness of its salient angle ; and yet exactly there,
on the north-west comer, is the point of attack for
an adversary.

The ground in front of the whole of the south sid^
can be inundated and rendered impassable by dam-
ming up the waters of the HI and Briisch, for which
purpose large sluices have been built between bas-
tions Nos. 6 and 7 ; while before the eastern part o{
the north side, from the Finckmatt down to the Small
Ehine, the country is traversed in the most confused
manner by the ramifications of the 111, and by canals

and ditches of various widths.

But in spite of this, no improvement on a large
scale of bastion No. 12 was undertaken, although such
was very feasible. It was deemed sufficient to erect
two hollow traverses, one on each face, for shelter
and for expense powder-magazines, and to construct
a casemated battery for one heavy gun in the salient
of the work.

Considering the contracted size of the town, and
the smallness of its lateral dimensions^ even a thorough
rebuilding of the main enceiute alone would not have
been sufficient It would have been much more to
the purpose to have surrounded the town with a
girdle of detached works at a considerable distance
from it; but in 1870 there was not one of these,
although projects for. them had certainly been de-
signed. About 6000 paces to the north-west of Stras-^

172 TH£ WAK FOB THE RHINE FBONTIER.

burg, a chain of heights, the Hausbeig, rises up to
about 140 feet above the plain of the valley, and at
their feet nestle the communities of Ober, Mittel, and
Niederhausbergen, and of MundolsheinL This chain
was to have been crowned with detached works^
which were to have joined on to the town, on the one
side over the gentle slopes of Suffelweyersheim and
Bischheim towards Schiltigheim, and on the other
over the undulations of Oberhausbergen towards
Konigshofen. The distance from the latter was cer-
tainly rather great; but if the principal detached
forts were made perfectly independent, and at the
same time had a sufficient armament of heavy guns,
no enemy would have dared to intrude within this
magic circle without having first obtained possession
of two or three of the works which formed it ; and a
bombardment of the town from the left bank of the
Rhine would be impossible for a long time.

But the great distance of the detached works on
the Hausberg, and perhaps more than anything else
the question of expense, caused the execution of this
project to be postponed; and the authorities deter-
mined to content themselves for the present with an
advanced line before the north-west comer, with its
right on the 111 at Schiltigheim, its left on the Briisch
at K5nigshofen, and lying about 1800 paces in front
of the outworks of the enceinte. The central work of
this line was to be built in the form of a homwork,
closed by a wall across the gorge, and situated, in

81EGE OF STRASBUBG. l78

j&ont of the connectaBg portion, between the railways
to Paris and Basle and the workshops of the Eastern
Bailway, between the Paris line and the road to Hit-
telhausberg. The construction of this central work
was to have been begun in 187L

Projects were also made for a better covering of
the east side. Two independent works were to be
erected in the northern and southern comers of the
He des Epis. These would have advanced the line of
fire of the citadel about 1800 paces to the eastward ;
and had they existed in 1870, would certainly have
rendered good service against the bombardment from
the right bank of the Rhine. But in a moment of
quietness, this scheme also was laid aside for a time,
for the Government feared that its execution might
unnecessarily cause a great outcry, in the spirit of
Nicolaus Becker's melody.*

Thus it came to pass that the attack of 1870 sur-
prised Strasburg in naked innocence ; and certainly,
at the outbreak of this war it did not, viewing the
armaments of the present days, in the least merit the
appellation of a fortress of the first class, much less of
'' one of the strongest places in the world."

If France had possessed a system of military service
which would have allowed her to dispose of large garri-
sons, and if the war had not been undertaken by the
Government of the Emperor Napoleon with such an

* <* Sic Bollen ihn nicht haben,
Den freien deataehen Bhem.**

'174 THE WAR MR :rfifi UHlS* ¥JlONTIER.

Utter absence of political and military calculation as
is scarcely elsewhere recorded in the history of the
world, the weak points of Strasburg might have been
remedied, at least to some extent ; for a few weeks
would have been sufficient to run up strong detached
works on the most important points outside the en-
ceinte, and particularly before the north-west comer.

The normal garrison of Strasburg was assumed at
15,000 men. In 1870 it was calculated by the Ger-
mans at about 18,000 men, but therein were included
not only the Sedentary National Guard and the Mo-
bile Guard, but also the numerous staff of the mili-
tary establishments, of the engineers, of the artillery,
jof the military medical school, and of the workshops.
Of regular troops of the line there were only 3000 in
Strasburg*

When the war began. General Uhrich was named
commandant of the place. Bom in 1802 at Ffalz-
burg, he entered the French infantry, from the School
of St Cyr, as sub-lieutenant in 1 820. He served in
the campaign in Spain in the year 1823, and in many
in A£dca after 1834. In 1852 he became brigadier-
general, and in 1855 led a brigade of the Imperial
Guard to the Crimea^ but, nominated to general of
division, returned to Paris in the same year. At the
commencement of the Italian campaign he stood at
the head of a division of the Army of Pans, which
then became the 2d division of the 5th Corps of the
active army.

SIEGE OP STRASBUBG. l7S

: We have already seen; how, two days after the
encounter at Worth, the Baden cavalry appeared, on
the 8th of August, before Stiiasburg.

The total besieging force was formed gradually by, —

The Baden division, which was commanded at first
by Greneral Beyer, and, he falling sick before the
bombardment, by General Laroche afterwards ;

By the Prussian landwehr division of the Guard
(Loen) ;

By the l8t Prussian Reserve aandwehr) division
(Treskow) ;

By 37 companies of fortress artillery, among which
were 2 Bavarian, 2 WUrtemberg, 4 Baden, and 29
North German companies ; and by 1 Prussian com-
bined company, and 1 Bavarian company of Pioneera

The command-in-chief of the collective siege
forces was given to General von Werder, Bom in
1 808, he entered the cavalry of the Prussian Guard,
the regiment, of Life Guards, in 1825, end was after-
wards, in 1826, transferred as an officer to the 1st
foot regiment of the Guard* In the years 1842 and
1843 he served in the Bussian army during the cam-
paigns in the Caucasus ; and after his return he was
in 1846 appointed as captain to the General Staff,
but in 1848 iretumed again to the infantry. In 1863
he became major-general, and in 1866 lieutenant-
general, in which rank he in the same year com-?
manded the 3d division of infantry in the army of
Prince Frederic Charles, and by his behaviour |tt

176 THE WAB FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

Gitschiu and Eonigsgratz won the order ^^pour le
m^rite/'

With him were associated lieutenant-General von
Decker as chief of the siege-artillery, and Major-
General von Mertens as chief of the engineers — the
latter had in 1864 conducted the siege-works against
the DUppel intrenchments.

General von Werder^ on his arrival at Strasburg,
established his headquarters at Mundolsheim on the
SnffeL

From the 11th to the 17th of August the Baden
division was alone before the fortress, and the invest-
ment therefore could not be completed ; but on the
15th Werder caused Schiltigheim, and on the 18th
Eonigshofen, to be occupied ; and after the latter day
the Prussian reserves, and after the 2l8t of August
the siege-guns, began to arrive*

On the 23d Werder determined to commence on
the morrow to bombard the town with the 40 dispos-
able Prussian siege-guns and with the Bavarian field-
artilleiy, and the citadel with the 32 Baden siege-
guns from Bastatt, which had been placed in batteries
on the right bank of the Bhine at EehL

Since the first shell fell into a besieged town, there
has always been much controversy as to the admis-
sibility and utility of a bombardment In France
itself the question has been much argued in recent
days by an engineer officer of great length of service,
and by an old artillery officer. The first, Chief of

SIEGE OF STRASBURG. 177

BattaUon Prevost * commandant of engineers for the
eastern forts of Paris, has come forward as the
decided opponent of bombardment ; but BloiB,t Gen-
eral of Artillery, has defended the practice with great
vigour. It will not be uninteresting to give here
a short summary of the arguments which the latter
adduces in favour of the practice. He says : —

1. During the bombardment the besieger will suffer
but little loss, being protected by his breastworks, and
sheltered in his parallels and batteries.

2. If the bombardment does not effect its purpose,
and the besiefi^er has to advance to the rec^ular attack,
he eomMenoi this with unweakened forTagainst a
garri^n which has suffered greatly, and wh^™-
bably has been already brought into conflict with
the citizens by the bombardment ; and therefore the
resistance to be overcome will not be so great as it
would have been had the besieger at once commenced
a regular attack.

3. If the besieger, out of pure philanthropy or from
other reasons, spare the inhabitants of the town, these
will not be grateful to him for his clemency, but will
rather support the garrison, and thus increase the
resistance, to the prejudice of the attacker.

4. By the inevitably long duration of a regular

* Etudes Histoziqnes snr la Foitification, T Attaque, et la Ddfense dee
Places. 1869.

t De la Fortification en Presence de T Artillerie noaveUe. Paiia, 1865.

Ezamen critique des Etudes Hifitoriques but la Fortifications, I'At-
taque, et la D^ense des Places. Par F. Prevoet. Paris, 1869.

VOL. II. M

178 THE WAB FOE THE RHINE FEONTIEE.

siege, the besieging troops, and also a corps of observa-
tion, will be rendered immovable, and prevented from
making other useful movements in the open field.

5. If the attacker obtains possession of the place
after a regular siege, he will only find empty maga-
zines, which he must at once refill, and demolished
ramparts, which he must at once rebuild.

In all ages the practice of bombardment has found
more adherents in the artillery than in the engineers.
This cannot be explained by saying that the corps of
engineers is composed of more humane elements than
the artillery. It rather arises from the fact that each
arm of the service naturally strives a little pro domo.
The engineer will hear nothing of bombardments,
because he wishes to render of value his good choice
of the points of attack, his saps and trenches, his
indication of the right position for batteries ; and
not only that, but he wishes to try how the works
of defence will hold out, which certainly were not
planned by himself, but yet were constructed by
comrades of the freemasonry on the other side. The
artiUerist, on tiie oti.er Zd, despises professionaUy
all these cimning contrivances, and trusts much more
to the big mouths of his large-calibre guns, and to
the dread which their thunder inspires — ^a fear which
he must always regard with a certain inward satis-
faction.

A bombardment is certainly a cruel affair ; but its
application cannot therefore be rejected on principle

SIEGE OF STRASBURG. 179

— ^for war itself is essentially a barbarous proceeding,
and it is its rule that the innocent suffer much more
than the guilty. Compare only the prisoner of Wil-
helmshohe and his followers with the noble French
nation, which he and those followers excited to this
hapless war.

We arrive, then, necessarily at the conclusion, that
to judge of the adnussibiUty and utility of a bombard-
ment, we must consider the particulars of each separate
case where it is employed. If we do this with regard
to Strasburg, we shaU find that the appUcation of a
bombardment there was not expedient, and we will
give our grounds for this assertion : —

1. If the inhabitants of Strasburg had been burn-
ing with desire to throw themselves into the arms of
Germany, a few shells from German ordnance would
have suflBced to cause them to exercise pressure upon
the commandant. Then the bombardment would
have been neither cruel nor inexpedient. But this
hypothesis was not true; on the contrary, the inhabi-
tants of Strasburg were more French in their senti-
ments than the people of the interior of France, and
it was to be assumed that they would only be im-
bittered against the Germans by the destruction
wrought by German artillery.

2. At the time that the bombardment was under-
taken, it had abeady been expressed with sufficient
clearness that the victorious Germans meant to retain
Alsace as a " German Brotherland,'' to keep for them-

180 THE WAR FOE THE RHINE FRONTIER.

selves that " land German at heart/' and especially
Strasburg, that " thorough German town ; '' and we
have certainly never before heard that a bombard-
ment was the right means to evince or to awaken
brotherly love.

3. Although the conduct of the Prussian field-
artillery in 1866 was very sharply criticised, it has
nevertheless been universally acknowledged since
1864, the time of the attack of the Diippel intrench-
ments^ that the Prussian siege-artUlery has attained to
a degree of perfection in the accuracy and eflFect of each
single shot hitherto unknown. Its destructive power
has been established beyond all doubt. Under these
circumstances, the bombardment of the town might
undoubtedly have been omitted ; and it certainly ought
not to have taken place, especially considering the
relative incompleteness of the preparations of the de-
fenders ; because, as we said before, such an act can
never be a convincing proof of brotherly love.

General von Werder, however, determined to bom-
bard the town, because he knew that there was no
excess of bomb-proof shelter in the town, and assumed,
therefore, that the citizens would compel the command-
ant to surrender. This calculation was false ; but it
would have been thoroughly correct if the population
of Strasburg had been composed of those men of Jew-
ish origin who in the present day give themselves out
to be the true Germany, and cry out for the annihila-
tion of France, — ^who, as contractors, gain an ill-earned

SIEGE OF STRASBURG. 181

pelf by the continuation of a destructive war, without
themselves incurring any danger — or, as professors,
disgracefully degrading science by the name, himger
after better posts, and are ready to commit any mean-
ness, even to defaming the German nation in the
history of the world.

Werder informed General Uhrich beforehand of his
intention to bombard the town, and at the same time
summoned him to surrender, which he refused to do.
Thereupon Werder entered into further details, and
requested the General to remove the observatory
established upon the minster, so that the Germans
might not be compeUed to fire upon this monument
of Gothic architecture ; he besought him also to change
the position of the military hospital, which was near
the citadel, as it stood in the line of fire from the
German batteries, and yet could not be distinctly seen
from them. But Uhrich declined to comply with
either of these entreaties.

The fate of the brave old town of Strasburg must
touch the heart of every feeling man, to whatever
nation he may belong, or whatever his poUtical feel-
ings may be. But this compassion must not cause
us to forget to be just In France, the bombardment
of the city was regarded as an act of Gennan barbarity ;
but when General Uhrich said that if the Germans
succeeded in entering the town he would himself re-
tire into the citadel and thence destroy the town, the
speech was praised in all the French journals as heroic.

182 THE WAR FOE THE RHINE FRONTIER,

We must confess that we cannot reconcile these two
views ; and we can say this the more openly, as we
have before most decidedly declared that a bombard-
ment in this case seemed to us on good grounds to be
inexpedient.

On the forenoon of the 24th of August the bombard-
ment was begun. Fearful devastations were caused
by it, and the venerable cathedral was shamefully
injured; the valuable library was destroyed; many
private dwellings were ruined ; and innocent, unarmed,
grey-headed men, women, and children, were killed or
crippled. The defenceless inhabitants sought refuge
in the cellars, while those capable of bearing arms
strove with heroic courage to keep under the flames,
and to save as much of their father-town as could yet
be rescued.

The Bishop of Strasburg sought to mediate. At
his entreaty Werder intermitted the bombardment on
the 26 th of August from four o'clock in the morning
until noon. But the negotiations of the Bishop led
to no result; he could obtain no concessions from
Uhrich, and could only make requests of Werder.
At noon, therefore, on the 26th, the bombardment
was recommenced, and carried on throughout that
day and the whole of the following one; but the
desired end was not gained, for commandant, gar-
rison, and citizens remained unshaken, and no one
urged General Uhrich to surrender.

While the German batteries on the left bank of the

SIEGE OF STEASBURG. 183

Shine directed their fire upon the town, the Baden
artillery on the right bank to the north of Kehl
bombarded the citadel with great success, and re-
duced the dwellings and magazines within it to a
heap of ruins.

The French guns in the citadel answered with
vigour, and for their part set the town of Kehl on
fire. From the German side the French are re-
proached for having directed their fire upon this
open place unnecessarily, as the Baden batteries were
not situated in any way before Kehl, but by the side
of it. This last statement is certainly true ; but it
must be admitted that Kehl, so hard by the position,
would have been an only too comfortable shelter for
the men of Baden had it been perfectly tabooed to the
fire of the French.

We must here further relate that General von
Werder, during his negotiations with the Bishop, had
expressed his willingness to allow the women, chil-
dren, and old men to leave Strasburg. But this ofier
was declined by General Uhrich, as it would be diffi-
cult to make a selection out of 85,000 human beings.

When it became evident that the bombardment
would not gain quickly the end in view. General von
Werder resolved, on the 27th of August, to begin a
regular siege with the abundant materials at hand ;
and the establishment of engineer depots, the prepa-
ration of fascines, gabions, Ac, were at once taken
in hand.

184 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The artillery matSriel which was on the spot was
both plentiful in quantity and excellent in quality.
There were altogether 241 siege-pieces, 44 of which
were from Baden, and the total was composed as
follows : —

58 rifled 24-pounders (16 of which were from
Baden — 12 short pieces particularly adapted
for pitching-firing) ;
80 rifled 12-pounders (among them 16 from

Baden) ;
20 rifled 6-pounders ;

2 rifled mortars of 21 centimetres (8 inch) ;
8 smooth - bore 60 - pounder mortars (from

Baden) ;
19 smooth-bore 50-pounder mortars ;
24 smooth-bore 25-pounder mortars (4 from

Baden) ;
30 smooth-bore 7-pounder mortars.
In the night from the 29th to the 30th of August,
the first parallel was opened by flying sap, about 700
to 800 paces from the north-west comer of the for-
tress, with its left on Schiltigheim, and its right
extending towards the Paris railway. At the same
time, 10 batteries for rifled guns were constructed
about 200 to 300 paces in rear of it. These were
armed with 44 guns, and were ready to commence
work on the morning of the 30th. When they
opened fire on the works of the north-west comer,
they were supported by the German batteries which

SIEGE OF STRASBUEG. 185

had been thrown up for the bombardment and were ^
not yet disarmed.

The artillery of the defenders was surprised by the
fire of the besiegers, which commenced on the morn-
ing of the 30th. The armament which they had on
the works for security against an attack de vive force
was not sufficient to answer with effect, and the
armament to withstand a regular siege had not yet
been completed. By the Germans it is supposed that
the French expected the attack to be made on some
point other than the one chosen. But this is scarcely
possible, for Strasburg offers but one easily assailable
front, and that is the one which was selected by the
Germans. We must therefore assume that the French
did not anticipate that the regular siege would be
commenced so soon as the morning of the 30th of
August ; but be that as it may, the fire from the
point attacked was completely silenced in two hours,
and was only able to reopen in the afternoon.

During the whole time of the siege, and even
throughout the nights, a constant fire of shrapnel
and of mortar shells rendered it very difficult for the
besieged to repair their injured batteries, or to con-
struct new ones even for mortars ; but nevertheless
they did their utmost, and placed their works again
and again in a condition to answer.

In the night from the 31st of August to the 1st of
September, the besiegers formed the approaches from
the first to the second parallel, and opened this latter

186 THE WAB FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

on the night from the 1st to the 2d of September in
the churchyard of St Helene, by common sap, at a
distance of 400 paces from the fortifications of the
town.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 2d September,
the defenders made the first sortie of any importance.
One column issued northwards upon ^e iLds of
Wacken and Jars^ to attack the leffc flank of the siege-
works of the Germans, while another debouched
southwards against the railway station before the gate
of Austerlitz. Both were repeUed after a short com-
bat ; but the Badensers, pursuing too hotly, suflered
considerable losses. Sorties on a large scale by the
garrison of Strasburg w^e in general very difficult to
carry out, owing partly to the total want of detached
works, partly and principally to the smallness of the
number of troops of the line which General Uhrich
had at his disposal

As the siege progressed, and as the approaches were
pushed forward, so did the artillery increase the num-
ber of its batteries, and remove them constantly nearer
to the front. Thus, on the 9th of September the
Germans had, including the Baden guns on the right
bank of the Rhine, 178 pieces actively at work, of
which 48 were mortars.

In the nights from the 9th to the 10th and from
the 10th to the 11th of September, the approaches
from the second to the third parallel were made ; and
during the night from the 11th to the 12th, the

SIEGE OF STRASBUBG. 187

greater part of the third parallel itself, which ran
along the foot of the glacis of Nos. 53 and 52 lunettes,
was opened.

But these labours in the trenches were not executed
without sacrifices. By the 5th of September, the
Germans had lost 57 killed, 327 wounded, and 30
missing. Of the engineer officers employed, 2 were
killed, and 2 wounded.

By the 11th of September the artillery had armed
a breaching-battery, battery No. 25, with four short 24-
pounders against the lunette No. 53. This breaching-
battery was on the highroad to Weissenburg, behind
the first parallel, and about 1100 paces removed fix>m
its object, which it could strike by a pitching-fire
across a moderately wide ditch. It fulfilled its object
in an unexampled manner.

As soon as the catastrophe of Sedan was heard of
in the German camp, General Werder had communi-
cated the news to General Uhrich ; but it was barely
credited in the garrison, and produced no effect what-
ever. Meanwhile imions for the assistance of Stras-
burg had been everywhere formed in Switzerland,
which sought to do its best in every way for a town
which had been in such brotherly connection with it
in former centuries. The centre of these unions was
naturally Basle ; and a delegation went thence to the
German headquarters to do any good it might be able
to. By order of the German commander it was ad-
mitted into the city, and then the inhabitants readily

188 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

believed from the Swiss that which they had refused
to give credence to when it came from their besiegers,
and the messengers were fortunate enough to be able
to take back with them to Switzerland 800 of the
defenceless citizens.

While the Germans were, as we have seen, continu-
ally drawing nearer to the north-west comer of the
fortifications of the town of Strasburg, they did not
at all neglect to approach towards the eastern side
also — towards the citadel ; and with a view to draw-
ing nearer to this, the Badensers crossed from the
right bank of the Great Bhine to the lie des Epis,
while Prussian battalions passed over the Small Hhine
to the same island from the Eobertsau.

On the 15th of September, the besieged, who were
also molested by German field-batteries from the
south side, made a sortie upon the He des Epis, but
were repulsed by the Badensers. On this occasion
Colonel Fiev^, the commandant of the French regi-
ment of pontoniers, fell — a man of extraordinary
corporeal dimensions, who was known throughout
France for his unnatural erectness, which would have
been remarkable even in Prussia.

On the 12th of September the Germans armed the
breaching-battery No. 42 with six short 24-pounders,
with intent to domolish the escarp of the right face
of bastion No. 11. The battery was 1000 paces re-
moved from its object, lying to the south of the road
which branches off at the churchyard of St Helene

SIEGE OF STRASBUBG. 180

from the Weiflsenburg highway, and runfl to Schiltig-
heim. Afterwards battery No. 58 was constructed,
between the Oberweg and the Unterweg, 900 paces
from its object, and armed with four short 24-pounders,
to breach the left flank of bastion No. 12.

As the guns in most of the batteries had to fire
over intervening objects, and therefore with rather
considerable elevations, the German artiUery employed
perfectly level trough-shaped embrasures instead of
the ordinary revetted ones. Owing to this, and to
the cover they derived from their position behind and
in the parallels and approaches, the batteries offered
to the besieged a very unfavourable target. Pitching-
fire, to breach masonry which could not be seen from
the batteries, was employed before Strasburg for the
first time, with how great success we shall see later
on. It is almost superfluous to remark, that the
difficulty of breaching at great distances when the
masonry is visible from afar — as, for example, was the
case in the artillery attacks of the English on the
fortresses in Spain — cannot be compared with that of
breaching by a pitching-fire. The gun chiefly used
for this pitching-fire was the short rifled 24-pounder
(15 centimetres).

On the 17th of September the Prussian sappers
effected by sap the crowning of the covered-ways of
lunettes Nos. 53 and 52, the system of mines before
the former having been luckily discovered and un-
loaded. It was found to be unnecessary to construct

190 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

breaching and counter batteries on the crest of the
glacis^ as the pitching-fire had already done its work
on lunette No. 53. When the breach was ready, the
sappers descended by a blinded-gallery to the level of
the water in the wet ditches of both lunettecf, blew
down by means of two mines the revetted counter-
scarp of lunette No. 53 opposite the breach, and began
to form a dam, 20 feet wide, across the 60 feet wide
wet ditch.

But before the dam was finished, it was discovered
on the 20th of September that the work was aban-
doned by the French. The breach was at once occu-
pied, and on the evening of the 20th the interior of
the lunette also. The sappers forthwith commenced
to establish themselves there ; but this having to be
accomplished under the fire of the works in rear, could
not be effected without loss. The lunette was found
to be in a state of utter ruin, and even the bomb-proof
barrack-traverses on the capital of the work had not
been able to withstand the effects of the Grerman
artillery. And as lunette No. 53 was destroyed and
forsaken, so also was lunette No. 52 ; and a bridge of
barrels having been thrown across the 1 80 feet wide
wet ditch on the evening of the 21st of September,
the latter work also was occupied.

The German artillery had, on the 24th of Septem-
ber, 229 pieces of ordnance in their batteries, among
which were 83 mortars. The last battery which was
built was called No. 60, and was constructed in lunette

SIEGE OF STRASBTJBG. 191

No. 53 for three rifled 6-pouiiders. On the whole,
the Germans made 68 batteries during the siege ; and
the reason that the last one thrown up nevertheless
only received the designation No. 60 was this, that
when, in the course of events, a battery had to be
moved forward, it retained its old number with an a,
and, if necessaiy, a b also, appended.

By the 2dth of September the works on the front
attacked were no longer tenable. In bastion No. 11,
a breach 80 feet wide, and perfectly practicable, had
been formed. The interior was a heap of ruins, and
communication with the town was nearly impossible.
In bastion No. 12 the breach was also cut, and it only
remained to batter down the masses of earth which
remained standing. This was to be done shortly
before the .tonJ^. The ceemated Utte^ in Z
salient, and the wall which closed the gorge, were
reduced to shapeless masses. The advanced lunette
No. 44, before the front 9-10, and the barracks and
parts of the town abutting on the front attacked, were
in the same condition. The arch of the Stone Gate
(Porte de Pierres) in the curtain 11-12 was on the
point of falling in, and, to prevent this, it became
necessary for the besieged to fill it up with sand-bags.
The works lying next to the front attacked, the
homwork Finckmatt (58-60 and 47-49), were not
so utterly battered down as the front itself, but were
nevertheless very materially damaged.

On the 27th of September, at 5 o'clock in the

192 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER,

afternoon. General Uhrich caused tlie white flag to be
hoisted on the minster and on bastions No. 11 and 12.

The German artillery at once ceased their fire.
They had, since the commencement of the attack,
thrown 193,722 shot and shell into the town and
fortress — 6249 for each day, 260 for each hour, 4 to
5 for every minute.

Among these were 28,000 common sheU and 5000
shrapnel - shell from the long rifled 24 -pounders;
45,000 common shell and 11,000 shrapnel £rom the
rifled 12-pounders; 8000 common shell and 4000
shrapnel from the rifled 6-pounders; 3000 common
shell from the short rifled 24-pounders (guns of 15
centimetres) ; 600 shell from the 21-centimetre (8-inch)
rifled mortars; 58,000 shell from the smooth-bore
mortars — namely, 15,000 from the 50-pounders,
20,000 from the 25-pounders, and 23,000 from the
7-pounders.

The capitulation ensued without delay. The terms,
especially as regards the officers, were similar to those
of the surrender at Sedan ; the troops of the line be-
came prisoners of war, the National Guard and Franc-
tireurs were disarmed and set free upon giving a bond.
At 8 A.M. on the 28th of September, the citadel, and
the Austerlitz, Fischer, and National gates, were to be
given over to the Germans. At 11 a.m. the garrison
was to march out to the square in the Gallgass, be-
tween redoubt No. 37 and lunette No. 44; and at noon
the giving over of the mat&riel was to commence.

SIEGE OF STBASBURG. 193

Much disorder took place during the marching out:
many of the soldiers destroyed their arms, and some
of them could not be removed from the town until
3 P.M.; but the transfer of the stores was more
speedily effected, and 1070 cannons were given over
to the Germans on the first day.

Lieutenant - General von OUech was appointed
Grerman governor of the fortress, and Major-General
von Mertens commandant. (General von Werder,
now nominated to the command of the newly-formed
14th Army Corps, was to operate southwards on both
sides of the Vosges into the valley of the Saone,
to prevent the formation of troops there, and to cut
the railway communication from Miilhausen to Paris, ^
and from Pontarlier by Dijon to Paris.

Even during the siege of Strasburg various detach-
ment. .{^p. l»>d beea sent bL th. mveetmg
forces into the Vosges to break up and scatter the
bodies of Franc-tireurs who were beginning to coUect
there in ever-increaqing numbers ; but they had, as can
be easily understood, but very imperfectly effected
their object

After the taking of the town, the inhabitants of
Strasburg, although they did not openly rebel, never-
theless showed by their whole behaviour that they
were but little disposed to accept the '^ brotherly
love " of the Germans.

Certainly this " brotherly love " did not show itself
in a very captivating form. An unfeeling curiosity

VOL. IL N

194 THE WAB POE THE RHINE FRONTIER.

rather than a sympathising compassion for the unfor-
tunate brought crowds of people to the ruined city.
It seemed abnost as though many were charmed
thither by the pictures of desolation which were to be
seen everywhere. The ruins were photographed ;
sketches of them adorned the various illustrated
periodicals, and were even collected together in
albums, which were recommended as suitable Christ-
mas gifts. Literary would-be warriors wrote with
brutal imbecility the text for these pictures in the
papers which pretended to represent German civili-
sation. It was not a bad thought which prompted
the authorities to set aside the citadel as reserved.
Whoever wished to inspect closely the devastations
wrought there, had to pay three shillings entrance ;
and the sum thus collected, which was to be spent
in restoring the cathedral, amounted in a very few
weeks to £7600.

An inteUigent man of Leipsic formed the ingeni-
ous idea of collecting the splinters of the shells which
had laid the town in ruins, and casting them into
"patriotic medals/' which were sold at a shilling
each. To the advertisement of this tender memo-
rial he added an authenticating certificate from the
mayor, to the effect that on the 9th of November
he had bought 50 hundredweight of the fragments
of shell.

Whoever enters into the spirit of the words^

SIEGE OF STRASBURG. 195

"silent sympathy is asked for/' * can scarcely find
pleasure in such manifestations, which, however, were
not here apparent for the first time.

The people of Strasburg, at least those whose
position and occupation allowed them to, retired
silently into their dwellings while the town was
thus crowded with sight-seers — even those whose
mother-tongue was German avoided speaking it when
conversing with the conquerors. Many, hoping for
better times, sought an asylum in Switzerland ; and
from Strasburg, as from the whole of Alsace, many
young men went into the south of France to join
the Mobile Guard and partisan corps which were
forming there.

* The words which usually accompany the notice of a death in a
Gtennan newspaper.

196

CHAPTER XXVL

STATE OF THE WAB AT THE END OF THE MONTH OF

SEPTEMBER.

At the end of September the military activity of the
Germans was confined to three main centres — Strasr
bm^g, Metz, and Paris.

Strasburg felL The troops which had been neces-
sarily employed in the attack were for the most part
set firee, and could be used for other purposes ; and
as Germany had declared that she intended to retain
Alsace after the conclusion of peace, their chief work
must next be to subdue Upper Alsace, and especially
the fortresses of Schlettstadt,Neu Breisach, and Belfort»
which were still in the hands of the French. But it
was to be assumed, also, that new formations would
be organised in the south and' west of Alsace, and
therefore the additional task must be undertaken of
destroying these in the bud where possible. This
might very likely, at that time, be effected with
smaU forces, and therefore flying-columns were sent
out in the above-named directions into the valleys of
the Rhone and Saone.

THE WAR AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. 197

Metz was, and had been since the 18th of August^
surrounded by two German annies — ^the First Army
and the Second Army — but it had not been regularly
attacked, neither had any attempt been made to bom-
bard it. The Germans were waiting to subdue the
fortress by famine, an end which they foresaw that
they must sooner or later attain. For even if the
fortress had been fully provisioned, and its future
requirements provided for, at the commencement of
the war, there had been a field-army using its sup-
plies during the latter days of July and the earlier
part of August ; and since then the army of Bazaine
had been daily consuming at least as much as the
inhabitants and the regular garrison together. Since
the arrival of the news of the catastrophe of Sedan,
and of the declaration of the Republic in Paris, the
offensive defence of Bazaine had become very languid,
as we shall see later on in our narrative. But the
Germans could not calcidate upon the continuation of
this lethargy ; it was, on the contrary, only prudent
to assume that Bazaine might rouse himself for a
desperate stroke. Considerable forces were therefore
tied down before Metz, and having to be always in
readiness in case of need, they dared not undertake
any secondary enterprises which would remove them
for any length of time from the investing lines. On
the other hand, such collateral undertakings were not
required from the besiegers, as there was no impor-
tant point in the neighbourhood where the French

198 THE WAK FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

BepubUc could endeavour to organise any formations
worth mentioning.

Paris had been invested since the 19 th of Septem-
ber, but a speedy surrender was no longer to be hoped
for. After the first bewildered surprise caused by the
news of the catastrophe of Sedan had passed away,
and a new order of things had been formed; after
this had been a^ccepted by the masses — ^we will not
say more ; after the conference of Ferrik'es, instead
of awakening hopes of a speedy peace, had rather
shown the gulf which now yawned between France
and Germany, — ^the Germans were compelled to ac*
knowledge that they would have to encounter an
earnest resistouce if they advanced to any more or
less regular siege of Paris. To bring up the mate-
rial necessary to overcome this would require much
time. On the other hand, if they wished to allow
hunger to do the work of battle, they must be pre-
pared to allow months to pass away before it would
begin to make its terrors felt

If the French could no longer hope for peace, they
muBt apply themaelvea to forming new armiea-na-
tional armies; for of the Imperial army but little
remained, and that little was either imprisoned or
split up into useless fractions. The objective of these
newly-to-be-formed armies must be, in the first place,
the relief of Pans — of that town which, taking into
account only the number of its inhabitants, and dis-

THE WAB AT THE END OF 8EPTEMHEB. ' 19ft

regaiding all else, completely outweighs many a Ger-
man kingdom or grand duchy.

Where, then, must these armies be formed — ^and
how?

The parts of France really overrun by the Germans,
and which could be easily dominated from their cen-
tres of operations, scarcely amounted to a seventh of
the whole country. But in the north the district
unoccupied by the Germans formed but narrow strips,
because of the nearness of the Belgian frontier and
of the sea. This portion was therefore unsafe, and
the points of concentration in it had too little terri-
tory around them to allow of their being used for the
formation of new armies.

These, therefore, must necessarily be collected and
organised in the south of France.

And in the south of France, again, two divisions
are sharply defined — the one to the east of the
Sevennes, the Bhone district; and the other to the
west of the Sevennes, comprising the district of the
Loire, the mountains of Limousin, and the basin of
the Gironde.

Of these two divisions, again, the eastern has never
been in such intimate connection with the capital of
France as the western.

Lx the valley of the Bhone, we, even to the present
day, still feel ourselves in the world of Greek colonies
and of Boman provinces. A large town, Lyons, has

200 THE WAK FOB THE RHINE FBOKTIEB.

sprung up there^ which, although far inferior in the
number of inhabitants and in all other respects^ still
stands next to Paris in France. A second great town
*has arisen also, Marseilles, the third in France; but
Lyons and Marseilles together have but little more
than a third of the population of the capital, although
they leave all other towns of France far behind. Still,
with these large and important cities in it, the fate of
the basin of the Bhone has never been so intimately
bound up with that of the centre of France as that of
the west has been.

There, on both sides of the Loire, that Camuten
land spreads out which the Druids declared to be tbe
navel of Celtic GauL Thence, from Orleans, went
forth the deliverance of France from the Engb'sh in-
vasion, wrought by Joan of Arc. Behind the Loire
the wreck of the French army retreated . after the
defeats of 1815 ; and the nickname of Brigands of
the Loire, which was given them by the followers of
the Bourbons, became a name of honour for them
among the people of France. More to the south, in
the mountains of Auvergne, arose Vercingetonx, the
hero who made such manful, although unsuccessful,
attempts to free his countiy from the dominion of
the Bomans.

The south-western land cannot boast of such large
towns as exist in the basin of the Bhone, but still
there are not wanting many, such as Nantes, Bordeaux,
and Toidouse, which, important by their population.

THE WAR AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. 201

offer by their commerce and industry centres where
the clothing, equipment, and arming of considerable
forces would be facilitated.

And in the then existing state of affairs, the district
of the Loire possessed a special importance, owing to
its nearness to Paris.

If it be asked what character the new French for-
mations would assume, it will be found that it must
by necessity be a revolutionary one. Even the new
formations of the line, which were to be gathered
together round the nucleus of the still existing or
hurriedly-collected depots, would consist partly of old
soldiers, partly and mostly of the young conscripts
of the year 1870. - To these would be joined the
Mobile Guards, and other corps of troops gained
in some way or other, since every means must
be adopted to obtain men. The mat^el, articles of
equipment, horses, and suchlike, would be procured
by requiaition. As tiere was a want of experienced
officers, such would have to be improvised; and as
the opinion was ever gaining ground that the old
generals who had been soldiers from their early
youth had been the cause of all the misfortunes, it
was very likely to happen that the rulers of France
would fall into the error of making generals and
officers of men who were utterly ignorant of military
matters.

As the great end was to obtain masses and large
numbers of soldiers, the armament could not be uni-

202 TOE WAB FOR THE BHINE FBONTIER.

form — arms would be taken wherever they were foimd^
wherever they could be obtained.

The matter was urgent. The relief of Paris was the
first objective; for however favourable the condition
of Paris might be painted, it could not be denied that
the sooner the time of relief came, so much the more
chance would there be that Paris would hold out until
its arrival.

The Grovemment, therefore, made desperate efforts
in mUitery affairs. The paaeion for war penetrated
into the masses, who were purposely excited by every
means. The more the theatre of war became ex-
tended, and the more the communications of the Ger-
mans were lengthened, so much the greater field
would there be for the working of national passions.
The Germans would be obliged to make many small
detachments, and these could be attacked again by
small French detachments and partisan corps, espe-
cially if the rural population supported them actively
and secretly, at the same time opposing a stubborn
passive resistance to the Germans. Every success
of such a partisan enterprise would lead to reprisals^
and these again would call for vengeance. Thus it
can be said that the more success seemed to vanish
from the cause of the now highly -excited French
people, so much the more cruelly, and with so much
the more bitterness, would the war be carried on.

And at that time, also, superstition began to play
its part Inspired men came forward and began to

THE WAB AT THE END OF SEFTEMBEK. 203

prophesy great disasters, which were, however, finaUy
to be followed by so much the more glorious successes.
The masses listened willingly; the journalists^ who were
not credulous, also spread abroad these prophecies^
and took care not to allow their scepticism to appear.

The Germans before Paris, at the same time that
they kept up the investment of the town, must also
send out expeditions, from this centre in all direc-
tions, partly to acquire information of what was going
on in their vicinity, partly to prevent new formations
arising, or to nip them in the bud, if it were possible
to do so without too great an expenditure of force.
But they must ever keep their gaze principally directed
towards the line of the Loire; and if it were possible,
they must establish themselves on that river in order
to earnestly oppose any serious attempt to relieve
Paris which might be made from the south-western
district of France.

Such was the military situation of the belligerents
at the end of September, and such were the cheerless
prospects of both parties after the shipwreck of any
hopes of peace which the catastrophe of Sedan may
have awakened — ^prospects cheerless for the French,
who could now barely hope any longer for a victory
in the open field, and cheerless also for the Germans,
who could no longer hope for a speedy peace, but
could only look sorrowfully forward to the kindling
of the most bitter national hate, and to fresh wars in
the future, which perhaps, spite of or because of

204 THE WAB FOB THE BHINE FBOKTIER.

Alsace and Loirame, would not be commenced under
such favourable auspices as that of 1870.

Many a Gennan looked back already from the
theatre of war to his own home, and asked himself
whether anything useful would be gained by so many
and great exertions either for it or for the German
nation, or whether the fruits of this war might not
fall short of what was expected, as those of the wars
of 1813 and 1815 did.

205

CHAPTER XXVIL

THE BATTLE OF NOISBEYILLE ON THE 31 ST OF AUGUST
AND THE 1ST OF SEFTEMBEB.

When the troops which were destined to form the
army of the Crown -Prince of Saxony quitted the
neighbourhood of Metz, the forces remaining behind
to oppose Bazaine were at once reinforced by the
strong division of General Kummer, which was only
then called up from Germany, and consisted of a bri-
gade of infantry of the line and Schuler von Senden's
division of landwehr.

Prince Frederic Charles, to whom the command of
the German *^ Army of Metz '' was intrusted, did not
expect to subdue the fortress by a regular siege ; and
a bombardment of the town was rendered impossible
by the strong detached works so long as the French
held possession of them. But, on the other hand, the
Germans could calculate with great certainly upon
the effects of hunger. They therefore kept the place
completely shut in, and watched it closely, throwing
up intrenchments, so that they could guard the long
investing lines with comparatively few men, and keep

206 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER,

strong reserves in rear, ready to follow Bazaine in-
stantaneously in any direction in which he might
succeed in breaking out

Moreover, to the bridges which already existed
above Metz, they added another below the town at
Hauconcourt, where at other times there was only a
ferry, to complete the communication between the
investing troops on both banks of the Moselle.

It was to be assumed as most probable that any
attempt which Bazaine might make to escape, during
the time of the operations of the armies of M'Mahon
and of the Crown-Princes in the Argonne and on the
banks of the Meuse, would be to the west or north-
west. If the French, imder the then existing circum-
stances, made any effort to break through the lines
in any other direction, it could only be regarded aa
essentially a demonstration, intended to draw some
of the German forces across to the right bank of the
Moselle; and so render it easier for M'Mahon, on
arriving before Metz, to decisively defeat such of
the. Germans as remained on the left bank. Conse-
quentiy the number of G-erman troops on the left
bank during the last days of August was much
greater than on the right.

The 8th Army Corps^ supported by the 3d divisioii
of cavahy, stood on both sides of tiie MoseUe above
the town. Their vedettes extended on the right to
the Seille, and on the left northwards as far as the
wood of Pl^nois. There the outposts of the 10th

BATTLE OP NOISSEVILLE, AUG. 31 AND SEPT. 1. 20Y

Corps joined on to them, whilst its left rested on the
river below Metz.

Behind this screen three Army Corps were concen-
trated — ^namely, the 3d Corps, on the road through
Doncourt and Conflans ; the 2d Corps, on the road
to Aubou^Briey ; and the 9th, between this laat road
and the one to Thionville, — all equally prepared to
form firont, either to oppose Bazaine or to meet the
advance of M'Mahon.

On the right bank of the Moselle the 7th Corps
joined on to the right of the 8th, being posted on
both sides of the highway to Strasburg. On its right,
again, stood the 1st Corps, on the roads to SaarbrUck
and Saarlouis ; and lastly, on the right of this, was
Rummer's division, on the road to Bouzonville and
resting on the Moselle below^ Metz, being in com-
munication with the 10th Corps by the bridge at
Hauconcourt

Thus there were about 70,000 men, infantry and
cavalry, on the right bank, and 120,000 on the left.

The headquarters of Prince Frederic Charles, who
commanded not only his own anny, the First, but also
the Second, Steinmetz's, were at Malancourt, on the
left bank, in the district of the 9th Army Corps.

An investment such as was now intended must
necessarily be somewhat wearying. The men must
always be in readiness to move or to fight, but
have not the variety which a march brings with it,
and, if the adversary remains quiet, are but seldom

208 THE WAR FOR THE RHmE FRONTIER.

roused by the excitement of a battle. And in addi-
tion to tbifl, they have to remain for a lengthened
period in a neighbourhood which is soon laid waste
by such a massing of troops ; they must consequently
submit to many privations, and this does not tend to
keep the troops fresh and in good spirits.

At first, certainly, the Germans found enough to
do : they had to intrench themselves in order to ob-
tain in some degree security from attack; and as they
did not carry tents, they had to build huts to pro-
tect themselves as much as possible from the rain and
from the chilliness of weather, which was just then
becoming unpleasantly autumnal.

And besides all this, a great work had been under-
taken, which, although it certainly did not directly
concern the soldiers, still gave them some occupation.

Even at the commencement of the wax, the Prus-
sian General Staff had assumed that Metz would be
able to hold out for a protracted space of time, and
that it Would be necessary to keep considerable forces
before it while others were operating in advance in
the direction of Paris. In that case Metz would
break the railway communication between these latter
troops and the frontier of Germany. It was therefore
resolved to restore this by a field-railway ; and in the
beginning of August the line for it was sought for,
and it was determined to construct it from Remilly
on the Saarbriick railway to Pont k Mousson on the
Metz-Frouard line — a distance of about 18 miles in a

BATTLE OP NOISSEVILLE, AUG. 31 AND SEPT. 1. 209

straight line, or nearly 22 if the windings are taken
into account. On the 14th of August, the day of the
battle of Bomy, the survey of the ground and the
levelling were commenced by the officials of two rail-
way detachments ; and on the 1 7th the execution of
the work was taken in hand. The construction was
begun, as far as the advance of the special prepara-
tory works allowed, in many places at the same time,
and not merely carried on from the two enda

In this task there were employed two field-railway
companies (450 men), four fortress pioneer companies
(800 men) ; 3000 miners from the coal-districts of
Saarbrttcken, who were thrown out of work by the
war ; a park of 250 vehicles, to which were shortly
afterwards added the waggons, 84 in number, of the
two pontoon-trains of the 7th and 8th Army Corps ;
and a squadron of cavalry, which was apportioned to
the building corps to perform patrol and requisition
duties.

The workmen, as they arrived at the various points
of the work, erected barracks and depots — ^the wag-
gon-park bringing up the implements and building
materials to the different portions of the line. The
weights to be transported amounted to 175,000
hundredweight, in which are included the materials
necessary for making two bridges — ^across the Seille
and the Moselle — and two viaducts between Remilly
and Bechy.

Although gradients of 1 in 40, and curves of only
VOL. n. o

210 THE WAE FOB THE RHINE FRONTIBE.

250 paces radius were allowed, still the irregularities
of the ground, as may be seen from our former de-
scription of it, were so great, that in some places it
was necessary to make very considerable cuttings and
embankments. On the 23d of September, however,
although five days had been lost owing to heavy
rains, the railway was completed, and traversed by a
locomotive ; and on the 26 th regular traffic along it
was commenced.

From the 19th of August to the last day of the
month, Bazaine remained quiet. His troops impera-
tively required repose, and lay encamped under the
protection of the detached forts, but separated from
the garrison of the fortress. Although the communi-
cation of Bazaine with the outer world was not com-
pletely cut oflf — ^for some of the brave and loyal people
of the neighbourhood still contrived to slip through
the Prussian lines, both from without into the fortress,
and from the town to the exterior — ^it was nevertheless
very imperfect. But still, from such information as
he did receive, and from the conclusions which he
could draw therefrom, Bazaine must assume that the
relieving army of M'Mahon would be in the vicinity
of Metz towards the end of August, if indeed it should
ever succeed in arriving there.

He resolved, therefore, on the 31st of August, to
make a great sortie, and that on the right bank of
the Moselle. The object of it could be nothing more
than to draw German troops across to that side of the

BATTLE OP NOISSEVILLE, AUO. 31 AND SEPT, 1. 211

river, and thus facilitate M'Mahon's victory on the
other. For this enterprise along the right bank the
Corps of Canrobert and Leboenf were destined, and
they consequently deployed behind Fort St Julien
and near Fort Bellecroix. The Guard and the 4th
Corps (Ladmirault) remained on the left bank, to reach
the hand to M*Mahon should he come up, while the 2d
Corps (Frossard) formed the reserve on the right bank.
The French attack was directed in the first place
upon Kummer's division and the Ist Army Corps
(Manteuffel), On the evening of the 30th of August
these troops stood thus : the brigade of the line belong-
ing to Kunmier's division was posted along the line
Mah-oy - Charly, with a detachment in the chateau
of Eupigny ; the landwehr division was in reserve
behind it, and the headquarters of General Rummer
were at Olgy, on the road to Thionville. Of the 1st
Corps, the 1st brigade of infantry stood on the front
Failly - Servigny - Noisseville ; the 2d brigade in re-
serve in rear, to the east of Fremy, where were
also the headquarters of General Bentheim, chief of
the 1st division of infantry; the 4th brigade of
infantry was on the front Colombey-Aubigny-Ars
Laquenexy-Mercy le Haut; the 3d brigade behind
it, at CourceUes on the Nied, where were also the
headquarters of General Pritzelwitz, chief of the 2d
division of infantry. The space between the Ist and
2d divisions on the Saarbriick road, on the front
NoissevUle-Montoy-Colombey, was covered by the two

212 THE WAB FOR THE BHINE FRONTIER.

divisional regiments of cavalry of the 1st Corps, the
1st and 10 th regiments of dragoons. The reserve
artillery of the 1st Corps was at St Barbe.

From half-past seven on the morning of the 31st of
August the Prussian observation-posts on the com-
paratively high ground of St Barbe remarked the
deployment of the French ; and in the forenoon the
advanced - guards of the latter attacked on the one
side the front of Rummer's division, and on the other
that of Pritzelwitz's division, in the following way: —

At 9 A.M. French troops appeared before Colombey,
and compelled the Prussian detachment posted there
to evacuate the village ; but, on the other hand, the
Germans maintained themselves in Aubigny and
Mercy le Haut, which were also attacked. At noon
the French relinquished their efforts there also, and
consequently for many hours stillness prevailed on
that part of the battle-field.

Meanwhile, at 10 a.m.. Rummer's division was
assailed by French cavalry and by a French battery.
These were quickly repulsed by the artillery of the
Prussians ; and afterwards the landwehr troops were
only molested by the fire of Fort St Julien.

From the commencement of these attacks, a mass-
ing of considerable numbers of French troops had
been observed on the road firom Fort BeUecroix to
the farm of the same name, at the point where the
highways to Saarlouis and Saarbrilck separate fi*om
one another. This caused General Manteuffel to sub-

BATTLE OP NOISSEVILLE, AUG. 31 AKD SEPT. 1. 213

pect that the main attack would presently be devel-
oped in that direction, and therefore, immediately
that the news arrived of the dispositions of his adver-
sary, he gave orders which would place yet greater
forces in readiness on these roads. His directions
were that the 3d brigade of infantry (Memerty) was
to march from Courcelles on the Nied to the Saar-
briick highroad at Puche, accompanied by two of the
divisional batteries; the 3d division of cavalry was
to despatch its 6th brigade from Pouilly to Eetonfay,
between the roads to Saarbrilck and Saarlouis ; and
General Rummer was directed to detach one regiment
of cavalry and one battery to St Barbe.
' At the same time Manteuffel sent information to
Prince Frederic Charles and to General Steinmetz of
what was going on, and of the measures which he had
taken.

Upon hearing these things, General Steinmetz at
once ordered that the whole of the 3d division of
cavalry should march upon Eetonfay, and also sent
the 28th brigade of the 7th Army Corps from Pouilly
to Courcelles on the Nied, where it arrived at 3 p.m.,
when for a time all was tranquil.

Events, as they went on, confirmed General Man-
teuflFel in his first assumption ; and as the 1st division
of infantry was now no longer molested, he caused its
troops to cook their dinner in succession, believing
that the attacks in the forenoon upon the fronts of
Kummer and Pritzelwitz were merely demonstrations

214 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

which would probably, later on, be followed by a cen-
tral thrufit ; and as the numbers of the French con-
centrated at the farm of Bellecroix was continually
increased, he caused the 3d brigade of infantiy to
move from Puche to Retonfay, and the division of
Schuler von Senden to St Barbe, to form a reserve
for Bentheim's division.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the French advanced,
as had been anticipated, from St Julien and Bellecroix
against the front which Manteuffel had prepared to
oppose them on the line Failly - Servigny - Montoy.
The battle was commenced by the guns of Fort St
Julien, and of a few field-batteries to the south of it^
opening fire upon the 1st Prussian division at Ser-
vigny-Failly. The Germans answered at first with
the four divisional batteries, and these were soon
reinforced by one horse and two field batteries from
the reserve of the 1st Army Corps. The last two
came up on the west of Servigny, posting themselves
on the flank of the French artillery ; the horse-battety
took up a position more to the north* at Poiz ; and
after the seven batteries thus placed had kept up a
steady fire until 5 p.m., they advanced, and obliged
the French guns to withdraw.

Meanwhile, soon after 3 p.m., Leboeuf moved for-
ward through the farm of Bellecroix upon Montoy,
tiireatening with his right wing Colombey and Au-
bigny; while, on his left flank, detachments of Canro-
bert's Corps moved up the valley of the stream of

BATTLE OF KOISSEVILLE, AUG. 31 AND S£FT. 1. 21S

YaUi^s against Notdlly and Noisseville. When this
movement was developed, and Aubigny attacked by
LeboBuf s right, the 28th brigade of infantry, which
since 3.30 p.m. had been employed in cooking at
Conrcelles on the Nied, was called up to support
the 4th. It at once marched by way of Laquenexy,
but airived too late to join in the contest, as the
French speedily relinquished their attack on the vil-
lage to throw their whole force upon Noisseville and
Servigny.

The head of Lebceuf 's main column aa it advanced
came at Montoy upon the troops of the 3d Prussian
brigade (Memerty), and was soon engaged in a heavy
musketry combat with it. Whilst this was going on^
the French, shortly after 5 p.m., developed their attack
from the valley of Yalli^res, and made an onslaught
upon Noisseville, which was only defended by one
Prussian battalion from the 1st brigade. After a
prolonged resistance this single battalion was obliged
to withdraw, and retired upon Servigny. Upon this
the French skirmishers at once occupied the vine-
clad hilk to the north of Noisseville, and kept up
thence a spirited and well-directed fire upon the
Prussian batteries, which had advanced at 5 p.m.
from Servigny in the direction of St Julien as far as
the heights to the north of NouiUy. The fire from the
Chassepots obliged the Prussian artillery to retire upon
Servigny, where it again took up a position to cover
the retreat of the battalion driven out of Noisseville,

216 THE WAB FOE THE RHINE FBONTIEB.

Under cover of the garrison of Noisseville and of
the increasing darkness, French batteries now moved
up to Mey and Nouilly, and coming into action against
Servigny and the batteries there, literally showered
shrapnel upon them ; but the Prussian artillery main-
tained its position, and directed a portion of its fire
upon Noisseville,

At this time — that is, at about 8 p.m. — the musketry
combat in which Memerty's brigade was still engaged
began to abate along the front, and thereby Memerty
became free to move towards his flank. Of this he at
once availed himself, and proceeded to attack Noisse-
ville and drive the French out of that village.

Towards nine o'clock in the evening the battle
subsided, the French appearing to have withdrawn
at every point. Manteufiel, however, in order to be
prepared for any emergency, caused the whole of the
troops of his first line to remain under arms. The
2d brigade of infantry and the reserve artillery of the
1st Corps were sent back to their bivouacs ; and, on
the other hand, Schuler von Senden's landwehr divi-
sion, which had not come into action, was directed to
move from St Barbe nearer to the front upon Failly
and Poix.

At ten o'clock in the evening the French again
assumed the ofiensive, and advanced to an attack by
surprise. Their right wing pushed forward through
Montoy to Flanville and Puche, wheeled then to its
left, and attacked simultaneously Retonfay and Noisse-

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLB, AUG. 31 AND SEPT. 1. 2lT

ville, Memerty's brigade was compelled to evacuate
very hurriedly its position in those villages, and to
retreat northwards upon Chateau Gras.

At the same time the French left wing had thrown
itself upon Servigny, Poix, and Failly. The struggle
for these villages was carried on with varying results,
Servigny especially being several times lost and won,
while the West Prussian brigade of the landwehr
division had to be called up to support the garrison
of Failly. When the fighting ceased, shortly after
11 P.M., Servigny, Poix, and Failly remained in the
hands of the Prussians ; while, on the other side,
NoisseviUe, FlanvUle, Montoy, and Eetonfay were
occupied by the French.

Prince Frederic Charles, in his headquarters at
Malancourt, had received information firom the out-
posts on the early morning of the 31st of August, of
extraordinary movements in the French camps, and
the reports soon left no doubt that the enemy was
watching for an opportimity to attack on the right
bank of the Moselle.

The commandant of the 10th Corps, General Voigts-
Rhetz, had been before directed that in case this should

■

happen he was to cause such of his troops as were not
in the investing line, and were therefore disposable,
to cross to the right bank by the bridge of Haucon-
court; and he had at once, without waiting for further
orders, acted in accordance with these instructions.
Between half-past eight and half-past nine o'clock in

218 THE WAB FOB THE BHINE FBONTIEB.

the forenoon, the Prince gave more detailed commands.
General von Manstein was to concentrate the 25th
(Hessian) division of his Corps, the 9th, at Pierre-
villers, and the 1 8th (Wrangel) at Roncourt, while the
reserve artillery of the Corps was to be also assembled
at the latter place. The 2d Corps (Fransecky) was to
be collected between Briey and Anbou^ ; and the 3d
Corps (Alvensleben) was to march from Doncourt and
Conflans upon St Privat la Montagne.

Prince Frederic Charles was at 11 A.M. upon the
Horimont, an eminence to the north of F^ves, and
570 feet above the valley of the Moselle. As from
that place French forces were observed to be contina-
ally passing over ta the right bank of the Moselle, he
sent a direct order at 11.35 p.m. to the 25th division
to cross by the bridge of Hauconcourt to Antilly, on
the right bank, and there place itself at the disposal
of Generals Kummer and ManteuffeL Accordingly,
at 2.30 P.M. the head of the Hessian division reached
Antilly, and deployed to the south of the village.
There it remained until 5 p.m., when Schuler von Sen-
den's division having marched away to St Barbe to
support the 1st Prussian division. General Kummer
requested the Hessians to advance against Charly and
Rupigny. Upon this Prince Louis of Hesse caused
the 50th brigade to occupy the comer of the wood of
Failly, to the east of Charly ; while the 49th brigade
placed itself in reserve between Charly and Antilly.
An attack, however, at this point did not take place,

BATTLE OP NOISSEVILLE, AUG. 31 AKD SEPT. 1. 219

aa we have already seen. The 50tli brigade remained
in ito position during the night preceding the 1st of
September, while the 49th brigade was withdrawn to
its bivouacs to the south of Antilly.

In the afternoon, General Voigts-Ehetz received
orders to withdraw again to the left bank the troops
he had sent across the Moselle. The Hessian divi-
sion was directed to remain under any circum-
stances on the right bank ; and, moreover. Prince
Frederic Charles resolved, at 1.30 p.m. on the 31st of
August, at all events to place reserves on the left
bank, in readiness to cross over to the right should
the battle which had subsided about noon be again
recommenced. For this the 18th division, with the
reserve artillery of the 9th Corps, and the 3d Corps
were chosen, the former being directed to cook at
Boncourt, and the latter at St Privat la Montague.

The 2d Corps, on the other hand, was ordered at
1.30 P.M. to stop the concentration before directed,
and to push forward detachments again to Longuion
and Aumetz, on the road to Montmedy and Longwy.

From the Horimont a better idea of the general
state of the battle could be obtained than from the
right bank itself. The staff of Prince Frederic
Charles observed that the French did not employ
nearly all the troops concentrated at St Julien and
Bellecroix in the fight in the afternoon, and it was
therefore to be concluded that Bazaine wished to
defer his main attack until the 1st of September.

220 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTTEB.

In order, then, that the forces necessary to ward it
off might be ready on the right bank of the Moselle
by the early morning of the 1st, Prince Frederic
Charles sent an order at 7.35 p.m. to Manstein at
Roncourt, directing him to set out with the 18th
division and his reserve artillery by Marange and
Hauconcourt to St Barbe. This order reached Man-
stein at 9.15 P.M., and he at once set out, being him-
self with the 6th regiment of dragoons at the head
of the column. He had to make a night-march of
fourteen nules, and that, too, along roads which were
in parts extraordinarily bad. It was therefore a
remarkable achievement to reach St Barbe, as he
did, with the 6th regiment of dragoons, at 4 am. on
the 1st of September, barely seven hours after receipt
of the order to march. The infantry and artillery
were, it is true, still behind, and they rested for some
time at Hauconcourt.

General von Alvensleben XL had the mass of his
Corps in the evening at St Privat and St Ail, with
the 5th division pushed forward to Marange.

The morning of the 1st of September was very
foggy ; but, standing on a height, the summits of the
hills could be seen. Early in the day the dull thun-
der of cannon was heard in the headquarters of Prince
Frederic Charles, in a north-westerly direction. It
was that of the battle of Sedan, which was being
fought about sixty-five mUes away from Malancourt ;
but shortly afterwards the fighting began again close

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE, AUG. 31 AND SEPT. 1. 221

at hand, on the right bank of the Moselle, and diverted
attention from this distant cannonade.

Only in the morning did the Prince receive infor-
mation from Manteuffel of the night attack of the
French, and shortly afterwards further intelligence
arrived of the recommencement of the battle. The
Prince, therefore, before he lefb Malancourt, sent
orders to General Voigts-Rhetz to move again with
his disposable troops to the right bank of the Mo-
selle to support Kummer and Manteuffel ; while Gen-
eral Alvensleben was to send the 5th division of
the 3d Corps from Marange, and the reserve artillery
from St Ail, to M^zieres, to oppose the sortie on the
left bank. These troops commenced their march at

•7 A.M.

After 8 a.m. the Prince had again repaired to the
Horimont ; thence at 9.15 a.m. he instructed General
Zastrow, by telegraph, to keep only a brigade of his
Corps, the 7th, in the line of the investment, and to
move all the remainder to the support of Manteuffel's
left wing. Goeben was to push forward the reserves
of the 8th Corps close up to the left bank of the
Moselle, in order, in case of need, to undertake the
guarding of the whole length of Zastrow's line, and
thus set the 7th Corps entirely free.

Kummer was to be ready to support ManteuffeFs
right wing 83 soon as the disposable troops of the 10th
Corps should have arrived behind his line.

At 4 A.M* Manteuffel gave the order to attack^ — ^the

222 THE WAR FOB THE BHINE FRONTIER.

immediate objective being the reconquest of the vil-
lages occupied by the French during the night, espe-
cially that of Noisseville. Advancing against this
latter place, Memert/s division came first into action^
but it could not make any progress, and was obliged
to be contented with repulsing a forward movement
of the adversary beyond the village.

When, then, General Manstein arrived at St Barbe,
he and General Manteu£fel agreed that the 49 th
brigade of infantry and the 25th brigade of cavalry
(Hessian), as weU as the reserve artillery of the 9th
Corps, should at once march to St Barbe ; while the
50th brigade, which stood in the Bois de Failly,
should also move to the same place as soon as it
should be relieved by the arrival of the 18th divi-
sion (Wrangel) in rear of Kummer s line. This move-
ment was carried out ; and at 8 A.M. the 49th brigade
with five batteries came up to St Barbe, followed soon
afterwards by the 25th brigade of cavalry with its
battery of horse-artillery, and at 9.30 A.M. by the
reserve artillery of the 9th Corps.

At 6 A.M. the 1 8th division appeared upon the left
wing of Kummer's position. The leading brigade,
the 36th (Below), was at once sent to the Bois de
Failly, and relieved the 50 th brigade there, where-
upon this latter was collected and despatched to St
Barbe, where, however, it only arrived at 11 a.m. The
other brigade of the 18th division, the 36th (Blumen-
thal), was placed in reserve to the north of Charly.

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE, AUG. 31 AND SEPT. 1. 223

We must alBO remark here, that the 6th regiment
of dragoons^ which had arrived with Manstein, and
afterwards the 25th brigade of cavaby, were sent in
the course of the morning to Betonfay to support, in
concert with the 1st regiment of dragoons, Memert/s
brigade.

As soon as Manteuffel received information that
his orders were being carried out, and that the 49th
brigade was marching upon St Barbe, he directed the
2d brigade of infantry (Falkenstein) of Bentheim's
division to attack Noisseville. The 43d regiment,
which was leading, penetrated into the village at
about eight o'clock, but was soon driven out again,
losing many men by the French mitraiUeuse fire.
The attack was supported by the 3d regiment, and
afterwards by Posen's brigade of Schuler von Sen-^
den's landwehr division. Thrice the Prussians par-
tially forced their way into Noisseville, and thrice
they were again driven out.

Manteuffel now saw that the attack had not been
sufficiently prepared for by artillery fire. He therer
fore at once brought nine batteries into action on the
line from Poix to Chateau le Gras; among them,
on the left wing, were five Hessian, before St Barbe
and near Gras.

While these guns played upon Noisseville, the 28th
brigade of infantry was set in motion against Flan-
ville. It had marched at 6 A.M. from Laquenezy
upon Puche, had posted two batteries there, and had

224 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

cannonaded Manville with thenL At 9 a.m. the French
began to evacuate the latter village ; the 53d regi-
ment advanced to the attack, and drove them out
completely ; the brigade then turned against Coincy,
drove the French thence, and took up a position
diagonally across the Saarbriick road. At 9.30 a^.
it received the order to march to its right, to support
Memerty ; but as it was about to comply with these
directions, it was itself again attacked from Montoy,
was obliged to form front, and had to confine its
endeavours to repelling the new assault

Soon after 10 a.m. Noisseville was on fire in several
places ; the French began to evacuate it; and at half-
past ten the Prussian infantry, penetrating into it^
found but little opposition — the village was aban-
doned to them.

But to compensate for this, the French had now
begun to develop greater forces against the right
wing of the Germans.

Shortly after the 36th brigade (Below) had relieved
the Hessians at the Bois de Failly, the French pushed
forward through Failly, Vany, and ChieuUes. Gene-
ral Wrangel opposed them at the Bois de Failly with
his artniery, brought forward a regiment of BeloVs
brigade against the right flank of his adversary, and
caused the 35th brigade (Blumenthal), which stood in
reserve, to make a movement upon Rupigny. At this
last place, and at Failly, violent local encounters en-
sued ; and finally, towards ten o'clock, these points

BATTLE OF KOISSEVILLE, AUG. 31 AND SEPT. 1. 225

remained in the hands of the Germans. The French
withdrew at first upon Vany-ChieuUes, then, threat-
ened simultaneously by Blumenthal's brigade and by
the line brigade of Blankensee, which General Kum-
mer had directed to advance from Charly, they con-
tinued their retreat upon Grimont.

Now, for the first time, the reserves posted by Fort
St Julien advanced to the attack, manifestly only to
receive the retiring left wing. Their onslaught was
feeble, and was repulsed at Poix by the German ar-
tiller,, while at sivi^y an i^4 combat enaued.
Afterwards, between eleven and twelve o'clock, when
the Prussians on this side were pursuing the retreat-
ing French line, a heavy fire was opened firom Fort
St Julien, and was kept up until 1 p.m., when it sub-
sided, as the Prussians did not continue their pursuit
into its sphere.

Quite unconnected with the fighting on the right
and centre of the Germans was an attack which the
French made with a detachment on their right wing
upon Mercy le Haut. The village was taken by
them in the forenoon, reconquered by the Prussians
at 11 A.M., but had to be again yielded to the French
at noon, and was only given up again by them when
they were ordered to withdraw from it in consequence
of the retreat of the centre and left.

As, on the 31st of August, the fighting had ceased
at noon, and had yet been renewed during the later
hours of the day, the German leaders did not know

VOL, II. p

226 THE WAR FOB THE BHINE FBOKTIEB.

whether the same game might not be again played on
the afternoon of the 1st of September.

The 3d division of cavahy had been abeady, on the
morning of the Ist^ sent back to Poiiilly and towards
the right bank of the Moselle, because the formation
of the ground, and the position of the battle-field
upon the roads to Saarbrttck and Saarlouis, did not
promise a field for its successful action. On the other
hand, at 1 p.m. Prince Frederic Charles sent orders to
General Zastrow to march with his whole Corps upon
Mercy le Haut to the support of Manteuffel. His
posts on the right bank of the river were to be occu-
pied by three brigades of the 8th Corps, Goeben, one
brigade only of the same Corps being left on the leffc
bank, between Chatel St Germain and Jusqr. The
posts which Goeben quitted between Chatel St Grer-
main and Saulny were to be occupied by General
Alvensleben with the 6th division of infantry, while
Fransecky was to send a division of the 2d Coips in
the course of the afternoon to Amanvilliers to form a
reserve for the position.

At 2.30 P.M. the staff of Prince Frederic Charles
observed, from the left bank, before it was possible to
discover it on the right bank, that the French had
given up the battle for the day, as they had already
commenced to withdraw troops from the right to the
left bank of the Moselle. Accordingly, at 2.45 P.M.,
General Voigts-Rhetz was directed to remain on the
right bank, with such troops of tiie 10th Corps as he

BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLB, AUG. 31 AND SEPT. 1. 22*7

had there^ until 5 p.m., and then, if the fighting was
not seriously renewed, to return to the left bank. At
the same time General Alvensleben was commanded
to withdraw the reserve artillery of his Corps at 4,30
P.M. from M^zieres to Marange and St Ail.

When, in the first hours of the afternoon, every-
thing was quiet, Manteuffel had first retired Mem-
erty's brigade, which for two days had had no leisure
to cook, from the line, and replaced it by a Hessian
brigade ; the 28th brigade, Woyna^ of the 7th Corps
was relieved in the afternoon of the lat of September
by the head of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin's Corps — ^5 battalions of Selchow's landwehr
division— wHch, coming up from Germany, reached
Gras le Chateau at noon.

The French did not undertake anything more on
the 1st of September, and remained quiet also during
the 2d* On the latter day the Hessian division
marched to the left bank of the Moselle to Pierre-
villers, and the division of the 2d Corps, which had
been called up to Amanvilliers, to Aubou^. Bazaine
also, after the failure of his attempt, sent the 4th, 6th,
and Guard Corps again to the left bank, and the
French commenced to intrench themselves in their
more advanced positions.

The loss of the Prussians (1st Corps, Rummer's divi-
sion, WrangeFs division, and Woyna's brigade) amount-
ed to 123 officers and 2870 men in killed, wounded,
and missing. Of the French losses nothing is known.

228

CHAPTER XXVIIL

THE ENCOUNTEBS AT WOIPPY ON THE 2D AND 7TH OF OCTOBER.

After the 1st of September a long and almost perfect
quietness reigned around Metz.

On the 1st, Sd, and 7th of September, Bazaine sent
Uke-worded despatches to Napoleon III., informing
him of the unsuccessful issue of the events of the Ist,
of his desperate condition by reason of want of sup-
plies, and promising to continue his efforts to break
out. Naturally he received no answer ; and, mean-
while, the restdt of the day of Sedan, and the events
of the 4th of September, became known both to the
investing army and to the invested. Bazaine could
now no longer hope to be relieved, at all events for the
present ; and every attempt to break through, what-
ever direction might be chosen, must be frustrated.
He now calculated upon a speedy peace, and, during
the first days of September, upon one which might be
concluded by the Imperial Regency. Even when he
received intelligence of the declaration of the Be-
public, he did not abandon his hope. Whether the
Provisional Gtovemment concluded the peace, or whe-

METZ IN SEPTEMBER. 229

ther, 83 was very probable, it was soon overthrown,
and either some old or new power succeeded in ob-
taining peace, was very indifferent to him. Under
any circumstances he woidd have a brilliant part to
play if he succeeded in preserving Metz and his
troops until peace was arranged. His army was now
the only real army of France. With it he could,
according to circumstances, either restore order for
the Regency, or, if France would not hear anything
more of this latter, step himself to the head of affairs,
supported by an easily -bought press, which would
applaud to the skies his mlHtary genius and his
French feeling.

The better the condition of the army of Metz when
peace should be concluded, and the less it had' suf-
fered, so much the greater weight would it place
in the balance. The former " Chief of the Govern-
ment'' had himself confided to Bazaine, before
taking the last step to the fatal abyss, the fate of
the main part of the French army, and, as he ex-
pressed it, of France herself. The inactivity of the
Marshal during the first weeks of September is there-
fore perfectly explicable, without having recourse to
any elaborate expositions, or without waiting for
enHghtenment from a side which, later on, will have
no interest in stating the truth. Bazaine, without
expressly declaring his position with regard to the
Republic and the Provisional Government, avoided
entering into any connection with them, or arousing

230 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

any prejudice against himself, and prevented his sol-
diers being engaged in any way with the subject

On taking stock of the provisions in Metz and in
the adjacent territory commanded by the French army,
it was found that there was sufficient stored up for
about four weeks more ; and by making use of horse^
flesh, limiting the rations, and foraging by small
sorties, the supplies might be made to suffice for twice
as long.

Eight weeks! In calculations such as must be
made in this case that was an eternity. The theory
of short wars, decided by a few powell blows, whi A
in reality was based solely upon the modem wars of
Austria, had taken firm root in Europe, especially in
military circles ; so much so, that if a man asserted
that this theory was only true so long as a people did
not exist upon both sides, or at least upon one side,
he might be well content if he escaped with the
appellation of a decided blockhead.

The real war of 1866 had only lasted four weeks ;
that of 1870 had already, on the 1st of September,
continued for that length of time ; and now another
eight weeks 1 was not that truly an eternity 1 And
if the idea of obtaining Alsace and Lorraine had not
sprung up in the German headquarters, would not
Bazaine have probably been right, — ^would not, at all
events, a preliminary peace have been concluded by
the end of September ?

On the (German side it was presumed, after the

MfiTZ IN SEFTEMBEB. 231

catastrophe of Sedan, that Bazaine would still endea-
vour to break through, and now in the direction of
Strasburg. Everything may certainly be attempted,
but it is not easy to see what Bazaine would gain in
Strasburg, or how he could accomplish the hundred
miles thither with any considerable portion of his
troops, when pursued by the Germans. And if he
succeeded in reaching and relieving Strasburg, what
could he undertake next ? To remain stationary and
to manoeuvre was still less practicable at Strasburg,
which has no detached forts, than at Metz. But
be that as it may, the Grermans now observed with
special attention the direction from Metz to Stras-
burg ; and on the 9th of September Prince Frederic
Charles removed his headquarters to Corny, on the
right bank of the Moselle above Metz. At the same
time, General Steinmetz prayed the King of Prussia
to relieve him, " for the benefit of his health,'' from
the command of the First Army. It is said that
Steinmetz had latterly become discontented with his
position as commander of an independent army, which
yet was not one, and could not agree either with the
Prince his superior, or with General Manteuffel his
subordinate. The King complied with the wish of
the old general by nominating him, on the 12th of
September, Governor-General of Posen for the dis-
tricts of the 5th and 6th Army Corps. Steinmetz
took leave of his troops in an order of the day, dated
Jouy aux Arches, the 15th of September. His post

232 THE WAB FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

was not for the present filled up, but the First Army
was preserved intact as an independent body, with a
view to future operations.

The Germans utilised the repose which Bazaine
gave them to draw their investing line closer in, and
to strengthen it by intrenchments ; and thus the
communication of the French in Metz with the outer
world became extremely limited. A few messengers
whom Bazaine sent forth managed to slip through
the Prussian lines, but were unable to return into the
fortress ; perhaps they did not make any great efforts
to succeed. After the middle of September, the
French again, in and about Metz, made use of balloons
to forward letters. We shall see later on how this
medium of communication was made use of on the
largest scale by the Parisians. The balloons sent up
from Metz were unoccupied ones, without cars, carry-
ing only a small basket, in which were the packets of
letters. It was calculated that the greater number at
least would fall outside the districts occupied by the
German troops ; and the honest finder was entreated
to deliver the letters to the nearest post-oflSce that
they might be forwarded to their destinations. Un-
fortunately, letters could not be brought into Metz by
the same means.

After the 22d of September, Bazaine again com-
menced a series of sorties, at first against the positions
of the 1st and 7th Corps on the right bank of the
Moselle. These sallies were made with small bodies

SMALL SORTIES IN SEPTEMBER, 233

of troops, purely for foraging purposes, and to destroy
the German supplies where they could not be taken
away. Ba^ JL ca«d theLlway, leadiBg fc,«
Metz to be repaired as far as he commanded them,
and he now made use of them to push forward the
troops which were to carry out the surprises. The
trains had then to bring back into Metz the supplies
seized in the enterprise.

On the 22d and 23d of September, the French
undertook such sorties upon Peltre; on the 27th,
upon Mercy le Haut ; and on the same day, along the
leffc bank of the Moselle, against the troops of the 10th
North German Corps at La Maze, which, on this
occasion, was burnt down.

On the 28th of September Strasburg fell. Bazaine
was at once informed of the fact by Prince Frederic
Charles. In the German headquarters it was now
assumed that Bazaine, if indeed he still purposed to
undertake anything at all, could only attempt. to break
through in the direction. of Thionville. In reality,
Bazaine could no longer hope, under any circum-
stances, to be relieved for a very long time. If he
could not defeat the Prussians before Metz, all larger
military undertakings were only so much lost trouble
to him. At Thionville he would find even fewer re-
sources of all kinds than in Metz ; if he took that
direction it could only be with the idea of gaining
the neutral territory of Luxemburg by Thionville and
Frisange, which is barely 28 miles from Metz.

234 THE WA& FOB THE BHIKE FRONTIEB.

On the 1st of October Prince Frederic Charles
moved over Kummer's division from the right to the
left bank of the Moselle, and the 10th Corps from the
leffc to the right.

Kummer's division took up ite main positiou along
the front F^ves-Sem^conrt-Amelange. Two land-
wehr battalions were pushed forward to the line of
the woods at BeUevue, St Remy, and the two farms
of Les Tapes ; in their front they occupied St Agathe
and Ladonchamps with weak field-posts, and in their
rear again towards Sem^court and Agathe stood two
more battalions of landwehr as their nearest support

On the right the outpost line of the 3d Army
Corps joined that of Kummer's division at Yillers les
Plenois ; while on the right, between the 1st and 2d
of October, two companies of the 10th battalion of
Rifles from the 10th Corps still remained widi the
outposts of Kummer's division, not having as yet
been drawn across to the right bank.

At midnight between the 1st and 2d of October,
detachments of the French Guard advanced to attack
the position held by Kummer's division. The field-
watch at Ladonchamps was thrown back upon St
Remy; that of St Agathe, which was thus left
isolated, withdrew of its own accord. The French
next proceeded to the attack of St Remy, which was
occupied by a company of the 3d Posen landwehr
regiment (No, 68); to reinforce it two other com-
panies of the same regiment were pushed forward.

80KTIE ON THE 2D OF OCTOBER. 235

These three companies offered some resistance; and
the French not being able to find their way properly,
owing to the darkness of the night, gave up the attack
for the time being.

On the Prussian side four companies were now sent
to St Bemy, and one battalion (Freistadt's) of the
1st Lower Silesian landwehr regiment, No. 46, to
Bellevue.

At 5 A.M. the French infantry renewed their at-
tack, supported closely by a mitrailleuse battery, and
at a greater distance by other batteries which took
post at St Eloy. The position of the Prussians, who
were graduaUy remforeed, was in the beginning only
supported by a battery to the north of Sem^ourt ; but
soon after nine o'clock this was joined by two others, —
the one on the right, to the south of Sem^court — ^the
other on the left, at Les Tapes. This last one was,
however, very soon compelled to retreat, by the fire
of the French batteries at St Bloy.

Meanwhile the infantry combat had been carried
on with varying success, but, on the whole, its course
was in favour of the Prussians. The landwehr bat-
talion which held possession of Bellevue, retook St
Agathe from the enemy ; and the well-aimed fire of
a company of the 10th battalion of Bifles also wrought
much damage among theuL

At 1 1 A.M. the French still maintained themselves
in Ladonchamps and St Agathe, which they had again
occupied. With this success they contented them-

236 THE WAR FOB THE BHINE FBONTIEH«

selves for the 2d of October. The infantry ceased to
fight, and the artilleiy alone continued to fire until
dusk fironi St EI07, and set St Remj and Frando-
champs in flames.

The losses on both sides were inconsiderable. The
Prussians give theirs at 115, including 5 officers.

On the 3d of October the Germans set fire to the
village of St Suffine, to destroy the enemy^s supplies
collected there, and the French fired from Fort St
Quentin upon the Prussian depots at Ars la Moselle
at a range of nearly 8000 paces.

On the 7th of October the French undertook an-
other attack upon the positions of Kummer's division
at Bellevue, St Remy, and Les Tapes. The onslaught
commenced at 1.30 P.M., and at three o'clock the
Prussian landwehr were obliged to yield the above-
named points after a stubborn resistance.

Meanwhile General Kummer had developed his
reserves and his artillery. Voigts-Ehetz, too, posted
batteries of Kraatz-Koschlau's division and of the re-
serve artillery of the 10th Corps on the right bank of
the Moselle at Argancy, Olgy, and Malroy, and sent
the 38th brigade of infantry (Wedell) of his Corps on
to the left bank of the river, to support Kummer at
the farmhouse of Amelange; while, on Kummer's
right, Alvensleben concentrated the 9th brigade of
infantry (now Conta's) and two batteries of the 3d
Army Corps at Norroy le Veneur.

As soon as Kummer knew that he was supported,

SORTIE ON THE 7TH OP OCTOBEE. 23*7

he at once took measures to regain the lost positions.
In the first line he deployed Schuler von Senden's
landwehr division and two battalions of his line
brigade (Blankensee). In the second line he placed
two battalions of Wedell's brigade of the 10th Corps
in support on the right, and the remainder of Wedell's
and filankensee's brigades on the left

And whilst he advanced with these troops against
the front Bellevue-St Remy-Les Tapes - Franclo-
champs, he attacked simultaneously, at 4.30 p.m.,
the woods of Bellevue and Woippy with Conta's
brigade

In consequence of these combined manoeuvres, the
line Bellevue-Franclochamps was at 6 p.m. again in
the hands of the Germans, who now repulsed seve-
ral attacks made upon it by the French. On the other
hand, an attempt which the Germans made soon after
seven o'clock to gain the Chateau of Ladonchamps was
unsuccessful, for the French had strongly fortified it
since they had obtained possession of it on the 2d of
October.

Simultaneously with their advance on the left of
the Moselle, the French had also developed troops on
the right bank. Against Charly they had moved for-
ward artillery, which was successfully answered by
batteries of the 10th Corps. Detachments of French
which showed themselves at Villers TOrme, caused
General Manteuffel to alarm the 1st Corps. Nothing
more ensued there than an artillery and musketry com-

238 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

bat, and even this died out at half-past six o'clock,
after 10 batteries had come up on to the line of the
1st Corps from Failly to Montoy, and had been
shortly afterwards further reinforced by 4 batteries
from the 7th Corps.

The losses were by no means inconsiderable. That
of the Germans on the 7th amounted altogether to
1730, among whom were 65 officers.

239

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE CAfrrULATIOK 07 BAZiOME.

The sortde of the 7th of October was the last militaiy
eflFort of the amy imprisoned in Metz ; and the con-
dition of the troops, and also that of the town gener-
ally, certainly bectune most deplorable and hopeless
after that day. The total loss of the army of Metz
«ncetheu/ofA^amountedatthi.tim.,««rf.
ing to Bazaine's account, to 25 generak, 2099 officers
of all ranks, and 40,339 non-commissioned officers and
men. The most diffictdt point now was that of sup*
plies ; for the sorties for foraging purposes, the one of
the 7th October also included, for which numerous
trains of waggons had been prepared, had resulted in
very little profit It was calculated that if every means
of supply were used — ^if the daUy allowance to each
soldier was reduced to 300 grammes^ — ^if the in-
habitants of the town were also put on fixed rations
— if the reserve two days' allowance of biscuit, which
the soldiers carried in their knapsacks, was also reck-
oned in — and if only one sort of bread was baked, with

* 300 grammes is equal to about lOi oz.

240 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

as much bian mixed with it as was in any way ad-
mis8ible,-then, with all these precautions, it was esti-
mated that the bread might last until about the 20th
of October.

Dry forage had long ago failed, and the horses were
driven out to keep themselves alive by grazing in the
meadows on the territory which the French still com-
manded, the extent of which> at the utmost, was about
20 square miles. Naturally they became lean, and it
was the interest of the army to lessen their number.
They were therefore freely slaughtered; and there
was so little lack of horse-fleshy both for the garrison
and for the inhabitants of the town> that the rations of
meat could be increased without hesitation, although,
after the end of September, horses ran over in large
numbers from their pasturage to the Prussian camp.
But if meat was plentiful, there was by this time an
utter want of salt and fresh vegetables, and the de-
privation of these necessaries was very keenly felt

On the 8th of October there were about 19,000
sick in the hospitals and partly also in private houses,
for the infirmaries could not contain alL Necessaries
for them — ^bedding, drugs, and doctors — began already
to fail. The smaUpox, which had been raging in France
since the autumn of 1869, had also broken out in
Metz; and in addition to this, typhus fever, diarrhoea,
and dysentery, now appeared, being brought on by
the poorness of the nourishment ; and these diseases
threatened to spread more and more as their preven-

CAPITULATION OP BAZAINE. 241

tion and the proper treatment of those attacked be-
came ever more difficult.

Great losses of horses were to be also expected in
the next following days ; and those which escaped
the shambles or a natural death, at least lost their
strength. By this a great portion of the really good
artillery and cavalry which had been origuiaUy shut
up within the works of Metz was rendered ineffective.
The number of men, also, who could be counted cap-
able of bearing arms, became ever smaller, through
bad food and despondency; so that it may be estimated
that the total strength of the army which was dis-
posable for any enterprise without the walls — ^there-
L. al». for bLki^thrcgh the 0«m«. lin,^
would be, at the most, 70,000 men.

StUl, many may reproach Marshal Bazaine for not
having used the time before the 8th of October for an
earnest, desperate endeavour to escape ; and such a
reproach would be just in speaking of the first weeks
which elapsed after the 18th of August Defenders
of the Marshal have asserted that his sortie on the
31st of August and the 1st of September was under-
taken with a view to escaping to Thionville ; and to
strengthen this statement they pretend that his ignor-
ance of events outside was much greater than it really
was. But, at all events, if such was his design on the
31st of August, his actual proceedings woidd prove
a want of capacity to lead, both in himself and his
advisers, which we should hesitate to believe to exist

VOL. II. Q

242 THE WAB FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

even in the most subordinate of educated officer&
But we have related the events of the day in detail,
and every one can judge for himself.

But, be that as it may, after the 8th of October the
army of Marshal Bazaine was indubitably not in a
state to undertake a serious attempt to break out ; it
lacked physical force, and there was also a want of
halting-places outside Metz which could be easily
reached. It might stiU make sorties, to aUow itself
to be slain and to sell its life dearly, but for no other
object : if that was not desired, nothing remained but
to consider by what means it might obtain the most
favourable terms of capitulation.

On the 8th of October the commanders of the
Army Corps assembled their divisional generak by
order of Bazaine, explained to them the situation,
and pointed out the necessity of seeking a capita-
lation. The minds of most certainly revolted at ihe
idea, but they were at the same time compelled to
admit that nothing else remained ; and they now be-
came possessed with the hope that the army would
receive in the capitulation liberty to depart with arms
and baggage to the south of France, only imder
the obligation not to serve again against Grermany
during the remainder of the campaign; and they
trusted that the fate of the army could be separated
from that of the fortress and of its garrison, to the
advantage of the latter. If these conditions were not
acceded to by the leaders of the Germans, it was

CAPITULATION OP BAZAINE. 243

assumed by most of the divisional generals, and also
by the mass of the officers subordinate to them, that
a desperate eflfort must yet be made to cut a way,
sword in hand, through the investing forces.

In a moment such as had now arrived for the army
of Bazaine, it cannot be expected that every one
should reason Idgically ; but the calm observer must
instinctively ask himself what was really meant by
the separation of the fate of the army from that of
the fortress and its garrison. Even if negotiations
were at once set on foot with the German chief com-
mand, and even if they ended well, yet some days
must at all events pass away before they could be
concluded, and more days again would elapse before
the departure of Bazaine's troops ; so that, in the hap-
piest course of events, some day about the 16th of
October would have arrived. But we have seen that
the provisions would only hold out to the 20th of
that same month, so that the garrison of Metz cer-
tainly would only be able to make the supplies left
with them last some five to eight days more, especially
as they must necessarily retain the sick. Was such
a gain worth much parley ?

After the divisional generals had been thus pre-
pared beforehand by the commanders of the Corps,
Bazaine, on the 10th of October, assembled a great
council of war. This was composed of the Corps com-
manders — ^General Desvaux (Guard), General Fros-
sord (2d Corps), Marshal Leboeuf (3d Corps), General

244 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

Ladmirault (4th Corps), Marshal Canrobert (6th
Corps) ; and, in addition, SoleiUe, General of artillery,
the General of engineers, and commandant of the
fortress of Metz; Coffini^res de Nordeck, and the
Intendant-general of the army, Lebrun.

General Desvaux, who at the beginning of the war
commanded the cavalry division of the Guard, was at
this time chief of the Guard in place of General Bour-
baki, who, acting with the agreement of Bazaine, had
shortly before secretly left the fortress, to endeavour
to originate some new poUtical combinations which
might give fresh hope to the army of Metz.

The divisional generals were not included in this
council, neither had' thev been summoned to any
former ones, nor we« 4^ to »ay fotore onee; si
tiu. eonrideri.^ the diffi^tie, rf ti.e position in
which the army and fortress stood, was certainly a
mistake. Discontent with the behaviour of Bazaine
had already manifested itself here and there among
the officers of the army, and the feeling threatened to
spread. Many of them had no great confidence under
the present changed circumstances, either in Bazaine,
or in the Marshals, or in the Corps commanders, who
all stood in too close connection with the Empire.
The pursuit of their own personal interests was
attributed to them, and to this was ascribed the
inactivity of their behaviour since the 19th of August
If, then, Bazaine had collected the divisional generals
aroimd him — ^had listened to their opinions^ and com-

CAPITULATION OF BAZAINE. 245

municated to them his own — ^ho would so have best
combated the evil spirit, and woidd either have gained
courage for, and a justification o^ a last desperate
efibrt, to the reckless execution of which the divi-
sional generals would stand collectively pledged, or
he would have obliged them to acknowledge their
conviction that such an attempt would be useless and
impossible.

After the miUtary situation had been explained to
the council of war which actually met, three ^estions
were proposed — ^namely: 1. Shall the army remain in
Metz until all the supplies are consumed ? This was
answered with " Yes ;" and thereby much was said of
the good service which the army of Bazaine was ren-

before it the army of Prince Frederic Charles, and
gave time to the country to undertake new military
organisations in the interior. 2. Shall sorties be
made into the environs to procure provisions 1 This
question was answered with a negative, it being con-
sidered as very improbable that the success of such
enterprises would be in any way commensurate with
the certain loss which they would involve. 3. Shall
negotiations be entered into with the enemy, with a
view to obtaining such a military convention as could
be accepted ? The reply to this was in the aflfirmative.
It was also urged that the necessary steps should be
taken within the next forty -eight hours, and not
postponed to the hour of the utmost need; and it

246 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

was further resolved, that if honourable conditions
such as might be accepted could not be obtained, the
attempt must yet be made to seek a retreat sword in
hand.

Very much in these proceedings is remarkable, but
it is chiefly noticeable that the word " capitulation''
was not employed, but in its place the term " military
convention" was introduced, from which it is suffi-
ciently manifest that an especial part was claimed for
the army of Metz. It is further apparent that, with
the acknowledged state of the means of subsistence,
the commencement of negotiations had been already
too long delayed, if it were reaUy seriously intended
to force a passage by hard fighting. No man in the
French camp could imagine that within a few hours
the extraordinary conditions which were claimed
could be obtained from the Germans after their
previous successes — conditions such as have scarcely
ever been conceded to an army in the position of
Bazaine's.

With the consent of Prince Frederic Charles, Ba-
zaine now sent his first adjutant. General Napoleon
Boyer, to the great headquarters of the German
armies in Versailles, so that he might obtain infor-
mation of the true situation of France, and ascertain
what concessions the German leaders might be dis-
posed to make in the interest of the army of Metz
and of a general peace.

From this last it is apparent that the mission of

CAPITULATION OP BA2AINE. 247

General Boyer was by no means purely military, but
that, on the contrary, it was eminently political. This
must be remarked here, as the defenders of Bazaine
have repeatedly asserted the contrary.

After Boyer had set out on his journey. General
CofiQniferes announced to the town of Metz, on the
13th of October, that thenceforward only one sort of
bread — ^with bran — would be baked ; that every adult
inhabitant would receive daily 400 grammes* of this
bread — every child between four and twelve years of
age, 200 — and every child under four, 100 grammes —
and that at the price of 45 centimes the kilogramme.!
This announcement, in connection with the uncertain
and mysterious intelligence of the mission of Boyer,
excited great consternation among the inhabitants of
Metz. The citizens did not complain of the privation
which they were to submit to, but they murmured
much about the obscurity which shrouded every
proceeding, and about the state of dependence upon
mysterious powers into which they had been gradu-
ally brought ; and they began to be filled with an
uneasy fear lest they should be treacherously betrayed
in the night to Prussia at the caprice of some few
individuala

The municipal council of the town gave expression
to these feelings in an address to General Coflmi^res.
The latter answered it in a manner which said abso-

* 400 grammes is equal to about 14 oz.
t About twopence a pound.

248 THE WAB FOE THE HHINE FRONTIER.

lutely nothing. He counselled the people of Metz to
abstain before all from meddling in politics, ** as pol-
itics exercise a very disturbing influence.'* Still he
advised them to unite in the cry, " Vive la France I"
which was certainly a political expression ; for when
the men of Metz shouted ** Vive la France ! " they
thereby acknowledged their adherence to the policy
of national resistance to the Germans. They there-
fore only foUowed different politics to what they
would have done had they cried aloud, **Vive Na-
poleon III. 1 " or even " Vive le Roi de Prusse ! " But
there are unfortunately a great mass of men who
understand by " politics " solely all that is disagreeable
to them, and designate by the name any expression of
feeling which is unpleasant to them.

Boyer arrived at Versailles, and began to negotiate
there with Bismark and Moltke. He naturally first ex-
pressed a wish that the army of Bazaine — ^no mention
was to be made of the fortress of Metz or of its garrison
— should be allowed to depart unhindered, with arms
and baggage, to the south of France, under the condi-
tion that it should not again serve against Germany
during the war. Hereupon he was answered by the
question. Who was to guarantee such a treaty ? Mar-
shal Bazaine was simply a general. Which Govern-
ment did he obey? Since the Emperor Napoleon
had surrendered himself a prisoner, the only Govern-
ment of France which Germany could recognise was
the Regency of the Empress Eugenie. The Allied

CAPITULATION OF BAZAINK 249

Governments of Germany could not possibly treat
with the "Government of National Defence'' — at
all events, not nntil a Constituting Assembly had been
convened. But they could deal with the Ilmpress
Eugenie, and if she accepted the conditions proposed
to her, they could also consent to the free departure
of the army of Metz, under the further conditions
that it — ^the army — should proclaim the Regency, and
as an " Army of Order," with Bazaine as " Monk " at
the head of the Government, make an end of the
" Reds,"

Boyer was just as little adverse to this conception
of the state of affairs as Bazaine was, as facts will soon
show. It may indeed be asserted with great positive-
ness, without having been present at the most confi-
dential interviews, that he entertained this view of
matters much more seriously than the leaders of Ger-
man politics did themselves. For was it really to be
supposed that Bismark reposed an imconditional con-
fidence in the authority of Bazaine over his troops
when once these were free and without the precincts
of Metz, or that he regarded as su£Scient surety the
declarations of the Empress Eugenie ? Certainly not.
He must necessarily say to himself that the army of
Bazaine, once free, would renounce its obedience to its
leader, even if he himself wished to keep his word,
and would place itself, with bag and baggage, at the
disposal of the Provisional Government.

General Boyer returned from his journey to Ver-

250 THE WAR FOE THE RHINE FRONTIER.

sallies on the night from the 17th to the 18th of
October, and announced the failure of his mission to
the council of war, which was composed as on the
former occasion. The generals assembled now deter-
mined, with seven voices against two, that General
Boyer should return to Versailles, and repair thence
to Chiselhurst to the Empress Eugenie, in order that
by her intervention favourable terms might yet be
obtained for the army of Metz ; and it was afterwards
unanimously resolved that Bazaine could not sign any
treaty which did not refer solely to the army, as this
last must be kept free from any connection with polit-
ical questions.

It is very apparent that these two resolutions were
directly contradictory ; either the latter was not seri-
oudy meant, bat was only designed to pacify the
masses, should it become necessary to make them
acquainted with the determinations of the council, or
else an alarming confusion prevailed in the ideas of
its membera That the majority certainly had not
absolutely clear consciences may, however, be deduced
from the involved and obscure manner in which the
Corps commanders made known these decisions to
their divisional generals.

Boyer then journeyed a second time to Versailles^
and thence proceeded to Chiselhurst. The Empress
Eugenie, after much wavering and hesitation, declared
finally that she would not engage herself to anything.
She mislrusted Bazaine ; she would not give herself

CAPITULATION OP BAZAIKE. 251

blindly into his power in a way which would allow
him in the end to do solely what was his interest and
pleasure; and she would not compromise the future of
her son, in which she stiU believed, by declaring her
consent to a peace which would appear to the mass of
the French to be shameful.

On the 23d of October, King William was informed
by General Boyer that his negotiations had led to no
result ; and as, according to all the information that
the German headquarters had received, the means of
subsistence for the French army in and about Metz
must now be reduced to the lowest ebb, Prince Fre-
deric Charles was ordered to commimicate to Marshal
Bazaine that the royal headquarters had given up all
hope of arriving at any result by " political " nego-
tiations.

It is interesting to see how this expression " politi-
cal negotiations" here appears in Bazaine's pamphlet
of justification itself, while elsewhere it is through-
out a88erted-in every possible turn and twist of
language — that the mission of Boyer had no polit-
ical end in view.

During the time of Boyer^s journey to England,
preparations were made in and about Metz as though
the departoe of ihe army of Bazaine with axms and
mcUSriel of war was assured ; and it was announced
to the superior officers that the army would now have
the task of proclaiming and supporting the Eegency
in France. This intelligence was received by most of

252 THE WAB FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

them with a silent, inward reservation to do what
they thought fit when they were once outside the
fortreaa and free again.

On the 24th of October, Prince Frederic Charles
executed the commission intrusted to him, and
Bazaine forthwith summoned another council of
war for the 25th.

In Metz, and with the army of Bazaine, was old
General Changamier, who, bom in 1793, and there-
fore now 77 years old, had entered the army in
1815, and had made a brilliant military career, espe-
cially under Louis Philippe. At the outbreak of the
February Revolution in 1848, Changamier was com-
mandant of the military division of Algeria. When
a junior general of division, Cavaignac, was nomin-
ated govemor-general of the province, Changamier
returned to France, and although one of the most
declared opponents of repubUcan institutions, never-
theless offered his services to the republic Lamar-
tine desired to send him as ambassador to Berlin,
but this he declined ; and shortly afterwards^ when
Cavaignac was returned for the Constituting Assem-
bly, Changamier was again sent to Algeria to supply
his place there ; but, elected himself soon afterwards
for the same Assembly, he was obliged to return
SLStaia — and when Cavaifi[nac became the head of the
SvLnent, received fom him the comM«,d of tt,e
National Guard. This he retained when Prince
Louis became President, and, in addition, was made

CAPITULATION OF BAZAINE. 253

chief of the Army of Paris ; but the latter command
was taken away from Ixim again in the beginning of
1851. No one really trusted General Changamier,
who had always shown himself in the chaxacter of a
miles glariosus and of a future Monk; and even
those whom, as such, he might have served, had no
confidence in him. After he was relieved firom the
chief command of the Army of Paris, he stiU con-
tinned to talk very loudly, but without, however, in
any way giving proof of possessing either miUtaxy
or political penetration. On the occasion of the
coup d'Stat he was arrested, imprisoned at first in
Mazas, and afterwards exiled from the coimtry.
Thenceforward he resided at Malines, in Belgium, in
the enjoyment, after 1859, of the revenues of his pro-
perty in France. When, in 1870, the majority of the
Princes of the House of Orleans tendered their ser-
vices to the French Government, General Changar-
nier also did the same. The ofier of the Princes was
not accepted ; but Changamier was received at the
headquarters of Napoleon III. at Met2s, and accom-
panied them as ^piritus familiarisy without, however,
the good results of his advice being anywhere per-
ceptible.

In the council of war of the 25th of October, it
was now resolved that General Changamier should
repair to the headquarters of Prince Frederic Charles
to obtain a firee departure for the army of Bazaine
to Algeria, or an armistice, with liberty to reprovision

254 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

the fortress. During this, the old Corps Legislatif
(the majority of which consisted of the Mamelukes of
the Empire) was to be reassembled to elect a new
Government, which the army of Metz should then,
as an "army of order," cause to be acknowledged
throughout France.

Of this mission of Changamier's the divisional
generals were also informed by the Corps com-
manders, and to them the whole affair seemed, as it
necessarily must do, only laughable. General Bisson
declared openly to Marshal Canrobert that Bazaine
and the Corps commanders, let them say what they
might, had no other thought than that of delivering
themselves up as prisoners of war. They knew right
well that they dared not show themselves again in
France, and they only wished to rescue at least their
" savings " by a compact with the enemy.

Changamier went to Prince Frederic Charles. The
latter had already received instructions — ^and besides,
he knew fuU well that now, two weeks after the 10th
of October, the army of Metz was no longer in a con-
dition to propose terms ; and in truth, if there was,
as was certainly the case, any talk now of a great
attempt to sally out, such would, in the present state
of affairs, be simply insane. An effort which could
not be attempted eight weeks before with the army
of Bazaine when it was still comparatively superb,
certainly could not be made with the miserable re-

CAPITULATION OF BAZAINE. 255

mains to which hunger and suffering had reduced it.
The Prince, therefore, demanded simply the surrender
of the army and fortress, and Changamier was obliged
to return with this answer.

Later on, on the same evening, the 25th, another
meeting took place in the chateau of Frescaty, to the
south of Fort St Privat, between the Chief of the Staff
of Prince Frederic Charles and General Cissey of Lad-
mirault's Corps. In this conference, as in the others,
the main subject of conversation was the separation of
the fate of the field-army of Bazaine from that of the
fortress. Bazaine had now sent a divisional general,
in order that no one might find occasion to say that
anything was kept secret from the army. As we
have before remarked, this separation of the fate of
the field-army from that of the fortress meant practi-
cally nothing; and moreover, on the other hand, it
was alleged on the German side that if the army of
Bazaine had not been present before Metz, it would
have been impossible to place the very incomplete
new forts in a state of defence.

On the evening of the 26th, the final negotiations
took place between Generals Stiehle and Jarras in
the chateau of Frescaty, when the only delay arose
in discussing whether the officers should be released
on parole or not. As it had come to pass that French
officers who had given their word of honour not to
serve again against Germany in this war had never-

256 THE WAR FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

theless accepted commands in the French army,
Prince Frederic Charles was unwilling again to con-
cede the favour, and therefore telegraphed to the
King of Prussia to learn his decision. The answer,
however, was favourable to the French demand.

On the 27th of October the terms were ratified by
the commanders-in-chief on both sides, and the
capitulation could finally be signed. The conditions
were in principle the same as those granted and
accepted at Sedan ; but special clauses provided for
the protection of the inhabitants of Metz, and regu-
lated the marching out of the troops.

When, on the 27th, Bazaine and CofiSni^res com-
municated to the army and to the town the conclusion
of the capitulation, great excitement and scenes of
disorder ensued, although such an ending must for a
long time have been foreseen to be inevitable ; and
Bazaine, the Corps commanders, and Coffini^res, were
accused of treachery, and even threatened with vio-
lence. By Bazaine's own wish, only the Guard was to
march out with arms and colours; the other Corps
were to give up their weapons in the town. The
eagles were deposited in the armoury on the evening
of the 28th, and it was given out that they were to
be burnt there ; but in reality they were all, 53 in
number, handed over to the Prussians.

On the forenoon of the 29th, after a detachment
of sappers had made diligent search for any mines
which might perchance still exist, the Germans occu-

CAPITULATION OP BAZAINB. 257

pied the detached forts and the gates of the fortress.
At noon the French troops began to march out : the
6th Corps and Forton's division of cavahy along the
road to Thionville on the left bank of the Moselle to
Ladonchamps ; the 4th Corps between Forts Plappe-
ville and St Quentin along the road to Amanvillers to
the Prussian lines ; the Guard, the great reserve of
artillery, the equipage train of the great headquarters,
on the right bank of the Moselle along the highway
to Nancy, as far as Toumebride, near Frescaty ; the
2d Corps, with Laveaucoupct's division and Lepasset's
brigade, along the road to Nomdny, through Magny
sur Seille, as far as the farm of St Thidbault ; the
3d Corps along the Saarbrtick road, as far as the farm
of Bellecroix ; the Mobile Guard and all the other
troops composing the garrison along the Strasburg
highroad to Grigy.

As the troops arrived in their bivouacks the oflBcers
returned to the town, and the French soldiers jjj^ed
under the command of German officers and non-
commissioned officers. Provisions were ready on the
spot, having been provided by the German com-
manders. The sending off of the prisoners of war
along the lines by Saarbrtick and Saarlouis was super-
vised by General von Zastrow, whose Corps, the 7th,
was to remain in the neighbourhood of Metz; and
General von Kummer was appointed commandant of
Metz, his division, at least so much of it as waa not

VOL. n. B

258 THE WAR FOB THE RHINE FRONTIER.

employed in escorting the prisoners of war, being
annexed to the 7th Army Corps.

The Germans give the number of the prisoners of
war taken in Metz at 1 73,000 men, but this must be
regarded as a very " round " number, even if in it
were included the 20,000 sick in the hospitals, the
Sedentary National Guard, the Mobile National
Guard, all the local officials, and every one connected
in even the most remote way with the army. It
would in reality appear to have been taken solely
from a writing which General Coffini&res addressed
on the 15th of October to the Municipal Council of
Metz to justify the capitulation which was impend-
ing. In it he naturaUy gave the highest estimate
possible of the number of people to be fed in and
about Metz, and reckoned them at 230,000. If from
this the ordinary civilian population of 57,000 souls be
subtracted, there remained, certainly, exactly 1 73,000
for the military forces. But it is very possible that
Coffini^res allowed himself to exaggerate: in the first
place, because such an exaggeration was useful to
him ; and, secondly, because he probably counted in
all who could be, or ought to have been, in and
around Metz ; and, moreover, it must be noticed that
the civil population had been increased to far above
60,000 by the influx of the peasantry and of the
inhabitants of the environs into Metz, and that
Bazaine himself gives the number of serviceable men

CAPITULATION OF BAZAINE. 259

whom he had at the time of the capitulation at
65,000 men, which coincides with other credible
information which we have received.

The value of the matSriel of war which, by the fall
of Metz, passed into the hands of the Germans, is
estimated by them at 80 millions of francs — a sum
which may be considered to be rather too small than
too great.

King William celebrated this new success of the
German arms by nominating the Crown-Prince of
Prussia and Prince Frederic Charles field-marshals.
Heretofore this title had purposely and by tradition
never been given to a prince of the Prussian royal
house. For a long time Field-Marshal Wrangel had
alone attained, in Prussia^ to this highest military
rank ; but he could only regard himseK as honoured
by being associated with such princely colleagues — a
feeling which the old man expressed in a characteris-
tic way. General von Moltke also received the title
of Count.

In France the fall of Metz aroused such a storm of
excitement and rage as might have been expected if
it had never before happened that a fortress, even
when defended by an army, had been compelled to
surrender. And yet, but fifteen years before, Sebas-
topol had faUen, although the Eussian army was
never so completely shut in and thrown upon the
resources of the place as Bazaine's was.

260 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The delegation of the Government at Tours, to
which now, as will be more fully described afterwards^
M. Gambetta also belonged, proclaimed without
more ado that Bazaine was a traitor ; and M. Gram-
betta instructed the prefects and state officials to
pursue and arrest him and his officers wheresoever
they might find them, and deliver them over to the
proper authorities.

261

CHAPTER XXX.

PBOCEEDINGS OF THE GOYEBNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
UP TO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER.

In the period between the beginning of October and the
middle of November, the capitxdation of Bazaine was
the greatest, and by far the most striking, military
event. For whatever else took place in the operations
of the campaign during that time led to no decisive
result, but, on the contrary, all the circumstances bore
about them more or less a character of uncertainty.
In order, however, to make the narrative of them as
connected ba possible, it is necessary now to relate
shortly the political occurrences which took place in
the interim.

The Government of National Defence had ori-
ginally, on the 8th of September, fixed the 1 6th of
October aa the day for the elections for the Consti-
tuting Assembly ; afterwards, during the negotiations
which preceded the Conference of Ferri^res, they ad-
vanced the time to the 2d of October, in order to put
an end to the reports that they desired to delay
or hinder the elections in order to retain office.

262 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

But when the eonversations at Ferri^res failed to
bring about any result, the Government in Paris
again postponed the elections, and this time inde-
finitely, or until such a day as they could take place
freely in the whole territory of the Eepublic.

It is not easy to perceive why the delegation of the
Government in Tours departed again from this resolve
on the 29th of September, and once more appointed the
16th of October as the day. As soon as the members
of the Government remaining in Paris heard, on ike
1st of October, of this, they resolved to declare the
decree of the delegation nuU and void, and also to
send one from among themselves to Tours, where,
being from longer co-operation better acquainted
with the whole policy of the Government, he would
be able to represent it without a constant corre-
spondence being necessary. For this office M. Gam-
betta came forward; and his colleagues were the
more willing to send him, as they believed that his
fire and ardour would animate the endeavours of the
provinces to continue the war.

Accordingly, on the 6th of October, Gambetta
quitted Paris in a balloon. The balloon has for a
long time been employed for military objects, but
never before to so great an extent as in this war.
When first used they were employed to reconnoitre
the enemy, and for this they were employed by the
French in the wars of the Revolution, especially at
Maubeuge in 1 793, and at Fleurus in 1 794. A special

EMPLOYMENT OF BALLOONS IN FRANCE. 263

corps of aeronauts was founded, which Moreau took
into the. field for the last time in 1796. The balloons
then used were held down by ropes {hallons captifs),
to which horses were harnessed. This arrangement
prevented them from mounting higher than was
wished, and also from drifting into regions whither
they were not intended to go. Such captive balloons
were again employed for like purposes in Paris in
1870. But before this campaign free balloons {bal-
Ions libres) had also been occasionally employed : in
such a one, for instance, M. Godard went up from
Castiglione on the 23d of June, the day before the
battle of Solferino, but, as is well, known, saw nothing.
A reconnoitring balloon must naturally always be an
occupied one {ballon montS) — that is, provided with
a car in which men can be carried. Balloons also
were used for yet other purposes by the Austrians
before Venice in 1849. There they made fast shells
to them, which, the balloons having been blown over
the town by favourable winds, were to detach them-
selves and fall into it This contrivance was, how-
ever, not very successful, but still it was not con-
demned as altogether impracticable.

In the year 1870, balloons were especially used as
a means to enable besieged towns to communicate
with the outer world, and for this they were used on
the largest scale by the Parisians. Begular workshops
were very soon constructed, under the superintend-
ence of M. Godard, in the station of the Orleans Bail-

264 THE WAB FOB THE BHINE FBOKTIEB.

way ; and in these, many hundreds of workmen and
workwomen were constantly employed, A model
was constructed after which the balloons were to be
essentially formed, and simple patterns were provided
for the rapid and uniform cutting out of the separate
sectors. These balloons had a diameter of about 50
feet^ so that they could carry in their cars a net
weight of 1000 kilogrammes* for a long journey, and
therefore could easily convey a considerable number
of letters and papers, besides two or three men and the
necessary ballast. Each one had in the upper cap a
valve which could be opened by means of a string by
the aeronaut in the car, and thus the descent could be
regulated. The strips were of the national colours of
the Republic — ^red, white, and blue ; and each balloon
received a name, as a ship does before leaving the
slips. The aeronauts received a practical and theoreti-
cal instruction — ^the former in captive balloons — and
were chosen in preference from among the numerous
sailors who had been called in to Paris.

Every aerial voyage is in itself attended with many
d«ge«!wHeh iLLe espeoiaUy great during ti.'
descent. A perfectly free selection of the place
where he shall touch the earth is impossible to the
aeronaut, owing to the rapidity with which the bal-
loon travels — a speed which depends upon the force
of the wind, but which, on the average, exceeds that
of an express railway train, and cannot suddenly be

* 2200 Knglwh ponndB avoiidupois.

EMPLOYMENT OF BALLOONS IN FRANCE. 265

checked ; so that it is rarely that aerial voyagers land
without sustaining some bodily injuries. But now,
during the war of 1870, the perils were manifoldly
increased for the Parisian aeronauts. The Prussians
fired with rifles and cannon at the balloons as soon as
they quitted Paris ; and at last it even came to this,
that Herr Krupp constructed, in the arsenal in Essen, a
special balloon-gun,which, of small calibreand mounted
on a stand as a telescope is, could be readily turned in
any direction and fired with any elevation. These
pis and inventions, however, Jnld only lead to a
comparatively small number of successful shots, owing
to the rapid motion of the object, and to the great
height which a balloon coming from Paris had already
attained before crossing the line of detached forts.

But in order that the aerial post might fulfil its
end, it was further necessary that the balloons should
descend outside the district' of the Germans, so that
the voyagers might place the mails they carried safely
in a post-oflfice, or on the railway, to be forwarded to
their destination ; and necessarily the more the inva-
sion of France extended, so much the more difficult
was it to comply with this condition. Many balloons,
which, for the sake of safety, fixed upon a distant
point of descent, fell in Germany. Often the men in
them were for hours uncertain of the direction they
were travelling in, and of the speed of their movement,
as by order of General Trochu they generally set out
in the dark, between midnight and two o^clock in the

266 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

morning, in order to escape the Prussian bullets^ and
to prevent their arrival being unpleasantly announced
beforehand. They were, it is true, supplied with
apparatus for generating electric light, but these did
not always act properly, and, moreover, they by no
means supplied the place of the light of day in de-
termining a position in space.

The Prussians increased the military codex by a
paragraph in which they announced that all aero-
nauts who fell into their hands would be treated as
priBoners of war and sent to Germany.

And although, spite of all dangers and hindrances,
the balloons which ascended almost daily from the
capital carried much news firom it into the provinces^
still they could not be employed for the opposite pur-
pose of conveying intelligence from the country into
the town. To do this it would be necessary to be
able to steer them, and that is still an unsolved pro-
blem. France, and especially Paris, is rich in thought-
ful and studious aeronauts. Besides MM. Godard and
Nadar, who have acquired a professional celebrity
throughout Europe, we must here mention the mathe-
matician, Wilfrid de Fonvielle, who has made many
aerial voyages for the purpose of physical observa-
tions, and who quitted Paris during the blockade in
a private balloon of his own construction. These,
and many others, among whom was the celebrated
marine engineer, Dupuy de L6me, have given much
study to the question of the possibility of steering

EMPLOYMENT OF BALLOONS IN FRANCE. 267

balloons. It has also been repeatedly asserted that
the problem was solved, and very recently M. Valine
claimed to have invented a steerable balloon capa-
ble of carrying 60,000 kilogrammes (54 tons). Cer-
tainly no one can venture to affirm in these days
that anything is impossible; but until something en-
tirely new is discovered, of which hitherto, no man
has thought, it is certain that the great difficulty con-
sists in constructing a balloon which shall have a
sufficient lifting capability to carry a steering-appa-
ratus of the strength requisite to overcome the resist-
ances to be encountered ; so that up to this time no
aerial machine has come into use which can be steered,
and, what is equally important, can be easily stopped.
We must therefore wait patiently.

The attempts, then, of bold aeronauts who endea-
voured to reach Paris from the provinces in ordinary
balloons, without steering - apparatus, by skilfully
utilising the currents of winds in di£ferent atmos-
pheric strata, all failed, and it was necessary to con-
trive other means to prociire the desired intelligence.
These ways were : 1, subterranean telegraphs ; 2,
messengers ; 3,. carrier-pigeons ; 4, despatches by the
water-courses.

Subterranean telegraphs existed in the environs of
Paris, but as they were only underground for short
distances and then came to the surface, they were
soon cut by the German cavaby.

Messengers were frequently sent with concealed

268 THE WAR FOB THE BHINE FEONTIEE.

despatches from the provinces, especiaUy from Tours
to Paris. At first many succeeded in passing the
German investing lines; but the more t^e bes^gers
established themselves, reconnoitred the neighbour-
hood, and intrenched themselves, so much the more
rarely did these successful journeys occur, and not a
few of these brave and self-sacrificing men were either
seized in the execution of their enterprise or shot^
the last not always by the Germans.

Pigeons have been used since the days of antiquity,
and especially in the East, to carry news. The Turk-
ish pigeon {Colurnha Turcica) was for a long time the
favourite carrier-bird; but the ordinary field-pigeon
(Columba livia), and our domestic pigeon, which
springs from it, render the same services. They
fly at the rate of about thirty miles in the hour,
and therefore would travel from London to Paris in
from five to six hours. Before the existence of the
electric telegraph, they were bankers who mostly
employed carrier-pigeons to convey important ex-
change despatches. But these aerial messengers must
not be heavily or uncomfortably loaded, if they are
to execute their task properly. The simple banking
messages were very short, and could be written on
the smallest fragment of silk-paper. To preserve
these documents from destruction by moisture or
similar causes, they were enclosed in a small quill,
hermetically closed at both ends, and this was then
carefully and securely fastened to one of the tail-

USE OF CAKRIER-PIGEONS IN FBANCE. 269

feathers of the letter-pigeon (pigeon vayageur). In
1870 the French made use of the same expedient, but
it then became desirable to forward by one pigeon
much more comprehensive intelligence than had been
hitherto sent M. Steenackers, who administered the
postal and telegraphic departments at Tours, dis-
covered a simple means, which had certainly only
been rendered practicable by the advances resulting
from modem industry, of fulfilling this requirement
without distressing the pigeon. He caused, namely,
a great number of despatches to be copied on to one
sheet, and then photographed this on such a reduced
scale, that about 70,000 words could be contained
on a very small scrap of silk-paper. By this device
a single bird could carry as much as stands
upon about 300 pages of the book which the reader
has now before his eyes. The officials at the receiv-
ing office in Paris could naturally only read the
messages by means of a strong magnifying-glass, and
the messages had to be written out again and for-
warded to the respective destinies. But, spite of its
ingenuity, the institution did not render all the
services that might perhaps have been expected from
it. The pigeons had to be in the first place conveyed
out of Paris in balloons, and then forwarded by the
railway to the places whence they were to cany the
despatches. When the wind was very strong the
birds would not fly, but sought shelter from the
weather, and on such occasions were liable to b^ cap-

270 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

tured or killed. The Prussians in the neighbourhood
of Paris procured birds of prey (falcons) to swoop
down on the letter-pigeons, and there is no doubt
that many were thus prevented from reaching the
capital^ while others, which succeeded in arrivmg,
came without their burdens. It is possible that the
Prussians may have taken away the despatchesf, and
then set the carriers free again ; but often the letter-
holders (quills) were unskilfully attached, and the
birds themselves being incommoded, freed themselves
from their loads by their beaks. Many j)igeons, again,
were delayed by bad weather in a most unaccountable
way, and to such an extent that they sometimes
arrived many weeks late.

Letters enclosed in sealed bottles were also in-
trusted to the waters of the Seine and other streams
above Paris^ and carried by them into the capital.
But this medium was also very uncertain, and its suc-
cessful employment for any long distance required at
least the attentive watchfulness of trustworthy people
at fixed points, not too far distant from one another.

We have here described the several ways of com-
munication to which it is well known that recourse
was had : many others have been talked of — as, for
example, vessels or boats propelled imder water — ^but
we have not yet succeeded in penetrating the mystery
in which they are involved.

Gambetta then, as we said, left Paris in a balloon
on the 6th of October, and descended in the neigh-

GAMBBTTA LEAVES PARIS. 271

botirhood of Bouen, whence he proceeded by railway,
arriving in Tours at nine o'clock in the morning.
Thence he on the same day issued a proclamation to
the French, in which he described the situation of
Paris, the condition of the fortifications, the number
of combatants, and the abundance of resources of all
kinds. Paris, he said, could hold out for many
months, and thus the provinces would have time to
organise their miUtary forces and come to tlie aid of
the capitaL In addition to this, the partisan war
must be carried on with energy, to cut off the enemy's
resources and render his employment of them difficult
The task which the French had before them was
difficult, but by no means impracticable : hitherto its
execution had only failed through default of deter-
mination and consistency.

The Ministry of War had been undertaken by Ad-
miral Fourichon as soon as he arrived in Tours about
the middle of September, in addition to the Ministry
of Marine which he already held ; but in the first
days of October he again resigned the first-named
office to Cremieux. It can easily be imagined how
ludicrous it must have appeared to the Prussians that
this ancient advocate, whose anjrthing but pleasing
exterior was a picture of the Oriental type in its most
unlovely form, should be a Minister of War. But he
did not long fill the office, for Gambetta now under-
took it as well as the Ministry of the Interior, which
had fallen to him in the beginning — a plurality of

272 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

offices which is especially important, as by it Gam-
betta had all the land forces of France at his disposal,
including the Sedentary National Guard, which is
dependent upon the Minister of the Interior. We
shall presently consider Gambetta's work of recon-
structing the French forces ; but first we must make
a few remarks on other matters."

At the end of October, M. Thiers returned to France
jErom his journey of visits to the Courts of the Great
Powers, and proceeded to Tours. The four Powers
he had visited — ^Austria, England, Russia, and Italy
— ^had all expressed a wish that there should be an
end to the shedding of blood, and that meanwhile,
at least, an armistice should be concluded that would
give France an opportunity of electing a Constituting
Assembly, and thereby of acquiring a recognised
Government with which the Germans could treat
without hesitation. But in view of the addresses
which were being signed in great numbers through-
out Germany, protesting against any interference of
other States in the strife between their country and
France, the Great Powers were naturally reluctant to
act, although, by the intervention of England and
Russia, Thiers received a safe-conduct from the Ger-
man headquarters to enter Paris in order to obtain
instructions from the Government, with the view of
afterwards conferring with the Chancellor of the
North German Confederation in Versailles.

Thiers quitted Tours on the 28th, and journeyed

CONFERENCE BETWEEN THIERS AND BISMARK. 273

by Orleans and Arpaion to Versailles, where he only
rLined . d.«rtTc wia.o,t ha^g «.y interview
with Bismark. On the same day he crossed the
Seine at Billancourt, entered Paris, and at once placed
himself in communication with the Government tiiere.
After receiving instructions as to the conditions of
the proposed armistice, he returned on the 1st of
November to Versailles, and at noon commenced
negotiations with Bismark.

The matter to be arranged was now much more
limited and more precisely defined than it was when
Jules Favre took part in the conferences of Ferriferes,
The conclusion of an armistice was the sole affair to
be arranged ; but notwithstanding this, the course of
these second negotiations was exactly similar to that
of the former ones.

At the conamencement of the conversation Bismark
remarked, merely as an historical fact, and without lay-
ing any special stress upon it, that there still existed
in Wilhelmshohe the ruins of a French Government,
which alone was recognised by the Great Powers of
Europe, and which was still thinking of re-establish-
ing itself. And this statement was perfectly true;
for in those days the Empress Eugenie made a short
visit to her imprisoned consort, and the Bonapartists
were beginning to agitate violently. To these agita-
tions two new journals owed their birth — * La Situa-
tion ' (the name of a former French Guelphic paper)
and * Le Drapeau.' The latter journal was published

VOL. II. s

274 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

in Brussels by Granier de Cassagnac, and distribnted
gratis, especially to the French oflficers who were
prisoners of war in Germany. But to every right-
thinking Frenchman these audacious efforts must
have appeared to be infamous. The majority believed,
though we are convinced wrongly, that they were
made with the connivance of the Chancellor. They
originated solely from Wilhelmshohe, as did the
movement to convoke the General Councils of the
Departments to constitute a government — ^that is, to
call together for that purpose the bodies from which
the official candidates for the Corps Legislatif were
usually nominated under the Empire.

Bismark and Thiers were soon in accord as to the
assertion of the latter, that the prisoner of Wilhehns-
hohe and his followers could no longer represent
France ; and they then commenced to discuss the
conditions of the armistice, which Bismark consented
should continue for twenty-five or twenty-eight days,
the period which Thiers declared to be necessary for
the orderly and regular conduct of the elections for
the Constituting Assembly. In regard to these elec-
tions themselves, Bismark only made reservations in
respect to Alsace and German Lorraine, and even
there he was willing to concede that those provinces
should be represented by notables. He declared, also,
that he was content that neither the future position
of these districts nor their separation from France^
both of which points could only be determined by

OONFEBENGE BETWEEN THIEBS AND BIS1£ABK. 275

the treaty of peace, shotdd be mentioned in the terms
of the armistice. For the positions of the belligerent
forces, the statvs quo on the day of the signing of
the treaty for the cessation of hostilities was to re-
main unaltered ; and accordingly a line of demarca-.
tion was to be marked out, though Bismark remarked
that this condition was very disadvantageous for the

composing which were set free by the capitulation of
Bazaine, would be prevented from making any move*
ment towards its future sphere of action. Still, on
the 2d of November the two negotiators believed that
all these difficulties were arranged, and that now
only the question of reprovisioning the fortresses,
and especiaUy Paris, remained to be discussed. Here
Bismark pointed out the material difficulties of the
undertaking; and this remark was not wholly an-
swered by the reply of Thiers that the procuring of
supplies was the affair of the French. For the pro-
vision-trains certainly could not be allowed to enter
Paris altogether uncontrolled by the Germans. The
destruction of the railways around Paris would un-
doubtedly render the transport very difficult and
tedious, and this would bring with it many incon-
venien;. for the investog Lj ; ond, iJy. what
measures were to be taken to prevent the provision-
ing of Paris from affecting very prejudicially that of
the German armies in France? Viewing all this,
therefore, Bismark determined to consult once again.

276 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER,

the German military authorities, after which^ on the
3d of November, a definite conclusion was to be
arrived at

While Thiers was in Paris, a socialistic demonstra-
tion had taken place there against the Government
of National Defence. When intelligence arrived of
the capitulation of Metz, and the news spread of the
negotiations which were about to take place for an
armistice, armed bands proceeded from Belleville to
the H6tel de YiUe, took possession of it, and made
prisoners of the members of the Government who
were assembled thera The leaders of the movement
— ^Flourens, Pyat, Joly, Blanqui, and others — desired
to institute a so-called " Commune,'' and naturally to
undertake themselves its government. On this pro-
ject they commenced to deliberate amid great con-
fusion, some of the members of the Government of
National Defence being more or less ill-treated. But
the Minister of Finance, M. E. Picard, had contrived
to escape, and he at once took measures to free the
prisoners. In consequence of his activity, the 106th
battalion of the Mobile Guard (from Brittany) suc-
ceeded at 8 P.M. in rescuing General Trochu ; and at
the same time MM. Jules Ferry and Pelletan made
good their flight The Ministers who were now free
assembled in the Luxembourg to take counsel as to
what measures must be adopted ; and soon after mid-
night General Trochu placed himself at the head of
the Mobile and National Guards, who were collected

DEMONSTRATION IN PARIS. 277

in great numbers, and at 3 A.M., on the 1st of Novem-
ber, cleared the H6tel de Ville, and set free the
captives, the insurrectionists flying in all directions.

On the 3d of November the Grovemment demanded
from the citizens of Paris, from the troops, and from
the National Guard, a vote on the question, whether
it still enjoyed the confidence of the inhabitants or
not. It obtained an enormous majority, and could
now regard itself as doubly established. Nine chiefs-
of-battalion of the National Guard who were im-
plicated in the revolt were dismissed from their posts.
Among them was M. Gustav Flourens, chief-of-bat-
talion of the Volunteer Rifles of Belleville. This very
eccentric man, who is notorious throughout Euro^
chiefly as an inciter of brawls, although he can fairly
claim the title of scholar, had acquired his military
education during the Cretan insurrection, in which he
played a very prominent part. In the meetings which
took place before the elections of 1869, he made him-
seK noticeable by his furious hatred of the Empire ;
and in the beginning of 1870 he was, being at the
time a fugitive, accused of complicity in Beaury's
attempt.

General Tamisier, Commandant of the National
Guard of Paris, was reproached with having at the
least acted very feebly. The rebels had, without his
consent, placed his name on the list of the members
who were to compose the proposed Provisional Govern-
ment, and he now tendered his resignation ; which^

278 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

being accepted, he was superseded by General Clement
Thomas, an old Bepublican, who had once before, after
the February Revolution of 1848, held for a time the
same command.

Bochefort, who on the 31st of October had made
promises to the insurrectionists which the Govern-
ment of National Defence in no way intended to
ratify, resigned office, and thenceforth devoted his
services to the defence of Paris as a gunner in the
National Guard.

Thiers naturally was cognisant of the events of the
3l8t, but did not deem it expedient to inform Bis-
mark of them. The latter heard of them fix>m other
sources on the morning of the 3d of November, and
at the meeting on that day interrogated Thiers as
to the extent of his knowledge. But the French
representative evaded the question by expressing his
conviction that, even if disturbances had arisen, they
must have been quelled in a very short time.

On renewing the discussion of the question of
reprovisioning Paris for the period of the armistice,
Bismark at once returned to his original statement,
that the matter was one which aflFected militaiy
interests, and must be considered and settled from a
miUtarypomtofview. For the Germans the arrange-
ment would be in itself disadvantageous ; they there-
fore could not agree to it without obtaining "a
military equivalent" which would in some degree
icompensate them, and Bismark demanded that this

CONFERENCE BETWEEN THIERS AND BISMABK. 279

should be the surrender to the Germans of one or two
of the forts of Fans. With this the negotiations of
Versailles were shipwrecked on the same point as
those of Ferri^res. Thiers strove to prove to the
Chancellor of the North German Confederation that,
although France would certainly derive military ad-
vantages by a cessation of hostilities, still, on the
other hand, Germany would gain politically ; for to
her profit would be the calming of the passions of the
two nations, who, during the armistice, would have
time to reflect, and would be thus preparing for
peace ; and moreover, the whole of Europe would be
compelled to acknowledge the readiness of Prussia
to concede terms, and would no longer be able to
deny her genuine and proved love of peace. But the
attempt was vain; and Thiers in his report allows
it to be understood that Bismark, being altogether
dependent upon the military authorities, could no
longer allow his own political ideas to govern him.

Thiers, who thus saw his efforts frustrated, now
expressed the wish to be allowed to proceed again
into the French lines with a view to a conference.
Bismark willingly assented to this, and moreover
desired him to inform the Government th^t if they
wished the elections to proceed without an armis-
tice, no difficulties should be laid in the way of
their being carried on in the districts occupied by the
Germans, and that every faciUty should be given to
the fcactioi. of the QoZ^t I Parta aud Toma to

280 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

correspond freely on the subject Accordingly, on the
5th of November, Thiers had an interview with M.
Favre inside the French lines, and a long conversation
ensued about the state of affairs as they then existed ;
but on the 6th he received an official notice from the
Government in Paris to break off all negotiations;
and the proposition of continuing the elections for the
Constituting Assembly without a temporary cessation
of hostilities was also rejected.

Thus, then, another hope was firustrated, and the
war assumed ever more and more the character of
an inevitable calamity which was destined to run
its course in Europe. Political and strategical com-
binations lose their value under such circumstances,
and men begin to ask themselves whether the much-
lauded military organisations, which make use of a
principle, to a certain extent, without fully recognis-
ing it, deserve the prize which they have won. The
world becomes thoughtful, and asks itself whether
the hour can have struck when it must be decided
whether Europe shall be republican or C!ossack. Sym-
pathies, which were hotly enlisted on one side or the
other, become cool, or even turn to the other party.
Much that was lately held to be wonderful ceases to
be marvelled at, already seeming too insignificant to
be regarded in view of the more recent phenomena
which are origiimted by the significant greatness of
general situation. But ever more and more it becomes
manifest that those men were right who held that this

FAILURE OF THE CONFEBENCE. 281

war, under any circumstances, and whatever might be
its issue, would be a great European disaster. Ever-
more in the land of the victor the cry arises that, how-
ever hapless may be the situation, so much the more
necessary is it to fight out this time the strife between
France and Germany to the very end ; and, never-
theless, the fear evermore arises whether the vcb
victoribus which was uttered at the outbreak of the
war will not cause its truth to be acknowledged.
War is always a political means; but is the policy
on either side the same in the beginning of November
that it was in the middle of July ? A peace may now
be concluded in one, two, or three months. Various
causes may bring it about ; but no one now believes
that it can be a lasting one, even to the extent of
securing ten years of peace, or that it can lead to a
thorough settlement of the strife ; and this uncertainty
of what will happen next prevails everywhere.

But this very uncertainty, again, gives room for
hope that affairs may finally turn out better than
man may venture to predict.

282

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE REC0N8TRUCTI0N OF THE FRENCH A&MY.

We have seen how, after the first misfortunes hap-
pened to the Imperial army, the fact was accepted
that great things must be done to reinforce it Pali-
kao's Ministry occupied itself principally with the
multiplying and augmentation of the marching bat-
talions and regiments, some of which we have abeady
found embodied in M'Mahon's army. It laid particu-
lar stress upon obtaining old soldiers. With these and
the conscripts it endeavoured to re-establish the differ-
ent Corps' depots, which had been almost altogether
absorbed into the old field -army. Moreover, the
Mobile Guard of the northern and eastern depart-
ments was to a great extent assembled, and a small
beginning at least was made towards the concentra-
tion of that of the western and southern provinces,
where heretofore even a paper organisation had not
existed. For it was true of the whole of France that^
up to the time of the fall of the Empire, the Mobile
Guard remained in a very bad state, insufficiently

REGONSTBUCTION OF THE FRENCH ABMY. 283

exercised and armed^ unless hj chance they had
been called into a fortress^ and there trained by
some prudent commandant to assist in its defence.

The reorganisation of the Sedentary National Guard,
also, remained in a very backward state, spite of all
fte promises and decl of Paffiao-, uL^. and
partly, indeed, because this Ministry did not believe
that a universal arming would be for the good of the
Empire.

After the fall of the Regency, the Government of
National Defence continued the labours of Palikao's
Ministry, but at the same time they gave greater
heed to the organisation of the Mobile Guard, seeking
to press it rapidly forward; and at the same time
they endeavoured also to reorganise the Sedentary
National Guard, so that it might take part in the
service of public security in large towns, and assist in
the defence of the fortresses. But hereby the want
of an adequate supply of well-constructed weapons —
a want which had been hitherto denied, but which
really existed — made itself felt The Government
therefore took measures for the manufacture of greater
numbers of breech-loaders in France itself, by employ-
ing private industry ; and at the same time it made
arrangements for purchasing abroad, especially in
England and America, "whence weapons were naturally
obtained constructed on different systems. Similarly
the rearming of tiie artillery was tZn in hand; for.
independently of the fact that many of the French

284 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

field-guns had been lost, the German artilleiy had, by
its accuracy and length of range, made itself much
respected by the French ; and the opinion ever gained
ground among them that their artillery also must be
provided with breech-loading ordnance to be able to
cope with that of the adversary.

But in spite of the multiplicity of the endeavours
of the Government of National Defence, we cannot
recognise any revolutionary character in them untfl
after the fall of Metz. Up to that time only cus-
tomary means had been employed, and only ordi-
nary processes applied. Only with that event did
this change, and then only did the Government b^in
to adopt revolutionary measures.

On the 2d of November the delegation in Tours
issued a decree by which aU men between 20 and
40 years of age were mobilised, unless, indeed, they
had ahready been called out by former statutes. The
men thus obtained were to be organised by the pre-
fects of the departments until the 1 9th of November,
and then placed at the disposal of the Minister of
War. All exemptions on social grounds, such as
being the sole support of a family, were abolished.
Only bodily incapacity, and the holding of certain
public offices, were now admitted as grounds for a
dispensation. The Eepublic was to provide for the
families of the Mobiles, and to adopt the children of
those who fell. By the same decree the Minister of
War was empowered to employ all workshops and

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 285

manufactories for the making of arms and other
necessaries of war.

This ordinance, which was described by many as a
call to the masses to rise {levSe en rnasse), although it
was properly only a considerable extension of the con-
scription, was much assailed. It was said : *^ There is
no lack of men, but of what use are they when every-
thing is wanting to prepare and equip them for war,
especially when winter is close upon us ? What end
can be served by such a general calling out of the
masses, when as yet the Mobile Guard is neither
armed nor exercised, and when there are neither
weapons nor leaders even for it; when such of its
men as are summoned are destroyed by idleness ; and
when, up to the present, it has been impossible to
gather round the colours even those men who have
been called out by former decrees ? "

The Government in Tours was not deaf to these
and similar objections raised by the press, and shortly
afterwards elucidated its decree of the 2d of Novem-
ber by another. By this latter one the men already
called out were to constitute a first levy, while those
affected by the decree of the 2d of November were to
form a second. This second levy was to be divided
into three classes — ^the first to include men from 21
to 30 years of age ; the second, those from 31 to 35 ;
and the third, those from 35 to 40, — and these three
classes were to be called up in succession; for the
present only the first.

286 THE WAR FOB THE EHINE FROKTESB.

We will now consider the numbers which Fiance
could place in the field through this most compie-
hensive decree of the 2d of November. Altogether,
France possessed 38 millions of inhabitants, without
including those of her foreign possessions. In eyery
20,000 inhabitants there were 832 men between 20
and 25 years of age, 802 between 25 and 30, and
1475 between 30 and 40. In the whole of France,
therefore, there would be before the war began —

1,580,800 men between 20 and 25 years of age.
1,523,800 „ „ 25 „ 30 „

2,802,500 „ „ 30 „ 40 „

But from the first class (20 to 25 years of age) at
least 200,000 must be subtracted to allow for the
killed in battle, the wounded, and the prisoners, up
to the 1st of November.

From this class again must be taken the men of it
stiU serving in the active army, perhaps 50,000 in
number; also the contingents for the year 1869 and
1870 — ^the first of 60,000 men, the latter, where no
freedom by lot or on account of social position was
allowed, of at the most 160,000 men ; and lastly, in
this class must be included the whole mass of the
Mobile Guard.

The prescribed battalions and batteries of the
Mobile Guard were by this time all called out, even if
they were not in any way completely equipped and
armed. The strength of the battalions on a field-

RECONSTRUCTION OP THE FRENCH ARMT. 28T

footing was most v^ed. The strong battaHons were,
owing to the want of good leaders, of no more value
than the weak, for there was a greater lack of con-
sistency in the former than in the latter. The battal-
ions were arranged in regimente of three each, and
the surplus ones in the different departments were
similarly disposed. The formation of depot-battalions
of the Mobile Guard was also commenced in the pro-
portion of one to every three or four field-battalions.
The idea of now placing these depot-battalions in a
fit state to take the field, and replacing them by newly-
raised ones from the yet disposable masses of this
annual class, was first made mention of in the decree
of the 2d of November ; and its execution was now
taken in hand.

We may assume that in round numbers about
400,000 men were taken, up to the 1st of November,
from the class of men between 20 and 25 years
of age, for the Mobile Guard. The fact that these
had suffered losses — ^for example, in the capitulation
of fortresses— does not concern us here ; and just as
little do we inquire in this place whether all these men
were capable of rendering real service in the field.

H now we add together all these different deduc-
tions, we obtain the number of 870,000 men (of whom
about 600,000 were still forthcoming). As now the
whole class only included 1,580,800 men, and as,
according to the usual calculation, only half of these
could be estimated to be capable of bearing arms; and

288 T^E WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

as^ moreover, owing to the occupation of so many
provinces by the Germans, it may be reckoned that
the Government in Tours could only dispose of at the
most three-quarters of the population, — it is manifest
that in this first class which we are now considering,
notMng more remained to be mobilised

In the second class — ^men from 25 to 30 years of
age— we are first interested in the old soldiers. To
these belong the men of the reserve up to the age of
29, who were called in in the beginning of the war.
Altogether, there were 260,000 such men in this cate-
gory, and of these 150,000 were killed, wounded, or
prisoners. There remained, then, at the most, 1 1 0,000,
and these were in part abeady serving in, or were to
be drafted into, the depots of the active army, to
leaven the masses of Mobile Guards and Mobilised
National Guard, and to restore the special arms of the
service, the cavalry, axtiUery, and engineers.

Deducting the old soldiers, there still remain of the
second class (25 to 30 years of age) 1,264,000 men.
Assuming, as before, the half of these to be fit for
service, we have 632,000 men, and taking the three-
fourths of them obtainable from the uninvaded
territory of France, we have 474,000 men ; and these
really formed the main part of the male population
which remained to be mobilised by the decree of the
2d of November.

These men were to be, in the first place, mobilised
by the prefects, as picked troops of the Sedentary

RECONSTBUCTION OF THE FBENCH ABMT. 289

National Guard. They were formed into battalions,
and these were to be assembled as a rule by threes
into marching legions. This work progressed but
very slowly, and was by no means completed by the
19th of November: in some departments it was
scarcely regularly begun even so late as the end of
December; and in others, again, the scarcity of service-
able weapons was much felt, as the Mobile Guard
had to be first armed. The most backward were cer-
tainly the southern departments, along the coasts of
the Mediterranean and in the Pyrenees ; but there, as
elsewhere, much depended upon the zeal and energy
of the individual prefects.

Of the third class — men between the ages of 30 and
40 — at least 50,000, who had been employed with the
army in various positions, were killed or wounded or
made prisoners of war. The remainder of this class,
then, numbered 2,750,000. Of these, 300,000 old
soldiers may be taken as disposable, although perhaps
the number is estimated rather too high, if it be
remembered that in France many men who have
served always pass from the army into various civil
offices, from that of mayor to that of field-guard, and
that the whole French territory was not free. But
let us accept this number, and there remain then
2,450,000 men of whom we assume the half to be fit
for service — ^that is, 1,225,000 ; from these we must
subtract a quarter for men in the occupied provinces ;

VOL. II. T

290 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

SO that of tilis third class — that is^ of the second and
third divisions of the second levy — ^there remain
918,000 men, of whom 500,000 may be estimated to
belong to the second division (from 31 to 35 years of
age), and 418,000 to the third (from 36 to 40). These
men, when mobilised, would also be embodied as
selections from the Sedentary National Guard, there-
fore as marching legions for the Mobilised National
Guard.

The total number of disposable men in Prance,
without falling back upon those corporeally wa&t,
amounted to 2,302,000 men ; and if of those between
30 and 40 years we only coxmt in the old soldiers
(300,000), it still amounts to 1,384,000.

We have already remarked that the work of mobi-
li«.tion. bemg dependent upon varies conditions
wHoh .;.nnotl, uLntoneo4 "aliped. m«Bt d»»j,
progress gradually ; but here, in addition to this in-
evitable retardation, many of the men bound to serve
became deserters.

In the larger towns it is comparatively easy to
collect the men called out, but in the coimtry it is very
different, especially in remote districts and in moun-
taruous territories, where news barely penetrates, where
but few people can read, where reluctant authorities
display but little zeal, and where perhaps even those
officials who strive to do their duty have not the
means necessary to enforce the law, especially since
the later French Governments have been often obliged

fiECONSTRUCnON OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 291

to employ detachments of the gendarmerie on active
service. When, therefore, in such districts the men
called upon were not possessed with any great desire
to serve, the contingents were very meagre. Many
young men of the better classes left the country. Such
behaviour has been branded, and rightly so, as dis-
graceful ; for certainly all of these absentees could not
urge in justification that they or their paxente were
Bonapartists, and that scruples of conscience prevented
them from serving under the Republic. Still the
number of these fugitives was, after all, but small,
not only because the rich and wealthy are but rela-
tively few in all modem European States, but also
because a Frenchman is more unwilling than any other
European to leave his native country. Much more
considerable was the number of young men of the
better classes who procured freedom from active
service by obtaining, through interest, civilian posts
which exempted them from being called upon to bear
arms, or who entered the numerous, strong, and use-
less staff of the National Guard, either as clerks of the
contractors, or in some other capacity. But still all
these means of escape could not very materially re-
duce the numerical strength, for at the most they who
were able to do these things would only amount to
some tens of thousands ; and therefore, if a great out-
cry arose about these evasions, it was because excep-
tional cases are often the most striking, and offend
most greatly the sense of justice in the masses. And

292 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER-

it must further be remembered that when an entire
nation takes up arms under such circumstances as
the French people did, it is not merely the active
soldiers who have to be considered, but the adminis-
tration, the manufacture and procuring of arms
and articles of equipment absorb much labour, and
workmen of every kind cannot be included in the
category of those physically unfit for service. Lastly,
it must also be borne in mind that the really disposa-
ble forces must necessarily be much disseminated,
that strong bodies are required for local purposea^
such as the defence of Paris, Lyons, Lille, and the
great sea-port towns, and thereby the numbers avail-
able for the composition of the real operating annies
become much reduced It is not therefore a matter
for surprise that these should be relatively weak, and
only increase in strength very gradually.

After all these necessary preliminary remarks, we
will return to the consideration of the separate forma-
tions — ^the Active Army, the Mobile Guard, the Mobi-
lised National Guard (marching legions), and the
Volunteer Corps — and will then add a few notes
about the several armaments of the different forma-
tions, about their organisation in Army Gorps» and
about their camps.

First of all, however, we must turn our attention to
the old soldiers who were forthcoming. We have
seen thjt of these there were —

KECONSTRUCTION OF THB FRENCH ARMY. 293

50^000 in the class between 20 and 25 years of age.
110,000 „ „ 25 and 30

300,000 „ „ 30 and 40

or 460,000 altogether.

To these numbers we may add 20,000 men from
the older classes, over 40 years of age, who were em-
ployed in various positions. We obtain thus 480,000
men in this category ; but however much importance
we may be inclined to attach to this supply, we must
remember that the greater number — ^namely, those
from the age of 30 upwards — had left the army after
the Italian and Crimean wars, and were utterly
ignorant of the use of modem arms ; and, moreover,
the majority had given themselves up to family life,
from which they would sever themselves with regret.
The value of their assistance in actual warfare would
therefore be very doubtful.

From these 480,000 we must deduct at least
80,000 for the formation of the staff of the several
administrative branches, including so much
gendarmerie as was imperatively necessary ;
40,000 for the training of the Mobile Guard ;
50,000 for the training of the Mobilised National

Guard ;
80,000 indispensable for the Sedentary National
Guard, the later mobilisation of a greater part
of which was anticipated. There remained.

294 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FROimSB.

then, 220^000 old soldiers to be distributed
among the troops of the active army.
In addition to these, there would be 220,000 con-
scripts of the two classes of 1869 and 1870, and these
440,000 men would form for the present the active
army. All other troops — ^Mobile Guard, Mobilised
National Guard, and Volunteers — must be designated
as the auxiliary army. Of the active army, again, a
part was localised, for example, in the defence of Paris
and in the depots. If we estimate the troops thus
detained at but 120,000, there remain only 320,000
men of the active army to form the operating armies.
To these we must add the Mobile Guard, who, indud-
ing the old soldiers employed to form the cadres,
would amount to 350,000 men. But of these, again,
at least 100,000, including the defenders of Paris,
were localised by various circumstances ; so that alto-
gether 570,000 men would be able gradually to take
the field before the end of 1870. And we must here
passingly remark that the conscripts of 1869 and
1870 were, in regard to their military education, in
no way better than the Mobile Guard, and that, more-
over, the above-named mass could not be collected at
one point.

The first division of the second levy (men from 21
to 30 years of age), 530,000 men, including the old
soldiers employed in forming them, must be regarded
as being during the whole of 1870 essentially in a
state of formation. It is true that before the expira-

EECONSTRUCTION OP THE FRENCH ARMY. 295

tion of the year, individual marching legions of the
Mobilised National Guard were actually called up to
the battle-field ; but these were quite exceptional and
chance occurrences, and may be neglected in consider-
ing the general state of a£fairs. As a rule, these men
of the first division were assembled together in forti-
fied camps as soon as they were in any degree organ-
ised. They were destined to defend for the present
these positions, which were not immediately threat-
ened, while their training and armament could be
completed there; and, therefore, these Mobilised
National Guard cannot be considered when calculat-
ing the strength of the operating army in 1870.

Included in the before - mentioned formations,
and composed for the most part of men of the same
ages as were those who formed the mass of them,
various bodies of more or less irregular troops
sprung up under the names of Franc-tireurs, Eclair-
eurs, and Volunteers. Such bodies had existed
almost since the beginning of the war ; and although
on the one hand it must be admitted that they in
some places rendered good service by disturbing the
communications of the Germans, still on the other it
cannot be concealed that many individuals willingly
joined these corps in order to evade the obligation to
serve in the regular army by performing merely a
nominal duty in them ; that the discipline in these
small formations, which were often dressed and
decorated in a most strange manner, and bore most

296 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

ridiculous titles, left much to be desired ; and that^
moreover, they often, owing to their more than loose
proceedings, rather hindered than aided the regular
troops. The interference, therefore, of the Government
to regulate these various corps, and to assign to each
one its specific post, soon became necessary, but still
even this could not effect all that was to be wished.

The Government of National Defence also allowed
foreigners to enter the service of France. The most
distinguished of those who offered their swords to the
Republic was Garibaldi. Those who knew him were
more than a little astonished at this, for they remem-
bered how often and how fiercely he had expressed
his hatred of the French, not merely of the Emperor
Napoleon, and how this animosity had become doubly
violent since his native town, Nice, had been united
to France. But Garibaldi arrived in Tours a few
days affcer the advent of M. Gambetta there, and
received the command over the collective irregular
troops in the Vosges, and also of a brigade of the
Mobile Guard. Under his leadership many corps of
foreigners sprung up, of Italians, Poles, and Spani-
ards, but they were certainly of very inconsiderable
strength, not at all corresponding to the high-sound-
ing titles which they generally assumed. We shall
later on see Garibaldi active in the east ; but we may
here remark that, from the very outset of his career
in France, he encountered much opposition. The
chief adversaries of this declared enemy of Papacy

RECONSTRUCTION OP THE FRENCH ARMY. 297

were among the clergy; and the followers of Garibaldi,
by interfering in matters which in reality concerned
the French alone, instead of devoting their whole
attention to combating the Germans, put many wea-
pons into the hands of their clerical adversaries,
estranging thereby the masses, who on the whole are
in France very faithful children of the Church.

Infantry is in case of need the easiest arm to im-
provise. but wili. the special axms the caae is different.
Frenchmen, like other civilised people generally, are
not a nation of horsemen. The improvisation of
mounted volunteers which was undertaken produced
therefore very meagre results, and the Government of
National Defence was practically obliged to fall back
for cavalry upon the reconstruction of the old regi-
ments, which, however, were now only forthcoming in
the depots and in a few rescued ruins. In this work,
the old soldiers who had served in the cavalry rendered
good aid. But not only was there a want of trained
horses, which could not be procured in a moment by
requisition, but there was also a scarcity of saddlery ;
and this it was impossible to remedy by means of
French labour alone, owing to the cessation of business
which resulted from the hurried calling-out of the
whole male population. It was, therefore, necessary
to procure the requisite saddlery and horse-furniture
elsewhere, and it was consequently bought abroad,
especially in England, even in small quantities of a
hundred pieces. This horse equipment was, moreover.

298 THE WAB FOB THE BHINE FBONTISB.

often of very bad workmanship^ so that it was neces-
sary to alter and repair much of it in Franca It must
therefore be regarded as a great achievement that, be-
fore the end of 1870, sixty of the old regiments, each
consisting of two weak field squadrons, or of 200 men,
were again in a state to take the field. It natnrally
follows that the same number of horsemen could not be
apportioned to each of the newly-instituted Corps that
was assigned to a like formation in its normal state un-
der the Empira But the Government had yet another
means of supply. This existed in Algeria^ whence con-
siderable reinforcements were drawn for the regiments
of Spahis, troops which in the cavalry hold the same
place with regard to the Chasseur d'Afrique that the
Turcos do to the Zouaves in the infantry. Moreover,
free Bedouin hordes (Gums) were enlisted for cavalry
service on French soil — a measure which perhaps for
the interest of European civilisation it would have
been better not to have adopted, and which we be-
lieve, seeing how badly it had fared with the Turcos
employed by the Empire, could have been omitted
without loss, if a so much the greater activity had
been developed in France itself. But who can call
desperation to account, especially when the con-
duct of war by Europeans assumes ever more and
more the character of that of savages ?

Artillery is in general easier to obtain than cavalry;
men are required as drivers who understand horses
without it being necessary that they should be per-

KBCONSTRUCnON OF THE FEENCH AKMY. 299

feet masters of the art of riding ; and gunners may
readily be obtained from among mechanics, if a proper
selection be made, and too high scientific attainments
are not demanded. In all ages it has been proved
that a good artillery, especially in insurrectionary
armies, is more easily obtained than good infantry ;
the great difficulty is in providing the TmUriel

In the new formation of the French artillery, the
Government had to rely for its first line upon the
depots which were still existing, and upon the ruins of
the old Imperial batteries. The old soldiers who had
formerly served in them aflforded a good nucleus.
But as the opinion had become general in France,
and by no means wrongly, that the Germans owed
their victories in a very great degree to their numer-
ous artillery and to its good employment, and as the
new army was by no means to be composed solely of
troops belonging to the former active forces, it became
necessary to make an appeal to the living forces of
the nation, which would bring about that decen-
tralisation in the departments which the existing cir-
cumstances required. Consequently, as early as the
5th of November the institution of departmental
batteries was decreed. By the edict then promulgated,
each department was to supply a battery of 6 guns
for every 100,000 men of its population, and as the
Government still ruled over some 30,000,000 of
Frenchmen, this would give 300 batteries, or 1800
guns, a number sufficient for an army of 600,000

300 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

men. The supply of guns, which were by preference
to be of the English 7-pounder Beffjre system, although
other models were not excluded, was to be obtained
from all available sources by the interposition of the
State, both by employing the State foundries of land
and sea service ordnance, by enlisting private indus-
try, and by purchasing abroad. The gun-caniageai,
limbers, harness, and horse-furniture were to be simi-
larly procured, and it was not to be considered neces-
sary to adhere rigidly to any one pattern for all these
things. The harness especially was to be obtained
where any could be found, and in the state in which
it was used in the district where it was procured, and
afterwards improved by repairing any glaring defi-
ciencies, and at the same time rendered if practicable
in some degree uniform.

These somewhat desperate endeavours were the
more justifiable, as young infantry who had yet to be
accustomed to fire, and that in the face of modern
arms of precision, would certainly require a numerous
artillery to support them and prepare the way for
their action. As a matter of fact, the results in this
case also did not immediately follow the order ; still
much was achieved — ^more even than any one could
have expected who considered the difficulties of the
undertaking, although he might have had the greatest
confidence in the love of country, the readiness to
make sacrifices, and the energy of the French people.

Engineers are also easily improvised in a national

DIVISION OP THE COUNTRY INTO FOUR DISTRICTS. 301

war. They are obtained by simply placing every
skilled mechanic and labourer in his proper place.
In every department a committee of defence was
formed under the presidency of the prefect and
of the general commanding, and this had essentially
the task of finding out and of applying every means
by which the advance of the Germans in this or that
direction could be hindered. They had to arrange all
the works of demolition and of intrenchment, and at
the same time to discover and arrange means of com-
munication for the detachments of the French forces,
using as instruments the newly-created bodies of
engineers.

The distribution of the country into territorial mili-
tary divisions and subdivisions was retained intact.
The generals commanding these were intrusted with
everything relating to the organisation and command
of the bodies of troops in their districts. Moreover,
in the middle of October, the whole of France, with
the exception of Paris, was divided into four general
governments which essentially corresponded with the
four marshalships or chief commands of the army of
the Empire. The four governorships were established
for the regions : 1, of the north, with the headquar-
ters at Lille ; 2, of the west, with the headquarters at
Mans; 3, of the centre, with the headquarters at
Bourges; 4, of the east, with the headquarters at
6esan9on. The command of the north was given to
General Bom-baki, who, having left Metz originally

302 THE WAR FOR THB RHINE FRONTIER.

with the intention or wish of negotiating with the
Empress Eugenie, had found, as soon as lie had
arrived at the enjoyment of liberty, that this was
impossible or useless, and had placed himself at the
disposal of the delegation of the Government in Tours.
He could not, however, succeed in making himself
popular in his new office, and was soon relieved, and
employed in a more suiteble maimer.

The west was to be commanded by General Fi^rek
of the artillery ; the centre by General de Polhes, the
same who commanded the brigade in the action of
Mentana ; and the east by General Cambriels. This
last officer had been wounded at Sedan before the
capitulation, and that so severely that he was obliged
to be afterwards trepanned. He had then, when
somewhat recovered, repaired to Tours, certainly
never suspecting that he, in his case, would be de-
clared by the Germans to have broken the conditions
of the capitulation. In his command he soon became
involved in questions of precedence with Garibaldi,
and troubled by these, and also by the state of his
health, tendered his resignation. He was at first suc-
ceeded by General Michel, but he also could not re-
main long in the command of Besan9on, and had to
be elsewhere employed, whereupon the governorship
of the east died out. The generals commanding these
several regions were to collect the war forces of their
territories as much as possible and organise them,
without it being expected that such troops should im-

COMPOSITION OP THE NEW ARMY CORPS. 303

mediately be converted into field armies, the Govern-
ment rather reserving to itself the power of calling
them out as requisite, and of specially appointing
their commanders.

The Army Corps which were gradually formed out-
side Paris numbered from th,e 15th upwards. The
12th Corps we saw disappear at Sedan; the 13th,
failing to arrive in time to take part in the battle, had
returned to Paris after the catastrophe. Meanwhile
the formation of another Corps, the 14th, had been
commenced in Paris, and although affairs soon became
so changed in the capital that there could no longer
be anything said of a 13th or 14th Corps, this explains
how it came to pass that the Departmental Corps
began with the number 15.

The Army Corps in the departments were composed
essentially on the same principle as those of the Em-
pire had been — ^that is, a Corps was, as a rule, to be
formed of three divisions of infantry and one divi-
sion of cavahy, and to these were to be added as many
batteries as circumstances might permit; and this last
condition was doubly and trebly necessary, as all the
Corps would be composed of young troops. The
divisions of infantry were composed of the marching
regiments formed since the end of July, and not yet
destroyed ; of regiments of infantry newly raised at
the depots, numbered from 101 upwards; of marching
battalions of Rifles, Zouaves, and Turcos ; and then
of regiments of the Mobile Guard. As a rule, a

304 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

regiment of the active army, gathered together in
some way or other, was joined with one of the
Mobile Guard to form a brigade of infantry.

However high the numbers on the ration list of one
of these new Army Corps may have been, its service-
able strength cannot be estimated at more than 30,000
men, of whom, on the average, 2000 were horsemen.
The number of guns in such a Corps, including mit-
raiUeuses, may sometimes have amounted to 100;
but this cannot be taken as true for all of them.
Sometimes also, in the days which immediately fol-
lowed, the strength of a Corps may have increased to
something greater than the numbers we have given,
through chance reinforcements of a local nature^ but
no permanent or lasting alteration was effected by
these additions.

On the 25th of November, Oambetta ordered the
formation of eleven camps of instruction and defence,
though some of these had practically been already
called into existence. The eleven were : 1, at Hel-
faut (St Omer) ; 2, Cherbourg ; 3, La Rochelle ; 4,
Bordeaux (St Medard) ; 5, Toulouse ; 6, Montpelli^ ;
7, Pas des Lanciers, near Marseilles; 8, Sathonay,
near Lyons; 9, Clermont-Ferrand (Gergovia); 10,
Nevers; 11, Conlie, near Le M^ns. In these camps
the Mobilised National Guard were to be assembled ;
and first, the 1st division of the second levy — 530,000
men, according to our calculation — ^and then the Mo-
bile Guard, and such troops of the active army as

CAMPS OF INSTRUCTION. 305

were not yet ready to take the field, together with
the necessary complements of the special anns. More-
over, these camps, although in the beginning only
destined for the defence of important points and for
instruction, were also to be employed as places for
the organisation of divisions and Corps capable of
taking the field. Each camp was, as a rule, to be
constructed for 60,000 men ; but the four which were
adjacent to the seaboard — ^namely, those of St Omer,
Cherbourg, La RocheUe, and Pas des Lanciers — ^were
to be capable of containing 250,000 men each.

If, then, this strength of troops was brought simul-
taneously into the respective camps, there would be a
force of 1,420,000 men assembled in them. These
numbers have been much ridiculed, but it was not in
reality the idea of the Minister of War that all the in-
dicated camps should at one and the same time receive
the forces assigned to them, but only that they should
be so arranged as to be able to accommodate them in
case the necessity should arise. And this idea was cer-
tainly not irrational. The camps which rested on the
sea would be comparatively easily provisioned from
abroad, even under the most difficult circumstances.
Army Corps, or even an army itself, might, when
hardly pressed, be compelled to take refuge in one or
other of them ; and as regards the camps not situated
near the coast, it might very possibly become neces-
sary, by the calling up of the second and third classes
of the second levy, to shelter in any individual one —

VOL. II. u

306 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

not in all simultaneously — at least 60,000 men. The
arrangement must therefore be judged from this point
of view.

The camp of Toulouse, or the camp of the south-
west army, was formed as early as the 12th of No-
vember : General Demay, an old artillery officer, was
appointed commandant. With him were associated
as commissaries, with the rank of generals of division,
MM. Lissagary and Perrin, men who, up to that time,
had only made themselves known as club orators, and
were perfectly innocent of the slightest military educa-
tion. This camp was also intended to arouse some-
what the organising activity of those parts, which
was certainly by no means so conspicuous as was
desirable.

Soon after Gambetta left Paris, he was followed,
also in a balloon, by M. K^ratry, who, having resigned
the office of Prefect of Police, was now intrusted with
the formation of the camp of Conlie, in which the
Mobile Guard and the Mobilised National Guard of
Brittany were to be assembled. The population of
Brittany has remained even to the present day some-
what isolated. Among other characteristics it has still
retained its devotedness to the Church ; and it was in
some degree a comical sight to see men who were in
no way religious, demeaning themselves like saints
of the calendar in order to gain influence over the
people. Even M. Cr^mieux behaved like a Christian.
K^ratry, without altogether thus adapting himself

WANT OP OFFICERS. 307

to circumstances, displayed great zeal, and by his
activity and good sense succeeded, by the end of
November, in collecting about 40,000 men — 47 bat-
talions and 9 batteries, — ^but shortly afterwards he
gave in his resignation, owing to conflicts which arose
between Gambetta and himaelf, and was succeeded in
his command by General de Marivault

The want of educated officers in this mass of new
organisations soon made itself keenly felt To remedy,
then, this evil, and also to acquire the power to
place fit mea in the higher posts, unhindered by
former regulations, the Government in the latter
part of October suspended by a decr-ee tihe customary
laws of promotion for llie duration of the war. Ex-
traordinary promotions could now be made, either for
services rendered or for proved capabiUty, and mili-
tary rank oould also be given to persons who did not
belong to the army, but this only provisionally and
for the period of the war, the definite confirmation in
such cases depending upon the after-rservices rendered.
This measure was necessary, but it is quite another
question, and one which cannot be answered alto-
gether in the affirmative, whether the Government
ever made a sufficient use of the power thus accorded
it. A very welcome supply, especially for the higher
posts of the new land army, was afibrded by the
many able marine t^fficers, who, owing to the course
the war had taken, could no longer be employed
upon their proper element.

308 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The notices we have here given wiU suffice to ei
plain the organisations adopted up to the year 1871,
excepting always the special ones arranged in Paris,
which require special consideration ; so that we can
now follow the operations for a long time without
any considerable interruptions. In the rektion of
these, it will probably become apparent that the
French did not achieve with their organisatioDS all
that people who did not care to regard minutely the
numbers and actual circumstances, might have ex-
pected from them. But he who gives heed to these
things will be constrained to confess that the French,
under the guidance of the Eepublie, far exceeded
his expectations, however great may have been his
opinion of their patriotism and energy. It maybe
that certain German doctors and journalists may still
dare to talk of the French as a people rotten to the
core, but we are convinced that German soldiers at
least do not hold such language.

309

CHAPTER XXXII.

MILITARY EVENTS IN AND ABOUT PARIS FROM THE 1ST OP
OCTOBER TO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER.

The first half of October passed away very tran-
quilly around Paris, Both parties were deliberating,
and preparing themselves for coming events.

We have already pointed out that the Germans
at first calculated upon obtaining possession of the
French capital in a very short time. They counted
upon internal dissent, and upon the unstable footing
of the existing Government. Was it not to be fore-
seen that parties would rise up against it, and that in
anticipation of the horrors and privations of the siege,
to which this Government wished to expoge the in-
habitants of Paris, these factions would overthrow the
authorities and surrender the town to the Germans ?
And in truth the Government of National Defence
had many enemies; from its very birth demonstra-
tions had been made against it. But on all such
occasions the patriotism of the Parisians manifested
itself gloriously; and thousands of men, who were
anything but friends of the Government, supported

310 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

and maintained it, in order not to present to the
world abroad the spectacle of internal dissension in
the hour of danger.

When M. Favre returned to Paris after the inter-
view of Ferri^res, and announced that nothing re-
mained for France but to continue the combat and
prepare to do battle, and when the whole population,
hearing these things, instead of shrinking back, joined
joyfully in the cry, the Germans were compelled to
confess to themselves that they could no longer cal-
culate upon a speedy triumphal entry into Paris in
consequence of internal discord. They therefore,
after the beginning of October, determined to employ
other means ; and on the 6th of October the King of
Prussia removed his headquarters from Ferriferes to
Versailles, to be nearer to the German lines.

It had now become apparent that Paris could only
be reduced by one of three means : either by a simple
blockade, by a bombardment^ or by a regular siege ;
and the adoption of one or other of these must depend
upon the length of time for which the town was pro-
visioned. This was not accurately known by any
one, but it was certain that there could not be a
suflBcient supply for any lengthened period, especially
of fresh meat, and of milk, butter, eggs, &c. It was
calculated, and, as it was afterwards proved, rightly,
that these would fall short before the 15th of Nov-
ember. After that date, then, the Parisians, if they
held out longer, would have to submit to great and

PARIS FKOM OCT. 1 TO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER. 311

unwonted privations. If they could endure these,
they might certainly maintain themselves for a much
longer time. But no one in Europe believed that
they possessed such patient endurance in that way
as they afterwards showed. Correspondents in Paris
described the situation in rosy tints, although even
before the end of October much misery began to be
experienced. At that time, it is true, there were still
provisions of aU kinds ; but prices had risen to the
highest rates, and but few people were able to procure
any culinary luxuries, or anything beyond the barest
necessaries of life. The men under arms still received
regular though scanty rations, and could not complain
of want; but it is well known how much female
labour is employed in every way in Paris, and now
that all business was stopped, the occupation of women
was suspended also, They could no longer earn any-
thing ; and want began to press heavily on them and
their children, even before the supply of any of the
necessaries of life was at all e^austed — before a single
horse had been slaughtered, or before it had become
necessary to fall bacl^ upon donkeys, dogs, cats, rats,

and the wild animals of the Jardin des Plantes. The

authorities of Paris did very much to secure the in-
dispensable means of subsistence to the needy classes;
but, as can easUy be understood, the most earnest
endeavours were insufficient to accomplish all that
was requisite in so large a town.

After the investment by the Germans was com-

312 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

pleted, the fundamental idea in all the militaiy opera-
tions of France could be nothing else than the relief of
Paris. The longer the town held out, so much the more
time would the departments gain to create armies for
that purpose. But these must not delay their arriyal
too long. The great danger was that they might come
to the rescue just an hour too late ; another, although
a lesser danger, was that they might only arrive in
the supreme hour, — for it was desirable that the
Parisian army should co-operate from mthin with the
relieving forces ; and if hunger had already exercised
its dejecting effects upon the former, it could hardly
be hoped that it would be able to act with any great
energy. The policy of the Paris correspondents, then,
in giving such favourable descriptions of the state of
Paris, even to the extent of stating at times that the
town could hold out for years, was undoubtedly bad ;
for in many of the departments men believed only
too readily that there was no need for great haste in
preparing the forces to relieve Paris, and it certainly
was not necessary or expedient to confirm them in
their error. Had not the whole of France entertained
most illusory ideas as to the time that Metz would be
able to hold out ? and was not the bewildered sm-
prise with which the news of its fall was received
greatly owing to the way in which these illusions had
been nourished ?

Paris was certainly much more favourably circum-
stanced than Metz had been. It was not burdened

PARIS FROM OCT. 1 TO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER. 313

with an army entirely disproportionate to its popu-
lation, and it had much more time to make prepara-
tions. But in any ease it was more prudent to
endeavour to bring about the relief of Paris as
speedily as possible than to calmly defer the attempt
for an uncertain time.

In the beginning of October, Count Bismark ad-
dressed a circular to the North German representa-
tives at the Courts of the Great Powers, in which
he pointed out the terrible consequences which might
ensue if Paris did not surrender until compelled to
do so by the bitter pangs of hunger. If the town
fell under such circumstances, there could be no
doubt that famine would ere then have slain its
tens of thousands ; and even if after the capitulation
the German leaders were minded to do their utmost
to pour provisions into the French capital, still —
because they must first think of the requirements
of their own armies, and because of the great diffi-
culty of communications — obstacles would arise
which would postpone for a long time any efiectual
reprovisioning of the town.

It was, however, impossible for the Germans to
fix any definite term within which Paris must sur-
render through want of provisions. In such a
calculation, errors, which might amount to months,
could not be avoided, and thus it was impossible
for the investing force not to bethink itself of other
means by which to force the French capital to yield

314 THE WAK FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

itself or which at the least would strengthen the
effect of a simple blockade.

The prolongation of the resistance of Paris would
not merely in itself prolong the resistance of France
also, but it would likewise give time to the depart-
ments to form new organisations ; and therefore the
sooner Paris was compelled to surrender, so much
the better for the Germans. Moreover, winter was
at hand, and would inevitably demand great sacri-
fices. The German leaders gained some comfort from
the reflection that they would be able to more easily
protect the troops from its ravages by warm clothing,
and by employing the accommodation at hand, be-
cause the majority of the men came from colder cli-
mates, and would probably find the winter before Paris
milder than they were accustomed to at home. This
assumption, however, proved to be incorrect, as the
winter from 1870 to 1871 was unusually severe, and
the inclement weather began very early. Moreover,
the troops upon outpost duty could only be very incom-
pletely sheltered from the rigours of the season, how-
ever carefully measures to that end might be under-
taken ; and the extent to which guard must be kept,
and consequently the amount of work the Germans
must necessarily do, depended solely upon the activ-
ity of the defenders of Paris.

The means of which we have spoken for forcing
Paris to surrender were, besides a blockade, a bom-
bardment and a regular siege.

PARIS FROM OCT. 1 TO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER. 315

It cannot be denied that a great aversion was
manifested throughout Europe to the idea of a bom-
bardment of Paris. Paris, it is true, was a fortress,
and must therefore be prepared for the employment
against itself of the violent means of which an
enemy customarily avails himself to subdue a fortified
place ; but still Paris is by no means only a fortress.
The pride of the Germans might resist the idea of
acknowledging that Paris meant more for Europe
than other capitals — than Berlin, for example; but
stiU they did acknowledge it, let them jeer as they
might at Victor Hugo when he called Paris the
" Holy Town." But disregarding this, and assuming
that neither sentimentality nor regard for the public
opinion of Europe had any influences upon the deci-
sions of the German headquarters, and that, on the
contrary, it based its resolutions solely upon military
grounds, still the enormous dimensions of Paris, and
the extent of the girdle which its detached forts
formed, rendered a bombardment extremely difficult ;
and if it had failed when employed against Strasburg
— a town surrounded by a simple enceinte — ^how
could any good result be expected jfrom it, in and by
itself, against Paris ? In any case, it certainly could
not be carried on from field-guns alone. A numerous
park of the heaviest siege-ordnance must be brought
up, which must at the least be more powerful than
was necessary against Strasburg These heavy guns,
together with a large supply of ammunition, must be

316 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

transported from the interior of Germany, for the
most part along roads which were anything but safe,
and which could only be traversed by day with the
employment of every possible precautionary measure.
Such a work, carried on partly along railroads, and
partly along country roads, which had not been con-
structed for such heavy trafl&c, would under the most
favourable circumstances occupy much time. More-
over, unless the Germans previously obtained posses-
sion of some of the detached forts, or at all events
could by some means contrive to render it impossible
for them to keep up a fire worth naming, it would be
barely possible to approach sufficiently near to the
town itself to damage it seriously by their cannonade,
and so promote any disposition to surrender which
might exist among the inhabitants.

Such being the state of things, we find it difficult
to conceive why the German leaders did not from
the outset resolve to besiege the town regularly, and
why they did not make the necessary preparations
from the first moments of the investment. The
regular attack must in the first case be directed
against some of the detached forts, for the siege of
the main enceinte could only be undertaken after
several of these had fallen. Now, it is indubitable
that a regular attack against two or more of these
detached works could be commenced with a much
less artillery mat&riel than a bombardment of Paris
itself ; for in order that the latter might gain its end,

PARIS FROM OCT. 1 TO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER. 317

it would be indispensable to open fire upon the
town simultaneously on all sides. It would not be
sufficient to strive to make an impression upon any
one fixed point> and therefore it would be necessary
to have an enormous supply of ammunition at hand
before commencing the cannonade, lest it should
come to pass that, after two or three days' work, the
lack of stores might compel a cessation of the firing,
which would expose the Germans to ridicule, and
redouble the courage of the besieged*

But the case would be quite difierent were a
regular siege undertaken* This must be commenced
against the detached forts — ^against perhaps three of
them ; or if the siege matSriel sufficed, it might be
set about as it was at Strasburg. The operation could
certainly be begun by the middle of October; and
the fall of some of the detached forts would in any
case be a gain, even should it afterwards become
apparent that a regular attack on the main enceinte
was no longer necessary or expedient. The previous
capture of some of the works also would, under any
circumstances, facilitate a bombardment; and even
should this not seem desirable, their feJl would ren-
der the taking of other adjacent forts easier, and
would a... Jin bringing aLt . closer inve,tn,ene
of the capital, and a more complete command of it
from without, which would tend to increase the moral
depression of the inhabitants.

Whoever studies the matter carefully and impar-

318 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

tially will be obliged to confess that the Germans
were not in any way so well prepared to cany on war
against fortresses as to execute field operations ; and
that, moreover, in their calculations they came upon
unexpected factors which had been created by the con-
version of the K"apoleonic war into the French.

In the beginning of October, Trochu occupied him-
self chiefly with the interior military organisation of
the forces assembled in Paris, and with the formation of
troops capable of fighting without the walls in order to
enlarge the extent of territory held by the defenders, or
to be prepared for a sortie m ma^ when a reUeving
army should draw near. About the 10th of October
news arrived in Paris of considerable movements in
the blockading force, and of the departure of some
of its troops to the soutk From general appearances
and from special information, it could be concluded
that these had marched away to reinforce the army
of observation which the Germans had been obliged to
detach to watch the formation of the relieving forces ;
and if this was the case, it might with justice be
further concluded that the organisation of such armies
had already made some advance: whether this was
considerable or not would become apparent if it were
ascertained whether the Germans had detached so
many troops as to materially weaken the investments
To obtain more information on this point, General
Trochu ordered a great sortie to be undertaken on
1 3th of October, under the leadership of General Vinoy,

SORTIE ON THE 13TH OF OCTOBER. 319

who placed the troops which were to be principally
and reaUy employed in the enterprise under the com-
mand of General Blanchard.

On the morning of the 13th, then> Vinoy caused a
heavy fire to be opened from the three forts, Issy,
Vanvres, and Montrouge, behind which the main re-
serve was posted, against th^ heights of Clamart After
this had been continued for some time, the sortie troops
were pushed forward — a marchii^ battalion on the
right wiQg against Clamart, a brigade under General
Susbielle in the centre against Cbatillon, and two bat-
talions of the Mobile Guard, under Lieutenant-Colonel
de Grancey, on the left from Montrouge against Bag-
neux. At first the French met with but slight resist-
ance, and penetrated without much diflSculty into
Bagneux and Chatillon, taking possession also of the
stone-quarries (De Calvents) between the last village
and Clamart ; but General von Hartmann, commander
of the 2d Bavarian Corps, having succeeded after awhile
in deploying many of his troops and in posting his
batteries, compelled them again to retire. The losses
of the Bavarians in killed^ wounded, and missing
after this aflfair, amounted to 388, of whom 10 were
officers, while the French give theirs as " inconsider-
able ; " but as it had been reported in Paris that the
Bavarians had marched away, and as, nevertheless,
the sortie was resisted by them. General Trochu was
thereby led to form a false conclusion, as we shall
hereafter see.

320 THE WAK FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER,

On the same day on which this sortie was made,
the French from Mont Valerien set fire to the Palace
of St Cloud ; and during the following days the
advanced troops of the 6 th North Grerman Corps
posted between Chevilly and Choisy le Roi were
frequently alarmed by movements from Villejuif

On the 21st of October a yet larger sortie was
undertaken, and this time upon the peninsula of
Nanterre, being directed mainly against Malmaiaon,
La Jonchfere, and Bougival. The first line of the
attacking force was composed of three columns : the
right one, under General Berthaut, between the Seine
and the Cherbourg highway ; the centre, under Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Cholleton, to the east of Sueil ; while
the third on the left, under General Noel, issued
from the south of Mont Valerien. The three columns
together contained 6400 men and forty-eight guns,
and were supported by two reserves of together 4600
men and forty-six guns, the one in rear of the right
at Nanterre, under General Paturel, and the other in
rear of the left at La Fouilleuse, under General
Martenot The cannon of Fort Mont Valerien, and
the gun -boats on the Seine from their station at
SurSnes, were to open fire at noon ; the artillery of
the first line was then to attack, and after it had
played for some time the infantry was to advance,
but the latter was expressly forbidden to push for-
ward beyond the heights of La Jonch^re. An ex-
tensive system of signalling, such as is usually only

SORTIE ON THE 2 1ST OF OCTOBER. 321

employed in exercising manoeuvres, was also arranged
in the dispositions; but it is difficult to conceive
what was the real object of this sortie, unless indeed
it was merely and solely intended to accustom the
young troops to being under fire. The men who
were engaged in it belonged to the newly-formed
14th Army Corps, under General Ducrot, who him-
self conducted the manoeuvre*

The cannonade from Mont Valerien and from the
gun-boats on the Seine rendered the Prussians on the
alert betimes, and the French, in their advance over
the descent which slopes down from St Cucufa to
Malmaison, encountered an organised resistance from
the 10th division of the 5th North German Corps.
These troops were immediately supported by several
battalions of the landwehr of the Guard, the division
of which had been occupied at the siege of Strasburg,
and after its fall had been called up into the neigh-
bourhood of Versailles, to St Germain en Laye and
Port Marly. Moreover, the artillery of the 4th Corps
also took part in the combat, firing from the peninsula
of Argenteuil, and the 9th division of the 5th Corps
posted itself as a reserve for the 10th division. As
a decided advance of the French was not prescribed
in the dispositions for the sortie, the battle was
limited to a useless, but by no^ means bloodless,
musketry engagement along the line from La Jon-
ch^re to the Porte du Longboyau. The real combat
was finished by about five o'clock in the afternoon,

VOL. IL X

322 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

but a cannonade was kept up from Fort Mont Vale-
lien until 6.30 p.m.

On the 28 th of October General de Bellemare at-
tacked the village of Le Bourget on the Molette brook
from La Coumeuve and AuberviUiers, and obtained
possession of it by surprise. The Prussians, who had
only occupied it with a small force, were compelled to
evacuate it; and the French established themselves
in it, and placed it in a state of defence. The affair
was in itself of no great importance, but apparently
the Prussians were vexed that they had allowed
themselves to be attacked unawares, and therefore
even on the 29th they made various eflForts with
small detachments to retake the village, and they
also opened fire upon it with their artillery. These
detached endeavours not having succeeded, on the
following morning — the 30th — ^the whole of the 2d
division of infantry of the Guard, and several other
detachments of troops, were concentrated for the re-
conquest of Le Bourget. The force was drawn up in
three columns : in the first line — on the right wing
two battalions of the Emperor Francis' Grenadier
Regiment, under Major von Derenthal, at Dugny; in
rear of them at Bonneuil the 2d regiment of Uhlans
of the Guard, and at Amouville all the artillery of
the 2d division of the Guard that was not employed
elsewhere ; in the centre at Pont Iblon on the Mor^
stream, Colonel Count Kanitz with four battalions of
Queen Augusta's and Queen Elizabeth's Regiments, a

FIGHT FOR LE BOURGET ON THE 30TH OF OCT. 323

company of pioneers of the Guard, and three horse-
artillery batteries of the Guard; on the left wing,
under Colonel von Zeuner, at Le Blanc Mesnil,
two battalions of the Emperor Alexander's Grenadier
Eegiment, three companies of the battalion of Rifles
of the Guard, and two batteries of the 2d division of
the Guard. All troops of the 2d division of the
Guard not mentioned here held the outposts along
the line 8tains-Dugny-Pont-Iblon-Le Blanc Mesnil,
while a few battalions of the Ist division of the
Guard were brought up and formed into a reserve for
the 2d division.

At 8 A.M. the three horse-artillery batteries at Pont
Iblon gave the signal for the commencement of the
battle by opening fire directly upon Le Bourget (3000
paces). Simultaneously with this, Colonel Zeuner
crossed the Mor^e with his two battalions, having the
two batteries on his right covered by the three com-
panies of the Kifles of the Guard, and moved against
Drancy, in order to advance thence against the south
side of Le Bourget. As soon as they had crossed the
Mor^e they opened fire upon Le Bourget, and Drancy,
being but weakly occupied by the French, was evacu-
ated without resistance, so that Zeuner was able to
turn at once against Le Bourget. The columns com-
manded by Derenthal and Kanitz advanced at 8.30
A.M. in the direction of Le Bourget, the three batteries
of the horse-artillery of the Guard firing uninterrupt-
edly over the latter one. These two bodies of troops.

824 THE WAR FOR THE RHtKE FRONTIER.

together with the column under Zeuner, entered Le
Bourget almost simultaneously, soon after 9 a.)L
The struggle for the village was extremely stubbomlj
fought out ; house by house was contested ; and the
combat lasted for four hours — that is, until nearly 1
P.M. The losses on both sides were very great. The
Prussians, according to their own account^ lost 500
men, among whom were the colonels of the Elizabeth
and Augusta Regiments, Herr Zaluskowski and Count
Waldersee. The French on their side lost many
prisoners, as must always be the case in an obstinate
local defence where no reserves are at hand.

No great importance can be attached to the gain or
loss of such a point as Le Bourget in itself, for the
possession of the village might firequently be contested
in the course of events. That its loss on the present
occasion created a very bad impression in Paris, must
be mainly attributed to the fact that the authorities
and journals in the capital had loudly proclaimed that
its gain was an immense advantage. To this feeling
also was added the excitement caused by the an-
nouncement of the negotiations of Thiers with Bis-
mark ; and thus the loss of Le Bourget contributed to
cause the manifestation of the tSlst of October, the
particulars of which we have before related.

During the early days of November a certain still-
ness again reigned around Paris. No more sorties of
any importance were attempted ; for the Government
.of National Defence was fully occupied, partly in de-

PARIS IN THE BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER. 325

termining its position with regard to the inhabitants
of Paris, partly in reorganising the forces of the capital.
But long before, as early as the beginning of October,
Greneral Trochu had been more than a little attacked
because of his inactivity. He had already answered
these charges on the 15th of October in a letter to
the mayors of the twenty arrondissements of Paris, in
which he explained that it was impossible to under^
take, unpunished, large sorties with the first crowds
which could be collected, without proper arms, and
without sufficient artillery; and that he was, even at
that moment, striving to procure troops fit in their
armament to attempt great enterprises, and also in
some degree disciplined and unconditionally subject
to military law. In his organisation he always fol-
lowed the principle of taking volunteers for service
outside the ramparts from the battalions of the Seden-
tary National Guard, and of reinforcing the active
army and the Mobile Guard by such mobilised Na-
tional Guardsmen. It was calculated that from every
battalion of the Sedentary National Guard about a
company of mobilised men might be obtained, and
four of such companies were to form a marching bat-
talion, to the men of which the best arms would be
given, especially the breech-loaders, which were up to
that time distributed without any rule throughout the
Sedentary battalions.

By the end of the first week of November the new
organisation of the forces of Paris was completed, and

326 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

we must here give some information respecting it
The collective forces of the capital were divided into
three armies. Of these, the First Army, nnd^ Grene-
ral Thomas, was composed of the National Guard of
the Department of the Seine, 266 battalions; of a
weak " legion " of cavalry, and of a legion of artil-
lery. It was destined for service within the walls^ and
to man the main eticeinte, being distributed along
separate portions of it. Of these portions or sectors
there were nine, corresponding to the exterior arron-
dissements. Each sector contained on the average
ten bastions, six of the sectors being on the light, and
four on the left bank of the Seine. We give here
these sectors in succession, with their names and com-
manders, only remarking that the 1st sector com-
menced at bastion No. 1, that the 6th sector ended
with bastion No. 68, the 7th began with bastion No.
69, and the 9th ended with bastion No. 94.
The sectors then were : —

1. Bercy, General Baroilhet

2. Belleville, General Callier.

3. La Villette, Vice^ Admiral Bosse.

4. Montmartre, Rear-Admiral Cosnier.

5. Les Temes, Rear-Admiral du Quilia

6. Passy, Rear-Admiral Fleuriot de Langle.

7. Vaugirard, Rear-Admiral de Montaignac

8. Montpamasse, Rear-Admiral M^uet

9. Des Gobelins, Rear-Admiral de Challier.

The command of the artillery on the right bank of

THE THREE ARMIES OF PARIS. 327

the Seine was given to General P^lissier, on the left
to General de Bentzmann.

The Second Army of Paris, destined for great oper-
ations in the open field, was placed under the com-
mand of General Ducrot, who had as Chief of the Staff'
General Appert It was composed of such of the old
regiments as still existed, of marching regiments, and
of Mobile Guards, and was divided into three Army
Corps and one division of cavalry. The appellation
of 1 3th aijd X 4th Corps, which the Corps of Vinoy
and Ducrot bore up to October, now died out ; and
the Second Army of Paris had now its 1st, 2d, and
3d Army Corps. The 1st Corps (Blanchard) con-
sisted of the three divisions of MaJroy, De Maud'huy,
and Faron; the 2d Corps (Kenault) of the three
divisions of Susbielle, Berthaut, and De Maussion;
the 3d Corps (D'Ex^a) of the two divisions of Belle-
mare and Mattet. Finally, the division of cavahy
(Champ^ron) had but three regiments.

The Third Army of Paris, the command of which
was originally retained by General Trochu, but was
soon afterwards delegated to General Vinoy, with
Lieutenant-Colonel Pechin as chief of the staff', was
intended to defend the detached forts, and also to
undertake local sorties. It was made up of marching
regiments. Mobile Guard, sailors, marines, custom-
house men, wood-rangers, and, lastly, of Mobilised
National Guard. The whole of these were divided
into seven local divisions — ^namely, the 1st division.

328 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

General Soumain ; the 2d, Yice-Admiral de la Bon-
eifere le Noury ; the 3d, General de Liniers ; the 4th,
General de Beaufort ; the 5th, General Corr^ard ; the
6th, General d'Hugues; the 7th, Kear- Admiral Po-
thuau ; and, in addition, a weak division of cavahy
under General de Bemis. The 2d division of this
Third Army was soon afterwards constituted as an in-
dependent Corps for the defence of St Denis.

The numbers of these armies in the early part of
November may be estimated as follows : —

The First Army at 160,000 men.
The Second „ 90,000 „

The Third „ 100,000 „

the Mobilised National Guard not being included in
these estimates.

329

CHAPTER XXXIIL

ENTEBPRISES OF THE GEBMAN CAVALBT IN THE ENYIBOKS

OF PABia

Immediatel7 after the investment of Paris was com-
pleted, the four divisions of cavalry which were
attached to the Third and Fourth Armies were
detached on special expeditions. They were to ex-
plore the country on the left bank of the Seine as far
as the Loire, and exact requisitions in order to re-
plenish and keep full the great magazines of the
investing army at Corbeil; and each of them was
reinforced by a detachment of infantry of one or two
battalions of the 1st Bavarian Corps, to render them
more independent in their movements.

The 5tii division of cavalry, Eheinbaben, had ite
headquarters at St Eom. Thence it sent forward, on
the 30th of September, a great part of the 12th
brigade of cavalry (Bredow), with six companies of
infantry, against Les Alluets and Maulle. For the
possession of these villages, and for that of Herbeville,
fighting ensued, the Germans being opposed by French
partisans ; but the artillery of the former, after a time,

330 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

set the places on fire. On the Ist of October, Bredow
destroyed the railway along the left bank of the Seine
to Bouen, close to Giverney, and occupied Mantes.
Advancing still in the direction of Evreux, Bredow
learnt, on the 4th of October, that the French troops
with which he had before had to deal had concen-
trated at Pacy. On the 5th, therefore, he attacked
that place and Aigleville, drove out the enemy, and
sent forward a detachment, which met with no op-
position, as far as Evreux. On the Eure he collected
large supplies of forage and of cattle, which were for-
warded to the German magazines before Paris.

While these enterprises were being carried out by
Eheinbaben, the 6th division of cavalry moved on his
left along the railway from Versailles, through Bam-
bouillet as far as Chartres. On the 2d of October it
sustained a first skirmish with some men of the
Mobile Guar^ at Rambouillet. On the 4 th, Colonel
von Alvensleben was detached with the 1 5th brigade
of cavalry, one battery, and two companies of Bava-
rians, to reconnoitre the town of Chartres. In the
wood of St Hilarion he came upon the advanced-guard
of a detachment of troops of the French National and
Mobile Guards assembled at Epemon, but speedily
driving them in, he on the same evening gained pos-
session also of the town of Epemon. On the 5th,
Alvensleben occupied himself in levying requisitions,
and returned on the 6th with the greater part of his
brigade to Rambouillet, laden with rich booty, having

BURNING OP ABLIS. 331

left a few detachments pushed forward in advance.
One of these, a squadron of the 16th regiment of
Hussars, was quartered in Ablis, a prosperous village
near the railway through Vend6me to Tours. These
horsemen were attacked unawares by Franc-tireurs
during the night from the 7th to the 8th of October,
and were either slain or dispersed, but few only suc-
ceeding in escaping. On the 9th of October, AbHs,
the inhabitants of which were accused of being privy
to the surprise, and of rendering service as guides,
was scientifically burnt to the ground.

This was the first act which clearly announced the
commencement of the " war of terror,'^ although accusa-
tions had been long before made by each party against
the other of not observing the recognised usages of war.
We must confess that, after a careful observation, we
do not attach much importance to such charges, for
war is certainly in itself a cruel afiair, and the savage-
ness with which during a battle every man, even the
most humane, becomes fiUed, is a natural phenomenon
the effects of which cannot be restrained ; and, more-
over, such accusations have of late become a kind of
fashion. In the war of 1870 the Geneva Convention
gave rise to many such recriminations. But whoever
regards the matter impartially must admit that not a
few of the determinations of the Conventions could only
be carried out by abolishing war altogether. As, for
example, how can one party prevent its shells, which
now range two miles or more, from sometimes striking

332 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

the enemy's ambulances, engaged maybe in coUectiiig
the wounded? But many of the French charges
soon fell through. Thus it was asserted by them
that the Germans/ notwithstanding the St Feteia-
burg Convention, made use of explosive projectiles
for their small arms. For field-guns, bb is weU known,
such are the only projectiles now in use — a circum-
stance which exemplifies the confusion which prevails
as to humanising war. But French doctors have
themselves explained how it stood with regard to this
alleged use of explosive bullets, and from their state-
ments it appears that the French troops mistook small
fragments of the thin coating of lead which coveis
the projectiles fired from the German breech-loadiiig
ordnance for fragments of explosive projectiles from
small-arms.

The cruelties, again, which may have been com-
mitted by the German troops in Bazeilles on the day
of Sedan may well be overlooked, for they at aB
events were committed in the heat and fury of battle ;
and it cannot be expected that soldiers, when their
blood is up, and they are hot with furious fighting,
shall always listen to the counsels of humanity ; and
the same may be said also of the events which took
place at Epense.

But the burning of Ablis was altogether another
matter; and this cold-blooded destruction, calmly
ordered and deliberately executed, stands in a very
difierent category of deeds. And such acts happen now

BURNING OF ABLIS. 333

ever more frequently; and to-day, in the nineteenth
century, they are announced with all the candour and
self-sufficiency that characterised the " great " Cajsar
when he informed the Senatus Fopulusque Romanus
that he had caused the right hands to be cut off some
thousands of Gallic men who had dared to rebel
against the same Senatus Fopulusque Romanus, and
especially against him, the Imperator.

We have given ourselves much trouble to find out
a case where such a manner of conducting war on a
system of terror has led to any good result, but we
have been unable to discover any. Even the much-
extoUed Manhds, fighting on a confined theatre of
war, and simply against bands of brigands, were unable
to effect anything with it. Napoleon I. lost much in
Spain by waging war in such a manner. Moreover,
we are most fully persuaded that the German soldiers
who were ordered to carry out the cold-blooded de-
struction of this peaceful and prosperous village went
to the work with heavy hearts ; for must they not
have thought of their own houses ? And still more,
we are convinced that the higher German officers who
gave such commands gave them sadly also, and gave
them only because they believed, in good faith, that
good would arise from them. In our conception, that
is precisely a delusion. For, in the first place, such-
like experiments demoralise the best army ; men soon
grow accustomed to anything, and why may not
German soldiers do hereafter in their Fatherland, from

334 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

pure love of them, those things which they did in
France by compulsion. The indifference to acts of
horror which characterised condemned murderers
in the second decennary of our century, accompanied
them from the times when, a^ soldiers of the first
Napoleon, they were participators in, or witnesses of,
similar deeds in Spain. In the second place, again,
such means will never lead to a peace, but only to a
compulsory cessation of hostilities ; and it is certainly
no advantage for us in civilised central Europe to
retrograde two thousand years in such a manner. Can
the annihilation of a civilised nation be advantageous
to another civilised people ? No I and this we can
say without judging this matter from a higher and
really civilised point of view, by merely applying to
this particular case the laws of political economy,
which have been so long and generally preached.

On the left, again, of the 6th division of cavaby, the
4th, Prince Albrecht of Prussia, operated along the
railroad from Patis by Arpajon, Etampes, Angerville,
Toury, and Artenay, to Orleans. On the left bank of
the upper Seine, the heights of the C6te d'Or branch
off to the south from the plateau of Langres, while
the Morvan mountains trend away to the south-west
towards the Loire between Nevers and Decize. From
these latter, again, a chain of hills branches off, which,
approaching the Loire at Cosne, runs along with it
into the neighbourhood of Orleans, where it turns
again to the north-west, to terminate finally in the

ORLEANS. 335

hills of Perche upon the peninsula of Cherbourg ; and
it is this chain of but low elevation which separates
the basin of the Seine from that of the Loire. The
only water-courses of any importance flowing from
this water-shed are the Essonne and the Eure, which
run into the Seine, and the Mayenne, the Sarthe^ and
the Loire, all of which join the Loire. The highest
point of the chain is between Gien and Orleans, where
it rises up to about 600 feet above the level of the
sea, or 100 feet above that of the valley of the Loire.
In the Perches, towards the peninsula of Cherbourg,
it attains at some points an elevation of 900,* and
even of 1300, feet; and from them branches run off
into the peninsula of Bretagne»

The chain of heights which we could only charac-
terise as the water-shed between the Seine and the
Loire, and which has in reality no general name, is
covered on the right bank of the Loire from Gien to
Orleans by the extensive forest of Orleans, and on this
abuts on the north, between the Eure and the canal
of Briare, the extremely fertile plateau of Beauce.
Coming from Paris on the Orleans railway, Beauce is
reached by Etampes, and the forest of Orleans by
Chevilly ; and on the more eastern line, through Males-
herbes and Pithiviers> the forest of Orleans is reached
at Neuville aux Bois.

The town of Orleans, with 50,000 inhabitants, lies
on the right bank of the Loire, and is at the main
junction of the railways which unite the east, and the

336 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

west with the south of France. The principal com-
munications from Bordeaux and Toulouse to Paris
also run through Orleans, aud the town, although cer-
tainly unfortified, forms a natural tSte-du-pont for the
enterprises of the French troops assembled on the left
bank of the Loire for the relief of Paris. To the
fiouth of the Loire, adjoining Orleans, the barren un-
fertile plains of the Sologne extend between the Dhui
and the Sauldre westward towards Blois ; on them,
under the Second Empire, large plantings of fir-trees
had been carried out, which at present cover about
1000 square miles.

The 4th division of North German cavalry stood
on the 4th of October in Toury. On the 5th a French
detachment, which was estimated too highly at a
division, advanced from Orleans northwards. The
4th division, threatened on its flank, retired into tiie
northern boundary of the Beauce to Etampes, and to
Authon to the west of it, and sent information of
what had occurred to the Crown-Prince of Prussia.

337

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE ENCOUNTEB A'T ARTKNAT — THE OOCUPATION OF OBLEANS
BT THE OBRMAKS, AND ITS BEGONQUBST BY THE BATTLE
or OOITLMISB.

The French troops which had penetrated on the 5th
of October northwards through Toury, belonged to
the germa of the Army of the Loire, composed at that
time of ther 15 th Army Corps alone. The Corps num-
bered in serviceable combatants 30,000 men, infantry
and cavahyv and wa& under the command of Qeneral
De la Motterouge. This General was bom in 1802,
and received his military education in the School of
St Cyr. In 1852 he became brigadier-general, and in
1855 in the Crimea general c^ division. In the year
1859 he commanded in Italy the 1st division of
M'Mahon's Corps. In 1867 he retired into the re-
serve, and in 1869 was returned to the Corps Legis-
latif as an official candidate with a large majority over
his opponent, Glais-Bizoin. General De la Motterouge
had a well-merited fame as a good soldier, but he
never made the slightest pretensions to the character
of a military "genius.'' He knew full well that he

VOL. II. Y

338 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

could not relieve Paris with the 30,000 men whom
he had at his disposal, and he therefore confined him-
self to reconnoitring in the direction of the capital.
Probably he would have done better if he had still
further limited his movements. Evil-minded people
assert that his parliamentary opponent drove him on
beyond the proper mihtary boundary. How far this

When the Crown-Prince of Prussia received in-
formation of the occurrence at Toury, he at once
formed a detachment under the command of General
Von der Tann to oppose the advance of the French
Army of the Loire, the real strength of which was
unknown, but which it was wiser to estimate at a too
high rather than at a too low rate. The headquarters
of Yon der Tann were at that time in Longjumeau,
the home of the gay postillion whom the celebrated
singer Wachtel, himself a postboy once, represented so
welL Under the command of the General were placed
the greater part of his own Corps, the 1st Bavarian,
the 22d division of the 11th North German Army
Corps, the 4th and 2d (Stolberg) divisions of cavalry.

Yon der Tann was first to advance to Arpajon
to take up the 4th division of cavalry. On the 7th
of October he arrived there, and on the 8th pushed
forward his advanced-guard through Estrechy upon
Etampes. The French, however, made no attempt
to push forward, but on the contrary retired be-
fore the Germans^ whereupon Yon der Tann was

FIGHT AT ART£NAY. 339

ordered to undertake himself an offenBive move-
ment against the line of the Loire. Complying with
these directions, he on the 10th of October encountered
at Artenay Longerue's brigade of cavalry, which had
been strengthened by a few companies of rifles. A
battle ensued, in the course of which Longerue was
remforced by General Reyau's division, and thus in-
creased in numbers, the French maintained themselves
in Artenay until 2.30 p.m. ; but the Germans then
bringing into action superior forces, their adversaries
were compelled to commence a retreat^ which was con-
tinued as far as the western part of the forest of Orleans.
At 6 A.M. on the next day, the 1 1th of October, Von
der Tann began to advance again upon Orleans. On
his extreme right was the 4th division of cavalry,
which sought to penetrate to the Loire itself ; on the
left of this the 22d division (Wittich) was to march
by Sougy, Hudtre, Briey, and Boulay, upon Ormes ;
in the centre was the 1st Bavarian Corps ; and on
the left the 2d division of cavalry, to observe the
forest of Orleans and to explore and take possession
of as much of it as possible. Of the centre — ^that is,
of the 1st Bavarian Corps — ^the 4 th brigade advanced
upon Orleans along the road through Chevilly, on its
left the 3d brigade moved upon St Li^, while the 1st
brigade followed the 4th as a reserve. As they ad-
vanced, the 3d brigade met with a somewhat stubborn
resistance. During the combat which consequently
followed, the advanced-guard of the 22d division, the

340 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

32d regiment, remained in support to the south of
Boulay. The artillery of the division, supported by
a few Bavarian batteries, deployed between Briey and
Gidy, and after fighting for some hours, the French
were obliged to yield, although they had received
considerable reinforcements, especially at Ormes, fix)in
the leffc bank of the Loire. General De la Motterouge
had, in fact, ordered all his troops to withdraw into
the 1^ bank of the Loire and into the Sologne, a
movem^QLt which naturally could not be effected with-
out a certain amount of disorder. It was therefore
not really necessary for the Prussian batteries to bom-
bard the open town of Orleans, as they afterwards did,
at 5 P.M., frwn Ingre ; for, under any circumstances.
General Yon der Tann could have made his triumphal
entry into the city on the evening of the 11th of
October,

M. Gambetta was deeply imbued with the revolu-
tionary principles of 1793. He therefore at once
superseded General De la Motterouge, because this
latter had not been able to gain a brilliant victory
with 25,000 young and barely-organised troops op-
posed to 40,000 well-disciplined Germans. But to
be consistent, ought not Gambetta to have caused
the guillotine to be prepared for every defeated
leader? Ought he not to have sent to the army
civil commissioners with unlimited plenipotence, and
with orders to place themselves always at the head of
the troops engaged ? Ought he not indeed to have

OCCUPATION OF ORLEANS BY THE GERMANS. 341

himself assumed the command of the main army to
make it invincible ?

It is in general true that one man alone can never
achieve very great things in any matter ; he must be
supported. In war it often happens that a leader
acquires great military renown without in the least
meriting it, simply because the elements of the army
which he chances to command are good and excellent
But if the God of War himself stood at the head of a
host whose components were nothing worthy he would
not be able to prevail. This is an indisputable tlniism.
A good leader may arrive at some results with very
moderate tools, but too much must not be demanded
from him. General De la Motterouge might have
manoeuvred so as to render it difficult for General Von
der Tann to gain possession of Orleans, and he might
also have made the position of the latter afterwards
in and about the town very uncomfortable ; but it is
difficult to understand how he could have prevented
the capture of the open city, considering the quantity
and quality of the forces at his disposal Experienced
generals called upon to op^*ate with very young troops,
may make mistakes through expecting too much fix)m
them, and regarding them as old soldiers ; but M. Gam-
betta, who required that General De la Motterouge
should hold Orleans at any cost, had certainly not
the slightest comprehension of the relative value of
military forces.

De la Motterouge was superseded in t^ command

342 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

of the Army of the Loire by General D'Aurelles de Pala-
dines. This General, who was bom in 1803, and had
been in the reserve forces since 1869, had been edu-
cated in the Military School of St Cyr ; and haying
spent the greater part of his time of service in Africa,
had afterwards distinguished himself in the Crimea,
at first as brigadier-general, and then as general of
division. He was not actively employed in the cam-
paign of 1859 in Italy, but nevertheless rendered
important services in his post as commander of the
9th Military Division (Marseilles), by promptly for-
warding men and mat&riel to the field army«

After he succeeded to his new command, Greneral
D'Aurelles gradually received considerable reinforce-
ments — ^to the 15th Army Corps a 16 th was added,
and then the nucleus of a l7th. Thus strengthened,
he determined, towards the end of October, to make
an attack upon Von der Tann's Corps, and, if possible,
to surround and cut it off. To this end the main body
of his forces was to cross the Loire to the westward
of Orleans at Mer, Beaugency, and, if practicable, at
Meung, and then advance upon the line - Ormes-St
P&re h, By ; while a strong detachment watched and
disquieted Orleans from the Sologne, and the right
wing, under General Palli^res, composed chiefly of
cavalry, passed over the Loire to the west of Orleans
at St Benoit, and completed the surrounding move-
ment from that side.
Such an operation, to be successful, must be executed

BEGONQUEST OF ORLEANS BY THE FRENCH. 343

with the greatest precision and rapidity. But these
two elements of success were scarcely to be expected
from young troops with the existing insufficiency of
their leaders and the inadequateness of their equip-
ment — ^there being, among other things, a great lack of
means of transport. With improvised troops, such as
those of General D'Aurelles, only the most simple opera-
tions should be imdertaken. The men may possess great
bravery, but none of the other qualities essential to the
success of complicated movements can be looked for.
On the French side there was much nonsense talked
after the first misfortunes about the so-called ** secrecy
of operations." For our part, we believe that when exe-
cution follows rapidly upon conception, it is scarcely
necessary to attempt to keep the affair secret from the
enemy ; and that when, on the other hand, long weeks
elapse between the time when the plan is formed and
the day when it is carried out, then even the most
perfect preservation of the secret by the inspired
journals will not avail anything — ^unless, indeed, a
most unexampled degree of carelessness and ignorance
may be attributed to the hostile general and his staff,
who would naturally not merely seek for information
in the newspapers, but would presumably bethink
themselves of, and provide for, every contingency.

As early as the first days of November, General
Von der Tann received intelligence that French de-
tachments, coming partly from the west and partly
from the left bank of the Loire, had strongly occupied

344 THE WAB FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

the line on his right flank, from Mer on the Loire
to Morde on the Loire, and especially the forest of
Marchenoir. At that time he had present in Orleans
one division of his Bavarian Ciorps ; the other was
pushed forward into the Sologne, while the 22d divi-
sion had been detached to Chartres. Of cavalry, only
the 2d division was completely at his disposal With
it, therefore, he made reconnaissances; and from
the information collected, and from the reports of
spies, he became assured by the 7th of November
that the main body of the French Army of the Loire
intended to attack him on the right flank. Li order,
therefore, to be able to await the arrival of the 22d
division, ai^d of any further reinforcements which
might be sent to him from the blockading army
around Paris, Von der Tann, on the 8th of November,
evacuated Orleans, leaving behind in the town only
the sick and a regiment of his Corpi^ and took up a
position on the highroad from Orleans to Chateau-
dun, between St Pfere k By and Onnes, having his
advanced troops pushed forward to Coulmier and
Huisseau. It will perhaps not be superfluous to call
to mind here that during the last days of October and
the first of November M. Thiers was in Paris and
Versailles attempting to negotiate an armistice.

On the morning of liie 9th the detachment of Grer-
man cavalry which was moving westwards through
Coulmier came very early, at about 7 A.M., upon
French troops, which moved forward to oppose them.

RECONQUEST OF ORLBANS BY THE FRENCH. 345

and a very obstinate fight ensued along the front
Coulmier-Huisseau, and especially on the right wing
of the Germans at Coulmier. The French had
brought up all the artillery which they had ready,
and on that day were very superior in that arm to
their adversaries. The young French infantry be-
haved very well, particularly as an active advance was
not demanded from them; and therefore, as it liecame
dusk. Von der Tann withdrew slowly upon St P^re k
By, in the direction of Artenay ; and from the latter
place again on the following day^ the 10th, upon
Toury, where on the succeeding night the 22d divi-
sion joined communication with hinu

There is no doubt that the surrender of Orleans
created a great impression in the German head-
quarters at Versailles, and was considered to be of
more importance than in our opinion it really was.
Orders were at once issued to despatch more troops to
reinforce Von der Tann, and large forces had just
become available for this purpose through the capitu-
lation of Metz. Later on we shall see the use which
was made of these and other troops.

On the French side. General D'Aurelles de Paladine
spoke very modestly of the victory of Coidmier, both
in his report to the Govenunent of National Defence
and also in the order of the day addressed to his
troops. Very different was the tone of M. Gambetta,
who saw in this success the beginning of the relief of
Paris — as if this could be effected by a young army

346 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

which at a very high estimate numbered but 60,000
men, against 200,000 Gennans accustomed to war.
Moreover, he on this occasion so exaggerated the
services of the brave and gallant D'Aurelles, that any
wise man could foretell the certainty, not merely the
probability, of his speedy dismission*

347

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE EAST — ADVANCE OF THE 14TH GER-
MAN ARMY CORPS UPON THE OIGKON, AND THE BATTLE OF
OIGNON ON THE 22D OF OCTOBER.

During the last days of the siege of Strasburg,
the Franc-tireurs aod the men of the Mobile Guard
gathered together in the southern Yosges had greatly
molested the communications of the Germans. As
soon^ therefore, as Strasburg fell, General von Werder
sent a column under General von Degenfeld into the
Yosges to reconnoitre, to scatter any bands of parti-
sans it might encounter, and to instil dread into the
inhabitants. This colimm was composed of 6 bat-
talions, 2^ squadrons, and 12 gun& It was sub-
divided into three minor columns of 2 battalions
each, with a proportion of artillery and cavalry. Of
these smaller divisions one, the northern one, was
to cross the Yosges, moving from Mutzig by way
of Schirmeck ; and the other two, the central and
southern ones, were to traverse the mountains by
various routes, and unite finally at Raon I'Etape and
Etival in the valley of the Meurthe.

348 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

The departure of these troops from the neighbour-
hood of Strasburg took place on the 1st of October —
the northern column leaving a battalion behind at
Schirmeck to keep up the connection between Degen-
feld. in the Vosges and Werder at Strasburg. In
crossing the mountains great difficulties were experi-
enced, as the French had everywhere destroyed the
roads or thrown barricades across them, although it
is true that these obstacles were only partially and
but very weakly defended. The first encounter was
a very unimportant one on the 5th of October at
Raon TEtape, at the confluence of the Plaine and the
Meurthe.

Meanwhile, by a decree from the headquarters at
Ferri^res, dated the 30th of September, the formation
of a 14th Army Corps under General Werder was
ordered. This was to consist of the troops which had
taken part in the siege of Strasburg, with the exception
of the landwehr division of the Guard, which was sent
to join the troops before Paris, but was replaced by a
new landwehr division, and of the 4th reserve divi-
sion, Schmeling, which had been assembled in the
beginning of October at Freiburg in the Breisgau.
Simultaneously with this order, Werder received on
the 4th of October his promotion to general of infantry,
and on the same day further instructions to cross the
Vosges with his Corps to attack and disperse the French
troops which were being collected and organised
there. For this operation he had just then only the

OPERATIONS IN THE EAST. 349

Baden field division and the 30th Prussian regiment
of infantry, as it was necessaiy to employ the land-
wehr division of Treskow and Schmeling partly in
garrison duties and partly in subduing the smaller
fortresses in Upper Alsace. To Degenfeld he sent
directions instructing him to regard thenceforth his
detachment as the advanced-guard of that part of the
1 4th Army Corps abeady in movement towards Epinal.

On the 5th and 6th of October the troops of Werder
which were to be employed in these operations left
the neighbourhood of Strasburg for the Vosges. On
the 6th, Degenfeld, in compliance with special orders
appended to the general instructions, determined to
occupy St Di^, and commenced to ascend the Melirthe.
But as he marched, he was attacked at Etival on his
right flank by strong detachments of French coming
from the direction of Kemberviller and Bruy^res.
This obliged him to halt, and a violent engagement
followed, which concluded finally with the repulse of
the French attack, but still the onslaught had rendered
it impossible for the Germans to reach St Di^ on that
day. Degenfeld therefore remained during the 7th
with his main body to the south of Etival, to secure
the descent of Werder into the valleys of the Plaine
and Babodot, but sent forward detachments to St
Di^, La Bourgonce, and St B^noit, which places they
reached without encountering further resistance.

On the morning of the 8th of October, Werder's
columns, under Generals Laroche du Jarrys and Keller,

350 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER,

desceDded into the valley of the Meurthe at Etival
and St Di& On the 9th, Werder, having now con-
centrated all his available troops, established his head-
quarters at Eaon TEtape, and on the same day set
his advanced-guard in motion from the Meurthe to-
wards the Moselle upon Epinal, following it on the
10th and 11th with his remaining forces in four
columns. During the advance small skirmishes took
place at Bemberviller, Bronveulieres, and Amould,
and on the 12th at Epinal. On the same day Werder
removed his headquarters to this last-named town,
and thence ordered various reconnaissances towards
the west and south. On the 15th he departed, mov-
ing along the Basle-Paris Railway, through Xertigny
and St Loup to Besoul. This town was occupied
on the 18th, .the Germans meeting with no serious
opposition to their advance ; but still, whenever the
faintest attempt at resistance was made, they shot
down unmercifully and levied heavy contributiona

During their march upon Besoul, the Germans re-
cognised that the centre of the French resistance in
this district was the important town of Besanjon.
The town is situated upon a peninsula formed by the
Doubs, has 47,000 inhabitants, and is surrounded with
modem fortifications, which cause it to be ranked as
a fortress of the first class. In the campaign of Caesar
against Ariovistus, the town, the old Besontio, served
as a main point of support to the former. Between
it and Besoul runs the Oignon. Close to the point

ADVANCE UPON THE OIQNON. 351

where it flows into the Saone, antiquarians have dis-
covered at Moigte de Broye the battle-field of Mageto-
briga, upon which the proud king Ariovistus defeated
the Gauls so decisively that his haughtiness thence-
forth knew no bounds.

Werder could scarcely think of attempting to take
Besangon with the forces which he had ; but by push-
ing forward in that direction he might nevertheless
succeed in enticing forth and defeating in the open
field considerable portions of the young French army
forming in those parts. By this, many advantages
woidd be gained. The Germans, no longer imme-
diately threatened by French field forces, would be
able to operate with greater freedom in Alsace, and
to undertake, besides, expeditions in any direction
with their otherwise disposable troops. Moved by
these reasons, therefore, Werder resolved to pursue
the French in the direction of Besan9on, and to this
end caused his forces to move on the 22d of October
in three columns upon the Oignon : upon the right
wing, against Le Pin, Prince William of Baden ; in
the centre, against Etuz, Degenfeld; on the left^
against Voray, General von Keller ; while the reserve,
under General von Krug, was to advance behind the
centre upon Oizelay, smaller detachments covering
and clearing up the flanks.

Degenfeld and KeUer soon met with considerable
resistance, especially the former, after he had gained
the passage of the Oignon at Cussey. Throughout

352 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

the day he sustained the battle nearly alone, only
receiving support from the Prussian reserve brigade
of Von Exug, — Keller and Prince William coming up
somewhat too late. But spite of this the Germans
were again successful, and that against a considerable
numeri^superiority:

Werder, however, dared not venture to think of
taking Besan^on. As he had operated on the Oig-
non, so must he proceed likewise more to the west-
ward, and therefore he now directed his troops
upon Gray on the Saone, a thriving town of 8000
inhabitants. By the 24th of October he had concen-
trated there the main body of his troops, and sent de-
tachments to the west and north-west towards the
southern slopes of the plateau of Langres. These de-
tachments had to sustain various sUght skirmishes,
making in them many pnscmers from among the rural
population, and shooting down by martial law,
without troubling their consciences much about con-
ventional rules, those who defended their country.

On the 28th of October, Werder deployed his avail-
able troops along the Yingeanne, a small affluent of
the Saone, flowing into the latter just above the point
where it receives the Oignon. In this neighbourhood,
about Prauthoy on the Yingeanne, the battle between
Csesar and Yercingetorix was most probably fought,
whereby the latter was obliged to retire upon, and
shut himself up in, Alesia (AUse St Beine), the siege
of which plays such a prominent part in military his-

ADVANCE UPON THE OIGNON. 353

tory. Werder established his headquarters in Eeneve.
On the 29th of October he purposed advancing upon
the old capital of Burgundy, Dijon, intending to occupy
that open town of 40,000 inhabitants, which was only
a good day's march distant from the positions on the
Vingeanne. With this intention he had already, on
the 28th, pushed forward the brigade of Prince Wil-.
liam of Baden to Mirebeau on the Beze ; but on the
mormng of the 29th he received orders to establish
himself in Gray, and from this important raUway
junction to cleanse the environs of the plateau of
Langres, and so secure the left flank of the advance of
Prince Frederic Charles, who, after the capitulation of
Metz, was to repair to Troyes on the Seine.

Werder accordingly resolved to march with at least
one portion of his troops upon Gray ; but as intelli-
gence had been received from Prince William that
Dijon had been abandoned by the French forces, he
at the same time determined to send forward to that
toii^Ti the two Baden brigades of Prince William and
of Keller, giving the chief command to General von
Beyer, who had again assumed the leadership of the
Baden field-division.

VOL. II.

354

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THB OGCUPATIOK OF DUON OK THE 3I8T OF OCTOBER.

On the moming of the 30th of October Beyer com-
menced his march, Prince William's brigade starting
from Mirebeau, and that of Keller from Tabnaj on
the Lower Vingeanne. In opposition to the earlier
information which had been received, Prince William
encountered opposition even when he anived at
Magny St Medard — ^very slight, certainly, at first, but
gradually increasing in obstinacy as the Badensers
advanced further towards Dijon by Arc sur Tille,
Varois, and St ApoUinaire.

The truth was, that on the 28th of October the
French troops in Dijon had, by the wish of the muni-
cipal authorities, evacuated the town. It would really
have been an act of insanity to have attempted to
defend as a fortress the open city, although it is true
that the scanty remains of some old fortifications still
existed, especially on the eastern side, the quarter
from which the Badensers would attacW. If the
military forces of France, which up to that time
had been assembled, had been properly concentrated

OCCUPATION OF DIJON, 355

in good time^ instead of being disseminated in the
defence of separate localities^ more might have been
effected. But now the population, especially the
working classes, opposed the decision of the local
authorities, and, on the 29th, crowded before the
prefecture and forced the new prefect to promise
the defence of Dijon. Marching battalions of the
line came up in all haste from Beaune, Auxonne,
and Langres, and to these Mobile Guards of the
Departments Cdte d'Or and Loz^re, and Mobilised
National Guards of Dijon, joined themselves. These
collective troops placed themselves under the com-
mand of Colonel Fauconnet, and he at once took the
necessary measures for defence — pushed forward a
detachment, which was the one that offered the first
serious resistance to the Badensers, to Magny St
Medard, occupied St ApoUinaire and the suburbs of
Dijon, particularly those of St Nicolas and St Pierre
to the east of the town, where the gardens are for the
most part surrounded by walls, caused them to be
placed in a state of defence, and then formed with
the remaining a reserve on the south of the town.

Colonel Fauconnet himself fell early in the forenoon
in the fight about ApoUinaire, and the defence of that
place became afterwards somewhat irresolute, so that
after three o'clock the Germans were able to turn to
the attack of the suburbs of St Pierre and St Nicolas.
There the infantry struggle was excessively stubborn.
The Germans suffered so considerably, that at 4 p.m.

356 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

General Beyer judged it expedient to cause the attack
to be more thoroughly prepared for by the artilleiy,
and accordingly the infantry was withdrawn and col-
lected under cover of a bombardment. The Baden
guns continued to fire upon the town until after
dusk; and meanwhile Prince William's brigade
was concentrated in St Apollinaire and Varois,
where also Beyer established his headquarters, and
Keller's brigade on the left between Coutemon and
Queligny. While the Baden troops were in the act
of concentrating, a French balteHon came np from
Langres, and, covered by the darkness^ fell upon the
right flank of the Germans, occasioning there a short
but violent combat, consequent on which it was com-
pelled to retreat.

By 7 P.M. Dijon was on fire in seven places, and
General Beyer then ordered the cannonade to cease.
At half-past three o'clock next morning a deputation
of the municipality appeared before the outposts of
Prince William's brigade, and in the name of the
town demanded a capitulation ; but before this the
French troops had been induced to quit Dijon, and
had taken their departure during the night. The
terms of the surrender were concluded at 10 A.M.,
tixe main condition imposed upon the town being
that it should furnish supplies for 20,000 German
troops, but only on regular requisitions through the
authorities ; and as a surety for the fulfilment of its
promise to keep the peace, the town was to lodge a

OCCUPATION OF DIJON. 357

sum of half a million of francs, which, however, would
be repaid if it kept its word.

At 1 P.M. Beyer entered the town with his troops.
His losses amounted to 245 killed and wounded, those
of the French to about double that number. Only
Prince William's brigade of Baden troops had really
come into action, as Keller, by reason of the long
march which he had to make, only arrived very
late before Dijon. The town having been thus
gained posseasion of, was left in charge of General
Be jer, whilst Werder, in the first two days of Novem-
ber, moved with the remainder of his troops from Gray
upon Besoul, in the environs of which the Franc-tireu«
were again begixming to exhibit great activity.

358

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE 4TH BESERVE DIVISION — THE
GAPTUBE OF SCHLETTSTADT AND mCU BBSISAOH.

We have already made mention of the 4th Prussian
reserve (landwehr) division under the command of
General von Schmeling. After it had been concen-
trated at Freiburg in the Breisgau, it crossed the
Rhine in ferry-boats on the 1st and 2d of October
at Neuenberg, into Alsace^ its immediate task being
to take the smaller fortresses of that district Schme-
ling sent a detachment to the left to the rich manu-
facturing town of Mtilhausen, and turned himself to
the north against Neu Breisach. This small town,
which contained barely 3500 inhabitants, and had
been fortified by Yauban as a bastioned octagon, was
summoned to surrender, but refused; and even a bom-
bardment from field-guns during the night from the
7th to the 8th of October, failed to induce the com-
mandant to change his mind. General Schmding
therefore determined to diverge for the present against
Schlettstadt — Cleaving only a detachment behind, be-
fore Neu Breisach and Fort Mortier, a detached work

CAPTUBB OP SCHLBTTSTADT. 359

situated to the east of the fortress towards the
Rhine.

Schlettstadt, which has 10,000 inhabitants, is, as
a town, of much moire importance than Neu Breisach.
As a fortress, it is, like the latter, a bastioned octagon ;
but its siege seemed to be more easily undertaken,
as it lies nearer to Strasburg, and Schmeling could
therefore the more easily procure thence his siege
mat&rieL. As a fact, he was reinforced fix>m the latter
place by siege-artillery, detachments of fortress artil-
lery, and companies of fortress engineers, and also by
a regiment of landwehr (Ostrowski) from Tree^ow's
division.

The commandant of Schlettstadt, Squadron Chief
De Reinach de Foussemagne, answered a summons to
surrender somewhat haughtily. Schmeling, therefore,
after he had received his reinforcements and finished
his preparations, first caused a four-gun battery to be
constructed to the east of the fortress and of the
ground inundated by the waters of the 111 and of the
Blind ; and a cannonade was commenced with success
on the 20th of October. Shortly afterwards, during
the night from the 22d to the 23d of October, the
first parallel was opened, at a distance of only 500
to 700 paces from the eastern side of the fortress ;
and at the same time six batteries, for a total number
of 32 guns, were built in rear of it. From these a
fire agaiDst the ramparts and the town could be com-
menced on the morning of the 23d. The batteries.

360 THE WAB FOB THE BHINE FBONTIEB.

and also the first parallel, were completed with an
incredibly small loss.

On the morning of the 24th the white flag was
hoisted over Schlettstadt. By noon the capitulation
was arranged, and Prussian battahons were marched
into the town by the special wish of the commandant,
to restore order, as the garrison, after refusing to con-
tinue the defence, gave themselves over to every
possible excess. By four o'clock in the afternoon,
these men (in number about 2000, chiefly Mobiles),
having by the terms of the surrender become prisoners
of war, were removed from the fortress, and on the
following day Schmeling formally entered the town.
In it were found 120 guns. Ostrowski's regiment of
landwehr was left behind for the present to garrison
the fortress ; and on the 26th, Schmeling departed for
Neu Breisach, taking with him the greater part of his
division, and the siege-artillery concentrated before
Schlettstadt

On the 2d of November several Prussian batteries
came into action against this latter place, at first on
the north side at Wolfganzen and Biesheim ; while
simultaneously with them three Baden batteries on
the right bank of the Ehine at Alt Breisach opened
fire upon Fort Mortier, which was only armed with
seven guns. This latter work. Captain Castelli of
tiie 74th regiment of the line commandant, capitu-
lated early on the morning of the 8th of November.
On the 10th the commandant of the fortress, lieu-

CAPTUBE OF NEU BREISAGH. 361

tenant-Colonel Lostie de Kerhor, was also obliged to
run up the white flag. On the morning of the 11th
the Prussians occupied the gates of Neu Breisach;
and an hour later the French prisoners of war, about
5000 men, marched out. In the fortress the Prussians
found 108 girns^ as well as many supplies.

362

CHAPTER XXXVIIL

THE OPERATIONS OF THE 14TH NORTH GERMAN ARMY CORPS

DURING THE MONTH OF NOYEMBER.

DiJON had fallen into Werder's hands on the 31st of
October ; but at the same time he had been compelled
to retire again upon Besoul, to keep up his connection
throufi^h the Vosfi^es with Alsace and the troops which
we. L™g fl. Genn«.y. Af^™cce«Lw.
won, things appear very insignificant which in their
toe l«>m^ ?^«^rpl»nl»»,: «><l ».w
General von Werder was obliged to cany on war
with all his disposable forces, much as he had learnt
to do in the Caucasus, against ''impalpable bands/'
as they are called in the present military phraseology,
— ^against the people, as will be said in a future
military nomenclature. But Werder had, moreover,
other strategical problems to solve, which were quite
in accordance with modem military ideas. Thus he
had to subdue such of the fortresses of Alsace as had
not already been taken or attacked by the Germans. It
has just been related how the 4th landwehr division ob-
tained possession of Schlettstadt and Neu

BELFORT. 363

Meanwhile a new landwehr division had been concen-
trated on the 26th of Octob^ at Kehl, under General
von Debfichitz ; and as this sufficed to form the garrisons
required in Alsace, TreskoVs division was set free to
undertake other tasks. It was therefore destined for
the attack on Belfort, and towards the end of October
commenced to move towards it

Belfort, situated on the Savoureuse — ^a river which,
uniting with the Haleine, flows into the Doubs — is a
small town with 7500 inhabitants, most of whom do
not dwell in the town itself, but in the suburb De
France on the west, of Montbeliard on the south, and
of Breisach on the north-east The original fortifica-
tions of the town date from Vauban. They are con-
structed on his third system, with tower riduitSf and
would form a regular pentagon if the citadel did not
project forward in place of one of the bastions, and if
a second bastion was not much retired for the sake
of obtaining mutual defence. The citadel itself. La
Roche, is in shape a small casemated crown-work,
with three enceintes rising terrace-like one above
another, and with ditches hewn in the rock. It
stands on the south-eastern corner of the town forti-
fications, and has all the imposing effect of a strong
old mountain-ckstle. It also was built, essentially in
its present form, by Vauban.

The so-called intrenched camp extends on the
north-eastern side of the town fortifications on both
sides of the highway to Eolmar. It consists of

364 THE WAB FOB THE BHINE FBONTIEB.

two main works — the forts of La Justice on the
south, and of La Miotte on the north, of the road.
These two are connected with one another by a con-
tinuous fortified line, and with the main enceinte of
the town by two more fortified lines of a very simple
construction, and the interior of the camp lies much
lower than the works which surround it Fort Miotte
has a high watch-tower, visible from a great distance.

The railway from Basle to Paris, comiug from
Mtilhausen, runs on the south of the town from east
to west to the village of Danjoutin on the Savour-
euse, and then crossing the river turns nearly north,
and passes through a deep cutting to the west of
the suburb of De France. When the line was con-
structed, the company was obUged to build a work
to cover this suburb and the bridge leading from it
over the cutting. This fortification took the form of
a very flat homwork with a long front. It was run
up in earth without any covered spaces, and did not
at all fulfil the requirements of modem warfare.
Accordingly, when in 1867 the system of fortresses in
France was subjected to a revision, the construction
of new detached forts at Belfort was projected, one
of which, the Fort des Barres, was to be placed
immediately in front of this homwork, and a second,
and perhaps a third, on the chain of heights of the
Perche.

The construction of the Fort des Barres was com-
menced in 1868, and was completed in all essential

BBLFORT. 365

details before the outbreak of the war of 1870, so that
only unimportant additions were then necessary.
The work was in the form of a large crown-work,
having its gorge towards the old railway fort, and
closed with a wall. It had large traverses and cava-
liers in the bastions and on the curtains, especially
on the northern or right half, with a view to SSlade
it from the spurs of the Mont du Salbert, which run
out close before the fort, or at least at a distance
which may be called close considering the range
of modem artillery. The work was also amply pro-
vided with exceuTntly-arranged bomb-proof iaces.
The chain of heights of the Perche runs along the
left bank of the Savoureuse, in front of the citadel,
and therefore on the south-east of the fortress, be-
tween the villages of Danjoutin and Perouse, and
from its hills a good view is obtained towards the
Jura Mountains over the " Gap of Belfort." Upon
this chain, General Lecombe in 1815 threw up
several earthworks, which greatly contributed to
the defence of the town against the Allies. Since
1867 no less than six projects have been drawn
up for the permanent fortification of the Perche.
At first it was designed to build two detached forts
there, but afterwards it was determined to have but
one; and the variety of opinion which existed was
as to the form which this solitary work was to take.

When in 1870 war was declared against Germany,
nothing had been settled on this point ; still less had

366 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

the work on the Perche been commenced. After
hostilities had been begun, two field-forts were under-
tSpken there — one upon " La Haute Perche " to the
eastward, another on " La Basse Perche " to the west-
ward towards Danjoutin; a similar one was also
placed to the south of the Fort des Barres at Belle-
vue, and, moreover, the latter work was joined by
an intrenched line to the fortified camp near La
Miotte.

The Government of the Republic named as com-
mandant of Belfort Denfert-Eochereau, chief of bat-
talion in the engineers, who at the same time was
promoted to colonel. The choice thus made was an
excellent one, which certainly cannot be said of all
the selections made at this time. Colonel Denfert had
for many years conducted the works about Belfort,
knew the place and its weak points thoroughly, and
was, moreover, a simple, quiet, thoughtful man, who
had only concerned himself about his country, not
about i^e Empire.

Belfort was certainly, through its fortificationa, a
much stronger place than Schlettstadt and Neu Brei-
sach, and even than Strasburg itself ; but still it was
not by any means so difficult to take as the Prussian
newspapers described it to be. It was only necessary
to find the weak point to attack ; but this was not
discovered here any more than it was at Paris. It
would seem that no^emers coming fromaflat dis-
trict are inordinately impressed by mountains— even

BELFORT. S67

by eminences which in a mountainous country would
only be called hills^--and that they are thereby led to
take wrong steps in spite of aU their wisdom.

On the 2d of November, TreskoVs troops began to
appear before Belfort, and on the 3d the place was
invested, although certainly very incompletely. On
the 4th, General von Treskow addressed a very pe-
cidiar letter to Denfert In it he did not directly
demand the immediate surrender of Belfort, but he
gave the commandant all manner of counsels as to
how the horrors of the siege with which the place was
threatened might be alleviated. Denfert replied in a
very humorous manner that the surest means to spare
the inhabitants such a trial would be for Treskow to
depart from the neighbourhood ; but that, neverthe-
less, he had no great expectations that this most cer-
tain remedy would be adopted, and that, accordingly,
he had taken other precautionary measures. Later
on Belfort acquired a still greater importance, and we
shall be obliged to return to it again. For the pre^
sent we leave it, only remarking that for many weeks
nothing took place in its vicinity, save skirmishes be-
tween the Germ^ investing forces, endeavouring to
complete and maintain their blockading line, and the
French garrison, which was striving to disquiet its
adversaries and prevent the carrying out of their
efforts. The investment was at first very incomplete,
and the correspondence with the country outside was
for a long time uninterrupted.

368 THE WAE FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

Treskow's division being thus cpmmissioned to sur--
round, and, if possible, take Belfort, which it was now
in any case important to obtain possession of, as the
German Government had declared that it intended
to keep Alsace after the conclusion of peace, the 4th
landwehr division (Schmeling) could be called up,
after the fall of Neu Breisach, to protect the etappen
roads (lines of communication), and to form a reserve
for those troops of Werder's Corps which were dispos-
able for field operations. With these, therefore, Wer-
der could now act more boldly, and on the 12th of
November he concentrated them on the Saone between
PontaiUier and Auxonne. The Baden brigades were
also called up &om Dijon, and it was determined to
take possession of Auxonne. This small utterly un-
important town of 7000 inhabitants was placed in the
old French scheme as a fortress of the third class,
chiefly because of its citadel ; and Werder convinced
himself by reconnaissances with his advanced troops
that the place was occupied, that the garrison was on
the alert, and that the fortress could not be taken by
a coup de main.

Meanwhile the French forces in the neighbourhood
availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by the
removal of the German troops from Dijon to reoccupy
it. Werder was greatly displeased at this, and there-
fore, on the 1 4th of November, he again inarched upon
that town. These French troops in the environs of
Dijon belonged to Garibaldi's Corps. The latter, who

GARIBALDIANS REOCCUPY DUON. 369

originally had established his headquarters in Besan-
gon, and had there fallen out with General Cambriel,
had moved to D61e, and afterwards, owing to the
energetic advance of the Germans, to Autun. At
that time his Corps numbered barely 10,000 service-
able men. His Chief of the Staff was a General Bor-
done — according to French accounts an apothecary
of Avignon, who, having involved himself with the
tribunals by an immoderate love of his art, had with-
drawn into Italy, and there changed his French name
of Bourdon into Bordone. How much truth there
may be in the reports of the criminal antecedents of
M. Bourdon we do not know, but we can certainly
affirm that this M. Bordone was a most singularly-
chosen Chief of the Staff for a Corps which was to be
raised to a strength of 20,000 men, and which was,
by its activity in la petite guerre, to exercise the
influence of one of 50,000. As a matter of fact, this
man seemed chiefly to have waged war against the
priests, and against the former adherents of the Em-
peror Napoleon IlL But if Garibaldi was badly
enough served on his inmiediate staff, he had at the
same time* some right good partisan officers in the
Corps, ready for any bold and daring undertaking,
among whom may be named his two sons, Menotti
and Bicciotti.

It was, then, a detachment of Garibaldians which
occupied Dijon after the Badensers had quitted it
Upon receiving information thereof, Werder, not hav-

VOL. II. 2 A

370 THE WAR FOR THE RH^nB FRONTIER.

ing any prospect of being able to take Auxonne im-
mediately, marched again, on the 14th of November,
upon the capital of Burgundy, and, as he approached,
the Garibaldian party again withdrew. Werder,
upon this, while his main force was being concen-
trated about Dijon, despatched two columns south-
wards, the one upon Nuits, the other upon D61e.
The first of these took the enviable route along the
Cdte d'Or, through the districts where Chambertin
and Clos de Yougeot grows, and established itself
firmly in those parts, as is easily conceivable, enjoy-
ing the good wine, and with its aid despising the
dangers threatened by hostile roving parties. The
column sent against Ddle had to sustain a more im-
portant combat at St Jean de Losne on the Saone,
where they found the bridge destroyed.

Werder, holding fast to IKjon as a central point,
confined himself to smaller undertakings against the
volunteer corps^ which, continually attacked and dis-
persed, ever appeared again and again at other points.
As early as the 10th of November he had sent a
detachment to the Seine, to seek to establish a com-
munication with the army of Prince Frederic Charles.
It arrived, after incessant fighting with Franc-tireurs,
as far as Chatillon cm the Seine, but was then com-
pelled to retreat, and succeeded in reaching Bijon
again through the Cdte d'Or, having suffered but un-
important losses. Shortly afterwards, Chatillon was
occupied by a battalion (Unna's) of the 16th regiment.

SURPRISE AT CHATILLON. 37l

of landwehr, and two squadrons of the 5th hussar
regiment of the reserve. These troops established
themselves only too comfortably in the town, and in
the night of the 19th of November were surprised by
a detachment of Garibaldians under Bicciotti Gari-
baldi. So successful was the attack, that the German
troops only escaped with difficulty, losing 120 men
and 70 horses; and reassembling on the north of
Chatillon, commenced a retreat in a north-easterly
direction, at first upon Chateau- Villain.

As early as October there had been much talk in
the leading circles of France of a great operation in
the east. An army was to be assembled there, and
advancing from south to north was to disturb Alsace
and break up the Strasburg-Paris railway, the vital
artery of the German armies before Paris. Un-
doubtedly such an operation was rightly conceived ;
but in October the new organisations had made but
very small progress, and if the French forces were
not forthcoming in excess, it must seem to be more
natural to assemble together everjrthing that could be
raised for the great and nearest objective of relieving
Paris by the most direct means. And in reality the
operations in the east were postponed, and we shall
hereafter see how they were only earnestly under-
taken at a much later period.

372

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE FIRST AND SECOND GERMAN ARMIES
AFTER THE FALL OF METZ — THE CAPITULATION OF SOIS-
SONS AND THIONYILLE.

That simplicity of the operations of flie German
armies which characterised the first periods of the
war, could not continue as hostilities went on. The
wider the theatre of war became extended, so much
the more did the struggle assume the character of a
national war, and so much the more numerous were
the secondaiy objects which the German leaders had
to pursue and cpnsider. It will therefore be well to
recall to mind from time to time the general picture
of the war, since the many details tend to obscure
and confuse it

In the middle of November, the picture, then, is
generally this : —

In Paris an army has been formed, numerically at
least very strong; the capital still maintain]^ itself
and submits, in a wonderful and unexpected manner,
to the hard conditions which a state of siege brings
with it, while all the resources of intellect are being
employed to discover new means of resistance, and

STATE OF THE WAK IN NOVEMBEIL 373

by their application to prolong the defence. Still it
can be foreseen that the great town must be finally
compelled to surrender, by famine or by something
similar, unless relief arrives in time. The German
troops before Paris are in quality superior to the
newly-created French forces, and the more time they
gain to intrench themselves, the more capable will
they become of repelling, even though they be inferior
in numbers, the sorties of the garrison of Paris,
however well conducted such enterprises may be.
Everything depends upon a timely reHef from with-
out Should such an attempt succeed in reaching
the German Unes, a sortie by the mobile army in
Paris will contribute greatly to the success of the
enterprise ; but this army cannot possibly execute
alone that which the whole of France should endea-
vour to bring to pass.

For the relief of Paris there is ready the Army of
the Loire, under General D'Aurelles de Paladine. Its
advance along the road from Orleans to Paris, and the
battle of Coulmier, have obliged General Von der
Tann to withdraw in the direction of Paris ; but
reinforcements are hurrying up from all sides to the
Bavarian commander, and it will be very difficult for
the Government of National Defence so to strengthen
D'Aurelles' army as to enable it to operate successfully
against the Germans. The command of the army of
observation, detached against the Army of the Loire,
is intrusted for the present to the Grand Duke of

374 THE WAB FOE THE RHINE FRONTIEB.

Mecklenburg. D'Aurelles can seek and may find
connection with the Anny of the West, which is
forming in the camp of Conlie, or even with the
Army of the North, whkh is based on Lille and
Amiens, and he may be farther reinforced by all the
new troops which are being organised in the south-
west of France, and which are assembling about
Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Neveri Will D'Aurelles de
Paladine — will they who are to organise and bring to
him forces for the attainment of tha great objective
— succeed in being beforehand with Ihe Grermans 1

In the east things are nearly equally balanced.
Werder cannot possibly achieye my great results wiih
the numerically small {qic^b at his disposal. But
in this zone of operations the French are no stronger
than he is, for although superior to him in numbers
and in material resources, they are still divided by
local considerations. The departments on the shores
of the Mediterranean do not do all that they might,
because they regard the war in itself as being stiU
far diBtant from them. The department of the Rhone,
and those adjacent to it, care principally to provide
for tbd defence of Lyons ; and thus Werder is only
opposed by a few French detachments, which trouble
him certainly, but which he can keep in check. His
most important task is the capture of Belfort, but
this he seems almost to have forgotten, being busied
with collateral enterprises, and finding it apparently,
more agreeable to capture large undefended towns in
the open country.

STATE OF THE WAB IN KOVEMBBB. 375

Meanwhile Metz and Bazaine's army have capit-
ulated. From the first days of September until the
end of October, the First and Second German Armies
stood united under the command of Prince Fred-
eric Charles before this principal place of arms of
France; but after the surrender of Metz, the two
hosts were now again separated. The First Army,
placed under the command of General von Manteuffel,
and consisting of the 1st, 8th, and 7th Corps, was to
engage the French Army of the North, advancing
itself in a direction from east to west, between the
Belgian frontier and the lower Seine. It was farther
to capture such strongholds as were stiU unsubdued
in those parts, and to establish communication with
the coast, so that if the supplies by land should fail,
provisions for the army might be procured by sea
from and through England,.

The Second Army, upder Prince Frederic Charles,
was to march to the south-west towards the middle
Seine, and establish thd communication between
Werder in the east and the Army of the Loire, imder
the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, which,
after the battie of Coulmier, had been concentrated
in the west. According to the aspect that affairs
might assume. Prince Frederic Charles could throw
his forces either eastward or westward, and wherever
he might direct the main body of his troops, there
would the chief command devolve upon him, a field-
marshal since the taking of Metz. Thus he would
assume either the leadership of the forces of Werder

376 THE WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

or of those of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-
SchweriiL

The 2d Coips, Fransecky, of the army of Prince
Frederic Charles, was given up to the army of the
Crown-Prince of Prussia, and arrived before Paris on
the 12th of November, where the Wiirtemberg divi-
sion was also united to it With his remaining Corps,
the 9th, the 10th, and the 3d, the last on the left
wing, Prince Frederic marched at first southwards
towards the upper Seine and the railway from
Paris to Mtilhausen. His headquarters moved from
Pont k Mousson by Commercy, Ligny, Montier
sur Saulx (5th of November), Joinville, Doulevent
(8th of November), and Brienne, to Troyes, where he
arrived with a part of the 9th Corps and the 1st divi-
sion of cavalry on the 10th of November.

On the 6th of November the advanced-guard of the
3d Corps had an encounter with Franc - tireurs at
Boulogne on the road which leads from Blesmes on the
Strasburg railway to Chaumont on the Mtilhausen line,
in the valley of the Upper Mame. The French were
defeated, but on the following day they again made a
stand at Berthenay, immediately below Chaumont,
and defended themselves obstinately against the new
attack of the Prussians, but were finally again obliged
to retreat, whereupon they retired upon the remark-
able fortress of Langres, and a brigade was at once
pushed forward to observe it. On the 5th and 6tib of
November the sappers of the Second German Army

ADTANOE OF THE FIBST AND SECOND ABMIES. 377

restored the many places broken up by the French on
the railway Blesmes-Chamnont.

In consequence of the battle of Coulmier, Prince
Frederic Charles, with the greater portion of his troops,
was called up to the Loire, to engage there the army
forming for the relief of Paris. His headquarters, with
the centre of the army, left Troyes to advance upon
the Loire by way of Villeneuve TArchevSque and
Sens^ along the Yonne and the Paris-Dijon-Pontarlier
railway, and we shall soon see him again actively
engaged.

Of Manteuffel's army, the 7th Corps remained be-
hind for a time on the Moselle — one division garrison-
ing Metz, while the other was detached to besiege
Thionville ; of the 1st Corps, one division advanced
before M^zieres, and a brigade of the other before La
F^re, in order to subdue also these two fortresses on
the Meuse and Oise ; jQnally, the 8th Corps, the 3d
brigade of infantry, and the 3d division of cavalry,
moved upon the Somme upon Amiens, to engage there
the so-called French Army of the NortL The ad-
vanced-guard of the 3d division of cavalry came first
into collision with the French at Le Quesnd, between
Boye and Amiens, on the 23d of November ; and later
on we ahaU Mow the operations of these txoops after
that day. For the present, we have yet to notice the
fall of those fortresses which capitulated before the end
of November, and which have not yet been mentioned.
During the time that the Germans lay encamped

378 THE WAB FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER.

around Metz^ the small fortress of Thionville had been
also observed by them, and at times molested The
troops to whom this duty was intrusted were con-
tinually changed, and their special enumeration would
be of no general interest But after the fEdl of Metz
it was resolved to seriously attack Thionville, and
Lieutenant - General Eameke, chief of the 14th
division, was commissioned to undertake the task.
Eameke, bom in the year 1817, entered the Prussian
Corps of engineers in 1834, became a captain in 1850^
and was at the same time removed to the General
Staff. From that date he was employed on the Staff
in the Ministry of War and in the Prussian embassy
in Vienna^ commanding also occasionally bodies of in-
fantry. In 1861 he became a colonel, and in 1865 a
general. In the campaign of 1866 he was Chief of
the Staff of the 2d Corps ; in the following year he
returned to the engineers, and at the end of it was
intrusted with their leadership. In 1868 he was
appointed lieutenant-general, and at the outbreak of
the war of 1870 was placed at the head of the 14th
division — although it was certainly remarkable to
remove the chief of the engineer from his post just
at the beginning of a struggle in which presumably
fortress warfare would play an important part

On the 13th of November, Eameke ordered the
complete investment of Thionville. His headquarters
were established at Hayange, and a post of observation
was erected on the chateau of Serre. On the 16th
of November the building of the batteries was com-

TAKING OP THIONVILLK 379

menced; on the 19th and 20th the siege-trains amved

from Metz, and the batteries were at once armed,

while simultaneously the investing lines were drawn

in closer. At 7 o'clock on the morning of the 22d the

bombardment waa commenced, when the following

batteries opened fire on the unhappy little town : 1st,

at Oberjtttz (Haute Yutz), 4 field-batteries— 18 6-

pounders and 6 4-pounders; 2d, by the wood of

Ulange, 4 24-poTmder guns, 4 12-pounders, and 4

1 3-inch French mortars from Metz ; 3d, at Gassion,

4 short rifled 24-pounders ; 4th, 8 long rifled 24-

poimders from 2 batteries on the right and left of the

chateau of Serre ; 5th, in the wood of Weymarange,

4 short 24-pounders; 6th, before Weymarange, 8 12-

pounders in 2 batteries ; 7th on the road from Grande

Hettange to Thionville, near the Maison Eouge, 12

12-pounders in 3 batteries. For service in these

batteries, which lay between 2000 and 6000 paces

from the fortress, 13 companies of fortress artillery

were concentrated.

The fire, which was opened at 7 A.M. on the 22d of
November, and which was at first answered with
vigour by the besieged, was continued until noon,
and then, affcer a pause of one hour, recommenced and
carried on with the same spirit until 4.30 p.m. After
that hour it was continued slowly but unintermittedly
throughout the whole night, while at the same time
the first parallel was opened against the west front of
the fortress at a distance of 800 paces. On the 23d
of November the besieged hoisted the white flag at

380 THE WAB FOB THE RHINE FBONTIEB.

1.30 P.M. They did not, however, wish to capitulate,
but merely demanded an armistice of twenty-four
hours, with free permission for women and cMdren
to depart. The request was not granted; but Kameke
gave a respite until 6.30 p.m., to allow the determina-
tion to capitulate to ripen. This, however, not being
agreed to by the expiration of the given time, the
Prussians again commenced the bombardment.

At half-past ten o'clock on the forenoon of the 24th
of November, the besieged again ran up the white flag
upon the church tower, and this time the negotiations
for the surrender were speedily concluded. On the
morning of the 25th, the Prussians occupied the gates
of the town ; and at two o'clock in the affcemoon, the
French garrison — ^about 4000 men — marched out as
prisoners of war, and laid down their arms before the
gate of Saarlouis. The Prussians found 200 guns in
Thionville.

The fortress of Verdun, which, as we have seen, had
been cannonaded as early as the end of August^ was
more closely surrounded after the 25th of September
by a detachment of the Third Army ; and when the
surrender of Paris did not take place in the expected
short time, and the security of the communications of
the German armies in France with Grermany became of
greater importance, a serious attack upon Verdun was
prepared. In the night between the 11th and the
12th of October, the Germans occupied the villages of
Thierville on the left and of Belleville on the right
bank of the Meuse. In the following night batteries

TAEIKG OF VERDX7N, S0I8S0NS, HAM, LA FERE. 381

were constructed at both these places. But although
the necessity of a regular siege of the place was pro-
vided for, a bombardment in reality sufficed to bring
about the surrender of Verdun. Immediately after
Bazaine's capitulation at Metz, considerable supplies
of artillery became available for the besiegers, and the
cannonade assumed a very violent character. On the
8th of November, Verdun was compelled to surrender,
when 4000 prisoners, 136 guns, and 23,000 stands of
arms, fell into the hands of the Germans.

Soissons was obliged to yield as early as the 16th
of October, after being bombarded for fourteen days
by landwehr belonging to the Grand Duke of Meck-
lenburg's Corps. By its surrender 4700 Frenchmen
became prisoners of war; and, moreover, the Ger-
mans found 128 guns well supplied with ammunition,
a war-chest containing 92,000 francs, a well-stored
provision-magazine — ^sufficient for a division for five
months — and depots of clothing and equipments.

The Castle of Ham, famed as the prison of Napoleon
III. after the failure of his attempt at Boulogne, was
evacuated by its garrison, and occupied on the 21st
of November by Prussian horsemen of the 3d division
of eavaby. La F^re, the main claim of which to dis-
tinction is the fact that Napoleon I. first entered as an
artillery subaltern into the regiment bearing its name,
capitulated with 2000 men and 70 guns after a two
days' cannonade. The capture of Amiens is so in-
timately connected with the operations of ManteufieFs
army, that we pass it by for the present. All these

382 THE WAR FOR THE BHIKE FRONTIER.

small fortresses without detached works were of no
real service to the defence — ^their capture simply in-
creased in a very easy way the trophies of the Ger-
mans ; and it may be said that their resistance would
have been terminated even sooner than it was, if the
fortress warfare had not been somewhat carelessly
carried on by the Germans.

But although small fortresses proved to be useless
in this war, the large ones played a most important
part in it At a future time we shall return to this
subject, and show that if these great fortresses failed
to prove fatal to the German invasion, it was owing
solely to the unhappy French military organisation,
which only allowed improvised armies to be brought
upon the theatre of war after the events of September.

END OP THE SECOND VOLUME.

pmnmo by wtlliam blackwood avd soim, mnvBUiwiR.

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